The development of reasoning heuristics in autism and in typical development

Reasoning and judgment under uncertainty are often based on a limited number of simplifying heuristics rather than formal logic or rule-based argumentation. Heuristics are low-effort mental shortcuts, which save time and effort, and usually result in accurate judgment, but they can also lead to systematic errors and biases when applied inappropriately. In the past 40 years hundreds of papers have been published on the topic of heuristics and biases in judgment and decision making. However, we still know surprisingly little about the development and the cognitive underpinnings of heuristics and biases. The main aim of my thesis is to examine these questions. Another aim is to evaluate the applicability of dual-process theories of reasoning to the development of reasoning. Dual-process theories claim that there are two types of process underlying higher order reasoning: fast, automatic, and effortless (Type 1) processes (which are usually associated with the use of reasoning heuristics), and slow, conscious and effortful (Type 2) processes (which are usually associated with rule-based reasoning). This thesis presents eight experiments which investigated the development of reasoning heuristics in three different populations: typically developing children and adolescents between the age of 5 and 16, adolescents with autism, and university students. Although heuristic reasoning is supposed to be basic, simple, and effortless, we have found evidence that responses that are usually attributed to heuristic processes are positively correlated with cognitive capacity in the case of young children (even after controlling for the effects of age). Moreover, we have found that adolescents with autism are less susceptible to a number of reasoning heuristics than typically developing children. Finally, our experiments with university students provided evidence that education in statistics increases the likelihood of the inappropriate use of a certain heuristic (the equiprobability bias). These results offer a novel insight into the development of reasoning heuristics. Additionally, they have interesting implications for dual-process theories of reasoning, and they can also inform the debates about the rationality of reasoning heuristics and biases

Number comparison and number ordering as predictors of arithmetic performance in adults: Exploring the link between the two skills, and investigating the question of domain-specificity.

Recent evidence has highlighted the important role that number-ordering skills play in arithmetic abilities, both in children and adults. In the current study, we demonstrated that number comparison and ordering skills were both significantly related to arithmetic performance in adults, and the effect size was greater in the case of ordering skills. Additionally, we found that the effect of number comparison skills on arithmetic performance was mediated by number-ordering skills. Moreover, performance on comparison and ordering tasks involving the months of the year was also strongly correlated with arithmetic skills, and participants displayed similar (canonical or reverse) distance effects on the comparison and ordering tasks involving months as when the tasks included numbers. This suggests that the processes responsible for the link between comparison and ordering skills and arithmetic performance are not specific to the domain of numbers. Finally, a factor analysis indicated that performance on comparison and ordering tasks loaded on a factor that included performance on a number line task and self-reported spatial thinking styles. These results substantially extend previous research on the role of order processing abilities in mental arithmetic. </jats:p

Understanding health risk comprehension: The role of math anxiety, subjective numeracy, and objective numeracy

Background. Numeracy skills are important for medical decision making as lower numeracy is associated with misinterpreting statistical health risks. Math anxiety, characterized by negative emotions about numerical tasks, and lower subjective numeracy (i.e., self-assessments of numerical competence) are also associated with poor risk comprehension. Objective. To explore independent and mediated associations of math anxiety, numerical ability, and subjective numeracy with risk comprehension and to ascertain whether their associations are specific to the health domain. Methods. Objective numeracy was measured with a 14-item test. Math anxiety and subjective numeracy were assessed with self-report scales. Risk comprehension was measured with a 12-item test. In Experiment 1, risk comprehension items were limited to scenarios in the health domain. In Experiment 2, participants were randomly assigned to receive numerically-equivalent risk comprehension items in either a health or non-health domain. Results. Linear regression analyses revealed that individuals with higher objective numeracy were more likely to respond correctly to the risk comprehension items, as were individuals with higher subjective numeracy. Higher math anxiety was associated with a lower likelihood of correct responding when controlling for objective numeracy, but not when controlling for subjective numeracy. Mediation analyses indicated that math anxiety may undermine risk comprehension in three ways, including through: (1) objective numeracy; (2) subjective numeracy; and (3) objective and subjective numeracy in serial, with subjective numeracy mediating the association between objective numeracy and risk comprehension. Findings did not differ by domain. Conclusions. Math anxiety, objective numeracy, and subjective numeracy are associated with risk comprehension through unique pathways. Education initiatives for improving health risk comprehension may be most effective if jointly aimed at tack-ling numerical ability as well as negative emotions and self-evaluations related to numeracy

