Should the Law Governing Maritime Areas in the Arctic Adapt to Changing Climatic Circumstances?

The legal regime of the Arctic maritime areas has for a long time remained on the backburner of international norm creating activities. This can primarily be explained by the inhospitable climate which created natural barriers for human activities and imposed limits on the usefulness of the available technology.At present, however, climate change seems to be responsible for a marked heating up, not only of the mere physical environment of the Arctic, but also of the political tensions concerning the exact legal regime to be applied in the region.This chapter provides a close examination of the present-day legal status of the Arctic. Since almost all territorial claims have been settled in the area, the present contribution will only focus on the Arctic water areas with a special emphasis on navigation. Starting from what seems to have finally become a generally accepted legal cornerstone for appreciating the legal status of these waters, namely the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the chapter will first examine how climate change impacts on this legal regime. Subsequently, the vulnerability as well as the adaptive capacity of the 1982 Convention will be examined. Before drawing some conclusions, ways and means will be looked at for this existing legal system to better meet the new challenges that climate change poses for Arctic waters

Participation in and Compliance with Public Voluntary Environmental Programs: An Evolutionary Approach

The joint evolution of participating and complying firms in a public VA, along with the evolution of the pollution stock is examined. Replicator dynamics modeling participation and compliance are combined with pollution stock dynamics. Fast-slow selection dynamics are used to capture the fact that decisions to participate in and further comply with the public VA evolve in different time scales. Evolutionary stable (ES) equilibria depend on the structure of the legislation and auditing probability. Partial participation and partial compliance can be ES equilibria, with possible multiplicities, in addition to the monomorphic equilibria of full (non) compliance. Convergence to these equilibria could be monotonic or oscillating. Full participation and compliance can be attained if the regulator is pre-committed to certain legislation and inspection probabilities, or by appropriate choices of the legislatively set emission level and the non-compliance fine