Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams

This paper studies a class of social welfare relations (SWRs) on the set of infinite utility streams. In particular, we examine the SWRs satisfying Q-Anonymity, an impartiality axiom stronger than Finite Anonymity, as well as Strong Pareto and a certain equity axiom. First, we characterize the extension of the generalized Lorenz SWR by combining Q-Anonymity with Strong Pareto and Pigou-Dalton Equity. Second, we replace Pigou-Dalton Equity with Hammond Equity for characterizing the extended leximin SWR. Third, we give an alternative characterization of the extended utilitarian SWR by substituting Incremental Equity for Pigou-Dalton Equity.Q-Anonymity, Intergenerational equity, Generalized Lorenz criterion, Leximin principle, Utilitarianism, Simplified criterion

On the leximin and utilitarian overtaking criteria with extended anonymity

This paper studies the extensions of the infinte-horizon variants of the leximin principle and utilitarianism on the set of infinite utility streams. We especially examine those extensions which satisfy the axiom of Preference-continuity (or Consistency) and the extended anonymity axiom called Q-Anonymity. We formulate new extended leximin and utilitarian social welfare relations (SWRs), called Q-W-leximin SWR and Q-overtaking criterion respectively, and show that Weak Preference-continuity (or Weak Consistency) and Q-Anonymity together with Strong Pareto and Hammond Equity (resp. Partial Unit Comparability) characterize all SWRs that include the Q-W-leximin SWR (resp. the Q-overtaking criterion) as a subrelation. We also show that there exists no SWR satisfying Strong Pareto, Strong Preference-continuity (or Strong Consistency) and Q-Anonymity.Q-Anonymity, Preference-continuity, Consistency, Leximin, Utilitarianism, Overtaking criterion

Bargaining over Managerial Contracts in Delegation Games: The Sequential Move Case

This paper examines the bargaining problem between firms' owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts in a duopolistic market with differentiated-products. Assuming that delegated managers make every managerial decision in the market, we analyze how the managers'' bargaining power affects social welfare and firms'' profits for each case of sequential quantity competition and sequential price competition. We show that the relative increase in the managers'' bargaining power leads to decrease in firms'' profits but improves social welfare in each case, and that this result holds for any case of the degree of product differentiation. This shows that the existing results obtained for the simultaneous move case and a single homogeneous product case are robust in the sequential move cases.

Essays on intergenerational equity in welfare economics

制度:新 ; 報告番号:甲3351号 ; 学位の種類:博士(経済学) ; 授与年月日:2011/2/16 ; 早大学位記番号:新566

On the extensions of the infinite-horizon leximin and the overtaking criteria

Revised version of No.36: The earlier version of this manuscript was entitled "Q-Anonymity and preference continuity." Main results of the earlier draft are restated in a different form

The Core and Productivity-Improving Mergers in Mixed Oligopoly

This paper is a revised version of 21COE-GLOPE Working Paper No.23. In the current version, Proposition 2 is newly added

Q-anonymous social welfare relations on infinite utility streams

Revised version of No.41: Concluding remarks are slightly changed