Risk-Taking Behavior in the U.S. Thrift Industry: Ownership Structure and Regulatory Changes

This paper is concerned with the relationship between ownership structure and risk taking in the U.S. thrift industry along with the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on this relationship. Our results, based on balance sheet and market measures of risk, suggest that insider controlled thrifts were more likely to engage in risk taking behavior prior to 1989 than were diversely held institutions. FIRREA seems to have curtailed much of the risk taking behavior of these institutions; in fact, some evidence suggests that insider controlled thrifts may have actually engaged in less risk taking behavior than their diversely held counterparts after 1989. We find inverse relationships between risk-taking behavior and levels of institutional shareholdings during all periods. This finding, along with the finding that increased risk-taking does not increase returns to thrift shareholders, suggests that the motive for risk-taking behavior on the part of insider held thrifts may not have been the maximization of the “option” value associated with shares as reported elsewhere. We do find evidence that entrenched managers may have generated significant private benefits for themselves

Risk-Taking Behavior in the U.S. Thrift Industry: Ownership Structure and Regulatory Changes

This paper is concerned with the relationship between ownership structure and risk taking in the U.S. thrift industry along with the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on this relationship. Our results, based on balance sheet and market measures of risk, suggest that insider controlled thrifts were more likely to engage in risk taking behavior prior to 1989 than were diversely held institutions. FIRREA seems to have curtailed much of the risk taking behavior of these institutions; in fact, some evidence suggests that insider controlled thrifts may have actually engaged in less risk taking behavior than their diversely held counterparts after 1989. We find inverse relationships between risk-taking behavior and levels of institutional shareholdings during all periods. This finding, along with the finding that increased risk-taking does not increase returns to thrift shareholders, suggests that the motive for risk-taking behavior on the part of insider held thrifts may not have been the maximization of the “option” value associated with shares as reported elsewhere. We do find evidence that entrenched managers may have generated significant private benefits for themselves

New Dimensions for Wound Strings: The Modular Transformation of Geometry to Topology

We show, using a theorem of Milnor and Margulis, that string theory on compact negatively curved spaces grows new effective dimensions as the space shrinks, generalizing and contextualizing the results in hep-th/0510044. Milnor's theorem relates negative sectional curvature on a compact Riemannian manifold to exponential growth of its fundamental group, which translates in string theory to a higher effective central charge arising from winding strings. This exponential density of winding modes is related by modular invariance to the infrared small perturbation spectrum. Using self-consistent approximations valid at large radius, we analyze this correspondence explicitly in a broad set of time-dependent solutions, finding precise agreement between the effective central charge and the corresponding infrared small perturbation spectrum. This indicates a basic relation between geometry, topology, and dimensionality in string theory.Comment: 28 pages, harvmac big. v2: references and KITP preprint number added, minor change

Bank ownership structure, regulations and risk-taking : evidence from commercial banks in Pakistan

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of the theories concerning the influence of ownership structure on bank risk-taking in the presence of regulations in Pakistan. The sample used in this paper comprises a panel data of 26 banks in Pakistan, for the period from 2000 to 2014. The analysis provides evidence that increase in ownership concentration leads to an increase in bank risk-taking. Managerial ownership is associated with high risk-taking at low and high levels of managerial ownership while at intermediate level, managerial ownership has negative impact on bank risk-taking. Different types of ownership of banks in Pakistan have different impact on risk-taking. While government, family and institutional ownership have a positive impact on bank risk-taking, foreign own- ership has a negative impact on bank risk-taking. Furthermore, the results show that capital regulations are important in influencing bank risk-taking with regard to higher ownership concentration. The findings of this paper suggest that the relation between bank risk-taking and capital regulations typically depends on the type of ownership.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Variation in use of surveillance colonoscopy among colorectal cancer survivors in the United States

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Clinical practice guidelines recommend colonoscopies at regular intervals for colorectal cancer (CRC) survivors. Using data from a large, multi-regional, population-based cohort, we describe the rate of surveillance colonoscopy and its association with geographic, sociodemographic, clinical, and health services characteristics.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We studied CRC survivors enrolled in the Cancer Care Outcomes Research and Surveillance (CanCORS) study. Eligible survivors were diagnosed between 2003 and 2005, had curative surgery for CRC, and were alive without recurrences 14 months after surgery with curative intent. Data came from patient interviews and medical record abstraction. We used a multivariate logit model to identify predictors of colonoscopy use.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Despite guidelines recommending surveillance, only 49% of the 1423 eligible survivors received a colonoscopy within 14 months after surgery. We observed large regional differences (38% to 57%) across regions. Survivors who received screening colonoscopy were more likely to: have colon cancer than rectal cancer (OR = 1.41, 95% CI: 1.05-1.90); have visited a primary care physician (OR = 1.44, 95% CI: 1.14-1.82); and received adjuvant chemotherapy (OR = 1.75, 95% CI: 1.27-2.41). Compared to survivors with no comorbidities, survivors with moderate or severe comorbidities were less likely to receive surveillance colonoscopy (OR = 0.69, 95% CI: 0.49-0.98 and OR = 0.44, 95% CI: 0.29-0.66, respectively).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Despite guidelines, more than half of CRC survivors did not receive surveillance colonoscopy within 14 months of surgery, with substantial variation by site of care. The association of primary care visits and adjuvant chemotherapy use suggests that access to care following surgery affects cancer surveillance.</p

The Virtual Sociality of Rights: The Case of Women\u27s Rights are Human Rights

This essay traces the relationship between activists and academics involved in the campaign for women\u27s rights as human rights as a case study of the relationship between different classes of what I call knowledge professionals self-consciously acting in a transnational domain. The puzzle that animates this essay is the following: how was it that at the very moment at which a critique of rights and a reimagination of rights as rights talk proved to be such fertile ground for academic scholarship did the same rights prove to be an equally fertile ground for activist networking and lobbying activities? The paper answers this question with respect to the work of self-reflexivity in creating a virtual sociality of rights