Consensus and democracy in Indonesia : Musyawarah-Mufakat revisited

This paper analyzes customary practices of consensus decision making, called musyawarah-mufakat, as a basis of democratic stability in Indonesia. Musyawarah and mufakat (deliberation and consensus) are a traditional decision-making rule in Indonesia which has often been observed in village meetings. This paper argues that this traditional decision-making rule is still employed even in a modernized and democratized Indonesia, not only at rural assemblies but in the national parliament as well. Furthermore, this consensus way of decision making provides an institutional basis for democratic stability by giving every parliamentary player, whether big or small, an equal opportunity to express his/her interests. On the other hand, this system of musyawarahâ€mufakat decreases political efficiency in the sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted laws in the parliament.Indonesia, Internal politics, Democracy, Political culture, Legislature

Politics of the 1945 Constitution:Democratization and Its Impact on Political Institutions in Indonesia

Introduction : Before 1998, no one could think about the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 1945 Constitution was a product of nationalist who had hard fought for independence from the Dutch colonization. This historical background made it the symbol of independence of the Indonesian nation. Thus, it has been considered as forbidden to touch contents of the 1945 Constitution whereas political leaders have legitimized their authoritarian rulership by utilizing a symbolic character of the Constitution. With the largest political turmoil since its independence, that is, a breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratic transformation in 1998-1999, however, a myth of the "sacred and inviolable" constitution has disappeared. A new theme has then aroused: how can the 1945 Constitution be adapted for a new democratic regime in Indonesia? The Indonesian modern state has applied the 1945 Constitution as the basic law since its independence in 1945, except for around 10 years in the 1950s. In the period of independence struggle, contrary to the constitutional provision that a kind of presidential system is employed, a cabinet responsible for the Central National Committee was installed. Politics under this institution was in practice a parliamentary system of government. After the Dutch transferred sovereignty to Indonesia in 1949, West European constitutionalism and party politics under a parliamentary system was fully adopted with the introduction of two new constitutions: the 1949 Constitution of Federal Republic of Indonesia and the 1950 Provisional Constitution of Republic of Indonesia. Since a return from the 1950 Constitution to the 1945 Constitution was decided with the Presidential Decree in 1959, the 1945 Constitution had supported two authoritarian regimes of Soekarno's "Guided Democracy" and Soeharto's "New Order" as a legal base. When the 32-year Soeharto's government fell down and democratization started in 1998, the 1945 Constitution was not replaced with a new one, as seen in many other democratizing countries, but successively reformed to adapt itself to a new democratic regime. In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime In the result of four constitutional amendments in 1999-2002, political institutions in Indonesia are experiencing a transformation from an authoritative structure, in which the executive branch monopolized power along with incompetent legislative and judicial branches, to a modern democratic structure, in which the legislative branch can maintain predominance over the executive. However, as observed that President Abdurrahman Wahid, the first president ever elected democratically in Indonesian history, was impeached after one and a half years in office, democratic politics under a new political institution has never been stable. Under the 1945 Constitution, how did authoritarian regimes maintain stability? Why can a democratic regime not achieve its stability? What did the two constitutional amendments in the process of democratization change? In the first place, how did the political institutions stipulated by the 1945 Constitution come out? Through answering the above questions, this chapter intends to survey the historical continuity and change of political institutions in Indonesia along with the 1945 Constitutions and to analyze impact of regime transformation on political institutions. First, we examine political institutions stipulated by the original 1945 Constitution as well as historical and philosophical origins of the constitution. Second, we search constitutional foundations in the 1945 Constitution that made it possible for Soekarno and Soeharto to establish and maintain authoritarian regimes. Third, we examine contents of constitutional amendments in the process of democratization since 1998. Fourth, we analyze new political dynamics caused by constitutional changes, looking at the impeachment process of President Abdurrahman Wahid. Finally, we consider tasks faced by Indonesia that seeks to establish a stable democracy.Constitution, Indoneshia, Politics, Political institution

Consensus and democracy in Indonesia : Musyawarah-Mufakat revisited

This paper analyzes customary practices of consensus decision making, called musyawarah-mufakat, as a basis of democratic stability in Indonesia. Musyawarah and mufakat (deliberation and consensus) are a traditional decision-making rule in Indonesia which has often been observed in village meetings. This paper argues that this traditional decision-making rule is still employed even in a modernized and democratized Indonesia, not only at rural assemblies but in the national parliament as well. Furthermore, this consensus way of decision making provides an institutional basis for democratic stability by giving every parliamentary player, whether big or small, an equal opportunity to express his/her interests. On the other hand, this system of musyawarah‐mufakat decreases political efficiency in the sense that it takes a long time to deliberate drafted laws in the parliament

Is the Indonesian President strong or weak?

