A case for heuristic optimization methods in forestry

With rising competition for scarce resources, forest managers are increasingly concerned with estimating optimal solutions to complex problems. Heuristic procedures are often useful in solving such problems

Thinning optimization in mixed-species forests

An approach is summarized for estimating optimal thinning and final harvest age for existing, mixed-species stands. The method involves stand-table projection with upgrowth and mortality equations, formulated as an integer-nonlinear programming problem. Random search methods are proposed for estimating optimal cutting prescriptions. Such solution methods warrant further study in forestry, since their use enables broad application of stand-specific modeling results

Estimating Optimal Thinning and Rotation for Mixed-Species Timber Stands Using a Random Search Algorithm

The problem of optimal density over time for even-aged, mixed-species stands is formulated as a nonlinear-integer programming problem with numbers of trees cut by species and diameter class as decision variables. The model is formulated using a stand-table projection growth model to predict mixed-speciesg rowth and stand-structureO. ptimal thinning and final harvest age are estimated simultaneously using heuristic random search algorithms. For sample problemsw ith two speciesr, andom searchm ethodsp rovide near-optimalc uttings trategiesw ith very little computer time or memory. Optimal solutions are estimated for problems with eight initial species/diameter class groups, projected for up to three discrete growth periods. Such solution methods merit further study for evaluating complex stand- and forest-level decisions. FOREST Scl. 31:303-315

Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric Information on Private Environmental Benefits

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the Principal and two groups of agents (landowners): a green' group deriving high private utility from the projects and a conventional' group deriving lower utility. Afforestation projects may be produced in different environmental quality, and we distinguish between two cases, a high quality and a low quality project. We find that the optimal set of contracts under asymmetric information involves two different contracts. One in which green landowners are somewhat overcompensated for projects of high quality, and one where conventional landowners are offered contracts including lower quality projects, compared to the symmetric case, but with compensation equal to his indifference payment. It is the ability to reduce quality requirements along with subsidies offered that allows for revelation of the private information. Finally, we discus how the results obtained may be used in the implementation of incentive schemes

Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions

With increasing numbers of consumers in auction marketplaces, we highlight some recent approaches that bring additional economic, social, and psychological factors to bear on existing economic theory to better understand and explain consumers' behavior in auctions. We also highlight specific research streams that could contribute towards enriching existing economic models of bidding behavior in emerging market mechanisms.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/47034/1/11002_2005_Article_5901.pd

Forest resource economics and finance/ Klemperer

xxii, 551 hal.: ill.; 24 cm

Forest resource economics and finance/ Klemperer

xxii, 551 hal.: ill.; 24 cm