Moonlighting

Supplementary employment ; Labor supply

Measuring labor market dynamics: gross flows of workers and jobs

Labor market

The transition from barter to fiat money

How did it become possible to exchange apparently valueless pieces of paper for goods? This paper provides an equilibrium account of the transition between barter and fiat money regimes. The explanation relies on the intervention of a self-interested government which must be able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money. To achieve credibility, the government must offset the benefits of seigniorage by internalizing some of the macroeconomic externalities generated by the issue of fiat money. The government's patience and the extent of its involvement in the economy are key determinants of whether the transition can be accomplished.Money ; Money theory

Feeding the national accounts

A complex tracking system, the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) is used to measure and monitor the U.S. economy. This article surveys the main data sources currently used in the NIPA. It is not primarily an article about methodology, but focuses instead on the raw inputs to the process: Who is answering what kinds of questions? Closer acquaintance with the data sources behind the accounts highlights the considerable uncertainty about exact magnitudes of various aggregate quantities (and their growth rates) and the need for ongoing evaluation of the data-collection efforts that support the accounts.Gross domestic product

Commitment as investment under uncertainty

Irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricing real options have led to significant advances many areas. We broaden this range of applications, showing how the techniques can apply to many policy problems in finance, macroeconomics, and trade policy. With small changes, standard techniques can handle a broad range of strategic problems related to policy. The decision to commit is like the decision to make an irreversible investment. Explicitly considering and correctly valuing the option to wait makes discretion relatively more attractive, implies that increased uncertainty increases the gain to discretion, and results in policy which displays hysteresis.Investments

Commitment as investment under uncertainty

An explanation of how irreversible investment and the techniques associated with pricing real options can apply to a broad range of problems in finance, macroeconomics, and trade policy.Economic policy ; Macroeconomics

Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.Monetary policy

Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

Considering the dynamics of commitment highlights, some neglected features of time inconsistency problems. We modify the standard rules-versus-discretion question in three ways: (1) A government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow, (2) the government's commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules, and (3) the government's ability to make irrevocable commitments is restricted. Three results stand out. First, the option to wait makes the incumbent regime (rules or discretion) relatively more attractive. Second, the option to wait means that increased uncertainly makes the incumbent regime more attractive. Third, because the commitment decision takes place in 'real time,' policy choice displays hysteresis.Monetary policy

Low-powered incentives

We study low-powered incentives in a model that captures important features of workplaces in which incentive-pay approaches are minimally relevant. Our motivation is that incentive pay, while not rare, is clearly far less common than are agency problems: many firms with agency problems nonetheless pay fixed compensation and offer continued employment to all but those workers judged "unsatisfactory" according to largely subjective criteria. We find that low-powered incentives can achieve efficient outcomes in simple workplaces and function surprisingly well even when the environment is characterized by unobservable performance heterogeneity and a high degree of complementarity among workers.Wages