The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems

This paper studies the interaction between time inconsistency problems in labor market policy and monetary policy. When both policies are discretionary, there is a positive inflation bias, whereas the bias in labor market programs may be either positive or negative. A commitment of labor market programs to zero increases inflation, as compared to the case when both labor market policy and monetary policy are discretionary. Delegation of labor market policy to a liberal labor market board may improve the discretionary outcome, even if labor market programs crowd out regular employment. A conservative central bank always reduces the social loss, even when monetary policy interacts with labor market policy.TBA

Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and Monetary Union

Membership in a monetary union (EMU) is likely to imply stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non-membership. For example, EMU entry may cause a move from a nonindexation to an indexation equilibrium. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an own monetary policy. It is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare-decreasing, because of the accompanying rise in price variability. If indexation occurs outside the EMU, either multiple equilibria or full-indexation equilibria may occur.nominal wage flexibility; wage indexation; EMU; asymmetric shocks

Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility

We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long-term wage contracts lead to highter expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short-term contracts. Therefore lower benefits reduce the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long-term than with short-term contracts and thus create an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers work in the same direction. Lower taxes associated with lower benefits also tend to make short-term contracts more attractive.Nominal wage flexibility, contracts length, macroeconomic fluctuations, unemployment benefits

Demand for Local Public Schooling: Another Brick in the Wall.

In this paper we investigate the demand for local public school expenditures in Sweden. By using survey data, a method previously never applied to Swedish data, the paper provides an additional piece of evidence on individual demand for publicly provided local services. Estimating a linear demand specification, we find that the demand is inelastic with respect to income and tax, much in line with previous Swedish findings in a median voter framework. Estimation of a log-linear demand specification indicates more elastic demand. Testing the hypothesis that municipal employees tend to have a higher demand for public spending than others, we conclude that income, as well as taxprice, enters the demand function differently for the two groups of employees. We find no evidence of Tiebout sorting.Demand for local public school expenditure; survey data; public employees

UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS, CONTRACT LENGTH AND NOMINAL WAGE FLEXIBILITY

We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long-term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short-term contracts. Therefore lower benefits reduce the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long-term than with short-term contracts and thus create an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers work in the same direction. Lower taxes associated with lower benefits also tend to make short-term contracts more attractive.nominal wage flexibility; contract length; macroeconomic fluctuations; unemployment benefits.

Bargaining Structure and Nominal Wage Flexibility

In a model with heterogenous agents, wage setting by monopoly unions and monetary policy conducted by a central bank, we show that the duration of nominal wage contracts is u-shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate bargaining systems yielding contracts of shorter duration and thus more flexible nominal wages than both decentralized and centralized systems. We also find the optimal level of centralization of wage bargaining to be negatively related to the degree of heterogeneity in the economy. The theoretical predictions of the model are tested on OECD data. There is empirical support for the main results regarding contract length, while there is less support for the predictions regarding the level of centralization.nominal wage flexibility; contract length; bargaining structure; monetary policy

Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and Monetary Union

Membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than nonmembership. For example, entry into a monetary union may cause a move from a non-indexation to an indexation equilibrium. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an own monetary policy. It is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare-decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability. The interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full-indexation equilibrium.nominal wage flexibility, wage indexation, monetary union, asymmetric shocks

Individual demand for local public schooling: Evidence from Swedish survey data

In this paper we investigate the demand for local public school expenditures in Sweden using survey data, a method previously never applied to Swedish data. We compare our results to those of earlier US studies, where the same method is used in a different institutional setup. Estimating a linear demand specifica-tion, we find that demand is inelastic with respect to income and taxprice, much in line with previous Swedish findings in a median voter framework. Es-timation of a log-linear demand specification indicates that the elasticities of demand for schooling are higher in Sweden than in the US. Testing the hy-pothesis that municipal employees tend to have a higher demand for public spending than others, we conclude that income, as well as taxprice and grants, enters the demand function differently for the two groups of employees.individual demand; local public schooling; survey data; public employees