The Development and Testing of a New Version of the Cognitive Reflection Test Applying Item Response Theory (IRT)

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a short measure of a person's ability to resist intuitive response tendencies and to produce a normatively correct response, which is based on effortful reasoning. Although the CRT is a very popular measure, its psychometric properties have not been extensively investigated. A major limitation of the CRT is the difficulty of the items, which can lead to floor effects in populations other than highly educated adults. The present study aimed at investigating the psychometric properties of the CRT applying item response theory analyses (a two-parameter logistic model) and at developing a new version of the scale (the CRT-long), which is appropriate for participants with both lower and higher levels of cognitive reflection. The results demonstrated the good psychometric properties of the original, as well as the new scale. The validity of the new scale was also assessed by measuring correlations with various indicators of intelligence, numeracy, reasoning and decision-making skills, and thinking dispositions. Moreover, we present evidence for the suitability of the new scale to be used with developmental samples. Finally, by comparing the performance of adolescents and young adults on the CRT and CRT-long, we report the first investigation into the development of cognitive reflection. Copyright (C) 2015 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Ltd

Mathematics Anxiety and Metacognitive Processes: Proposal for a New Line of Inquiry

This paper presents a proposal for a new area of investigation that connects the metacognition literature, and especially the recently developed meta-reasoning framework, with research into mathematical reasoning, mathematics learning, and mathematics anxiety. Whereas the literature on mathematics anxiety focusses on the end result of learning and problem-solving, the metacognitive approach can offer further insight by a fine-grained analysis of the stages of these processes. In particular, it provides tools for exposing students' initial assessment of tasks and test situations, the targets they set for themselves, the process of monitoring progress, and decisions to stick with or abandon a particular solution. The paper outlines various ways in which the metacognitive approach could be used to investigate the effects of mathematics anxiety on mathematics learning and problem solving. This approach could help in answering questions like: Do anxious and non-anxious learners differ in how they prepare for an exam? Are anxious students more or less prone to overconfidence than non-anxious students? What metacognitive decisions mediate maths anxious participants' tendency to give up on problems too early? Additionally, this line of work has the potential to significantly expand the scope of metacognitive investigations and provide novel insights into individual differences in the metacognitive regulation of learning and problem solving. It could also offer some practical benefits by focusing the attention of educational designers on particular components within the learning process of anxious students.<br /

La ponctuation et les reprises de l’indicible

Marque d’un manque à référer, l’indicible procède de la même manière que la métaphore. Or certains modes d’actions de la ponctuation sur le référé, que l’on analysera comme un processus de non congruence, autorisent à les identifier comme une forme de l’indicible. Cette contribution cherche à en analyser les modalités dans l’innomable de S. Beckett.The unsayable, as a mark of impossibility to refer, proceeds in the same way as a metaphor. Certain effects of ponctuation on the referent, which are analysed as a process of incongruence, allow us to identify them as a form of unutterability. This paper attempts to analyse these types of modality in Beckett’s L’innommable

Can I Count on Getting Better? Association between Math Anxiety and Poorer Understanding of Medical Risk Reductions

Lower numerical ability is associated with poorer understanding of health statistics, such as risk reductions of medical treatment. For many people, despite good numeracy skills, math provokes anxiety that impedes an ability to evaluate numerical information. Math-anxious individuals also report less confidence in their ability to perform math tasks. We hypothesized that, independent of objective numeracy, math anxiety would be associated with poorer responding and lower confidence when calculating risk reductions of medical treatments. Methods. Objective numeracy was assessed using an 11-item objective numeracy scale. A 13-item self-report scale was used to assess math anxiety. In experiment 1, participants were asked to interpret the baseline risk of disease and risk reductions associated with treatment options. Participants in experiment 2 were additionally provided a graphical display designed to facilitate the processing of math information and alleviate effects of math anxiety. Confidence ratings were provided on a 7-point scale. Results. Individuals of higher objective numeracy were more likely to respond correctly to baseline risks and risk reductions associated with treatment options and were more confident in their interpretations. Individuals who scored high in math anxiety were instead less likely to correctly interpret the baseline risks and risk reductions and were less confident in their risk calculations as well as in their assessments of the effectiveness of treatment options. Math anxiety predicted confidence levels but not correct responding when controlling for objective numeracy. The graphical display was most effective in increasing confidence among math-anxious individuals. Conclusions. The findings suggest that math anxiety is associated with poorer medical risk interpretation but is more strongly related to confidence in interpretations