An examination of the dynamics of commitment, showing that because the decision regarding rules versus discretion occurs in real time, opting for discretion is often the better choice, since it leaves open the possibility of adopting rules later on.Monetary policy

Joseph A. Ritter

Joseph G. Haubrich

English

Research Papers in Economics

2d ed.

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Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/1996/dynamic.pdf

Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules

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Research Papers in Economics