This paper analyzes the newly institutionalized political system indemocratizing Indonesia, with particular reference to the presidentialsystem. Consensus has not yet been reached among scholars on whetherthe Indonesian president is strong or weak. This paper tries to answerthis question by analyzing the legislative and partisan powers of theIndonesian president. It must be acknowledged, however, that these twofunctions do not on their own explain the strengths and weaknesses of thepresident. This paper suggests that in order to fully understand thepresidential system in Indonesia, we need to take into account not just thepresident\u27s legislative and partisan powers, but also the legislative processand the characteristics of coalition government

Presidentialism and political parties in Indonesia : why are all parties not presidentialized?

This paper analyzes whether the "presidentialization of political parties" is occurring in newly democratizing Indonesia, as argued by Samuels and Shugart (2010). In Indonesia not all parties are becoming presidentialized. Parties are presidentialized when they have a solid organizational structure and have the potential to win presidential elections. Parties established by a presidential candidate need not face an incentive incompatibility between their executive and legislative branches, since the party leader is not the "agent" but the "principal". On the other hand, small and medium-sized parties, which have few prospects of winning presidential elections, are not actively involved in the election process, therefore party organization is not presidentialized. As the local level, where the head of government has been directly elected by the people since 2005 in Indonesia, the presidentialization of political parties has begun to take place

Voting behavior in Indonesia from 1999 to 2014 : religious cleavage or economic performance?

In this study, we examine the voting behavior in Indonesian parliamentary elections from 1999 to 2014. After summarizing the changes in Indonesian parties\u27 share of the vote from a historical standpoint, we investigate the voting behavior with simple regression models to analyze the effect of regional characteristics on Islamic/secular parties\u27 vote share, using aggregated panel data at the district level. Then, we also test the hypothesis of retrospective economic voting. The results show that districts which formerly stood strongly behind Islamic parties continued to select those parties, or gave preference to abstention over the parties in some elections. From the point of view of retrospective economic voting, we found that districts which experienced higher per capita economic growth gave more support to the ruling parties, although our results remain tentative because information on 2014 is not yet available

High-field magnetization and magnetic phase transition in CeOs2Al10

We have studied the magnetization of CeOs2Al10 in high magnetic fields up to 55 T for H // a and constructed the magnetic phase diagram for H // a. The magnetization curve shows a concave H dependence below T_max \sim40 K which is higher than the transition temperature T_0 \sim29 K. The magnetic susceptibility along the a-axis shows a smooth and continuous decrease down to \sim20 K below T_max \sim40 K without showing an anomaly at T_0. From these two results, a Kondo singlet is formed below T_max and coexists with the antiferro magnetic order below T_0. We also propose that the larger suppression of the spin degrees of freedom along the a-axis than along the c-axis below T_max is associated with the origin of the antiferro magnetic component.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, to appear in Phys. Rev. B, Rapid Commu

High-field magnetization and magnetic phase transition in CeOs2Al10

We have studied the magnetization of CeOs2Al10 in high magnetic fields up to 55 T for H // a and constructed the magnetic phase diagram for H // a. The magnetization curve shows a concave H dependence below T_max \sim40 K which is higher than the transition temperature T_0 \sim29 K. The magnetic susceptibility along the a-axis shows a smooth and continuous decrease down to \sim20 K below T_max \sim40 K without showing an anomaly at T_0. From these two results, a Kondo singlet is formed below T_max and coexists with the antiferro magnetic order below T_0. We also propose that the larger suppression of the spin degrees of freedom along the a-axis than along the c-axis below T_max is associated with the origin of the antiferro magnetic component.Comment: 4 pages, 4 figures, to appear in Phys. Rev. B, Rapid Commu

4.Rocks and minerals

金沢大学COEポストドクターDepartment of Earth and Planetary Science, Tokyo Institute of technology鹿児島大学Editor : Tazaki, Kazue, Cover:Scanning electoron microscopic photograph of Gallionella sp. in biomats of Aso caldera, Kyusyu, Japan. Various shapes of Gallonella sp. are shown (image:Moriichi, Shingo).COE, 金沢大学 水・土壌環境領域シンポジウム「地球環境における微生物の役割」, 日時：2002年12月4日（水）13：00～, 場所：金沢大学理学部3階第一実験