An Experimental Analysis of the Ultimatum Game: The Role of Competing Motivations

This paper forwards a new way of accounting for the experimental evidence related to the Ultimatum Game. We argue that players in this game have reasons to be both fair and self-interested, but the balance between these two considerations cannot be expressed in terms of a tradeoff. We test our thesis by perturbing the Ultimatum Game in a way that emphasizes the force of self-interest considerations; the evidence we collected provides support for our thesis.

An Essay on Decision Theory with Imperfect Recall

In this paper, I seek to establish a framework in which solutions to imperfect recall decision problems can be suitably examined. I introduce a strategy concept which is an extension of the standard concept employed since von Neumann and Morgenstern, and show how it may provide optimal solutions to problems which feature forgetting. For a technical analysis, I provide a characterization of imperfect recall extensive forms, a crucial input into future studies on the properties of optimal extended strategies. Also, I discuss further issues in decision theory with imperfect recall, including the prospects of induced forgetting when preferences change during the problem.decision theory, bounded rationality, imperfect recall, strategy

On Optimal Solutions of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall

In this paper, I study decision theory in the presence of imperfect recall. I use an extension of the standard strategy concept for the analysis of extensive form games in order to examine the range of imperfect recall problems for which there exists an optimal solution. Optimality is assessed in terms of perfect recall problems associated to their corresponding imperfect recall problems.decision theory, impefect recall, strategy

Deviations from interest rate parity in small open economies: A quantitative-theoretical investigation

It is frequently claimed that the expected yield on emerging market bonds commands a premium. Here we investigate the sources of this phe-nomenon. A stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy is analyzed numerically to derive conditions for interest rate premia. The novelty of our approach is to attack the problem form the point of view of state dependent policy mixes. The main lessons include: if positive premia were universal, then 1. nominal rigidity should be important, 2. monetary authorities might have a current account stabilization motive, and 3. taste shocks possibly play some role in emerging markets.

Notes for an Essay on the Soft Budget Constraint

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39507/3/wp117.pd

Delegation and Delay in Bank Privatization

The paper explains why bank privatization in transition economies is frequently delayed in comparison to privatizing non-financial firms. In the model, the government inherits a distressed bank with bad loans to a representative non-financial firm. The firm will only abstain from wasteful opportunistic behavior if there is a credible to signal that its future budget constraint will be hard. If the government takes over the state-owned bank directly or re-capitalizes and privatizes it immediately, then signaling leads to excessive liquidation. Delay in privatization allows delegating the signaling and can be beneficial because the signaling distortion can be shifted across "types". The analysis assumes a political constraint to sell the state-owned bank to a domestic investor (shallow pockets), but shows also that a Pareto improvement can typically be achieved if a buyer with a deep pocket can be found (foreign investor), Policy implications concerning timing and scope of bank privatization are discussed.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39568/3/wp181.pd

Delegation and Delay in Bank Privatization

The paper explains why bank privatization in transition economies is frequently delayed in comparison to privatizing non-financial firms. In the model, the government inherits a distressed bank with bad loans to a representative non-financial firm. The firm will only abstain from wasteful opportunistic behavior if there is a credible to signal that its future budget constraint will be hard. If the government takes over the state-owned bank directly or re-capitalizes and privatizes it immediately, then signaling leads to excessive liquidation. Delay in privatization allows delegating the signaling and can be beneficial because the signaling distortion can be shifted across "types". The analysis assumes a political constraint to sell the state-owned bank to a domestic investor (shallow pockets), but shows also that a Pareto improvement can typically be achieved if a buyer with a deep pocket can be found (foreign investor), Policy implications concerning timing and scope of bank privatization are discussed.bad loans, delegated signing, delayed recapitalization

Trade Credit Chains and Liquidity Supply

Working Paper Series, Social Science Research Network, 200