The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find in a world sample from 1970 to 2002 that the anticipation of receiving new programs immediately after a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival

The golden hello and political transitions

© 2017. We analyze the influence of IMF and World Bank programs on political regime transitions. We develop an extended version of Acemoglu and Robinson's [American Economic Review 91, 2001] model of political transitions to show how the anticipation of new loans from international financial institutions can trigger political transitions which would not otherwise have taken place. We test this unexplored implication of the theory empirically. We find that the anticipation of receiving new loan programs immediately af ter a political regime transition increases the probability of a transition from autocracy to democracy and reduces the probability of democratic survival

Decentralization as a Disincentive for Transnational Terror? An Empirical Test

Using panel data for a maximum of 109 countries over the years 1976-2000, we empirically analyze the impact of decentralization on the occurrence of transnational terror. Taking account of the potential simultaneity between terror and decentralization, our results show that expenditure decentralization robustly reduces the number of terror events in a country, while political decentralization has no impact

The Rise of Market-Capitalism and the Roots of Anti-American Terrorism

We examine the role of market-capitalism in anti-American terrorism, differentiating between level- and rate-of-change-effects associated with market-capitalist development and their respective relationship with anti-U.S. violence. Using panel data for 149 countries between 1970 and 2007, we find that higher levels of capitalist development - consistent with the capitalist-peace literature - coincide with less anti-American terrorism, while the marketization process has inflammatory effects on anti-American terrorism. These findings are further corroborated by system-level time-series evidence. We argue that a higher level of market-capitalism is associated with less anti-American terrorism by creating economic interdependencies and a convergence of pro-peace values and institutions, while the destabilizing effects of the marketization process may stem from the violent opposition of various anti-market interest groups to economic, politico-institutional and cultural change initiated by a transition towards a market economy. These interest groups deliberately target the U.S. as the main proponent of modern capitalism, globalization and modernity, where anti-American terrorism serves the purpose of consolidating their respective societal position. Our findings that the U.S. may ultimately become a less likely target of transnational terrorism through the establishment of market economies, but should not disregard the disruptive political, economic and cultural effects of the marketization process in noncapitalist societies

Does Income Inequality Lead to Terrorism? Evidence from the Post-9/11 Era

We study the influence of income inequality on terrorism. Using cross-national data for 79 countries for the 2002-2012 period, we show that endogeneity matters to the inequalityterrorism relationship, e.g., because of the distributional effects of terrorism. Once endogeneity is properly accounted for by means of an instrumental-variable approach, higher levels of income inequality result in more terrorist activity. This finding is robust to different definitions of the dependent variable, different estimation techniques and different instruments for income inequality. Our finding that inequality fuels terrorism is consistent with relative deprivation theory which argues that conflict results from frustration over the actual distribution of economic resources within a society

The Rule of Law: Measurement and Deep Roots

This paper does three things. First, based on a limited number of theoretically established dimensions, it proposes a new de facto indicator for the rule of law. It is the first such indicator to take the quality of legal norms explicitly into account. Second, using this indicator we shed new light on the relationship between the rule of law and the political system of a country. Presidential governments tend to score significantly lower on the rule of law indicator than parliamentary ones. Many presidential democracies are even outperformed by dictatorships. The observation that political systems hardly predetermine the rule of law level raises the question why the authority of law differs across societies in its capacity to constrain the behavior of public officials. Third, because of this question, we investigate the roots of the rule of law. As theory on this specific question is scarce and the rule of law is closely associated with income levels, we draw on a topical literature that deals with the fundamental causes of economic development. Our findings suggest that specific determinants of long-run development operate via the rule of law, whereas others are not related to the rule of law at all. Our empirical evidence does, however, support not only the “primacy of institutions” view, but also the important role that human capital, which European settlers brought to their colonies, played in historical economic development

An Outlier-Robust Extreme Bounds Analysis of the Determinants of Health-Care Expenditure Growth

Hartwig (2008) has presented empirical evidence that the difference between real wage growth and productivity growth at the macroeconomic level is a robust explanatory variable for deflated health-care expenditure growth in OECD countries. In this paper, we test whether this finding is robust to the inclusion of additional covariates, applying different versions of Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to data for 33 OECD countries over the period 1970-2010. As far as it is statistically feasible, all macroeconomic and institutional determinants of health-care expenditure growth that have been suggested in the literature are included in the EBA. Furthermore, we analyse to what extent outliers in the data influence the results using an outlier-robust MM estimator. Our results confirm Hartwig's earlier finding. A number of additional both covariate- and outlier-robust determinants are also identified

Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis