Regular distributive efficiency and the distributive liberal social contract.

We consider abstract social systems of private property, made of n individuals endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences, who interact through exchanges on competitive markets and Pareto-efficient lumpsum transfers. The transfers follow from a distributive liberal social contract defined as a redistribution of initial endowments such that the resulting market equilibrium allocation is, both, Pareto-efficient relative to individual interdependent preferences, and unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium. We elicit the global structure of the set of Pareto-efficient allocations: its relative interior is a simply connected smooth manifold of dimension n-1, homeomorphic to the relative interior of the unit-simplex of ℝn . The property obtains under three suitable conditions on the partial preordering of Pareto associated with individual interdependent preferences, which essentially state that: the social utility functions built from weighted sums of individual interdependent utilities, by means of arbitrary positive weights, exhibit a property of differentiable non-satiation and some suitably defined property of inequality aversion; and individuals have diverging views on redistribution, in some suitable sense, at (inclusive) distributive optima. The set of market equilibrium allocations associated with the transfers of the inclusive distributive liberal social contracts consists of the allocations that are unanimously weakly preferred to the initial market equilibrium and that maximize, in the set of attainable allocations, weighted sums of individual interdependent utilities derived from suitable vectors of positive weights of ℝn ++. Its relative interior is a simply connected smooth manifold of dimension n-1 whenever the initial market equilibrium is not Pareto-efficient relative to individual interdependent preferences.Walrasian equilibrium; Pareto-efficiency; liberal social contract; individual social preferences; allocation; distribution.

Optimal production of transplant care services.

Most organ transplants are from dead donors. National transplant organizations exhibit considerable differences in terms of their donor population rates. Spain’s organization is by far the most efficient in this respect. We argue that much of the productivity advantage of Spain’s transplant organization proceeds from an efficient organization of the production chain, from organ procurement to transplantation. Transplant inputs from dead donors are analogous to a common resource for the transplant community. Their circulation through the national transplant organization creates public good externalities between the care units in charge of organ extraction and those in charge of transplantation. It is shown that a socially efficient production of transplant services requires an optimal control of both the production and the circulation of transplant inputs by the institutions of the transplant system.organ transplants; donation; public goods; production organization.

The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and Altruism

Macmillan International Economic Association Series October 2000 400 pages Description: Reciprocity is a pervasive type of social interaction in encounters, groups and organizations. Simple giving is one of the major ways of transferring goods. And others regarding social sentiments, play crucial roles in the working and in the quality of society. This volume gathers basic recent works in its main domains such as, among others, the theory of reciprocity, the public economics of transfers, the economics of the family, charities, gifts of organs, or the motivations for gift-giving. It constitutes a landmark in this rapidly expanding field of research. Read PDF sample chapter: http://www.palgrave.com/catalogue/catalogue.asp?Title_Id=0333747690

The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth

This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory concentrates on lump-sum voluntary transfers, individual or collective, which aim at equalizing the distribution of wealth from altruistic reasons or sentiments (perfectly substitutable altruistic transfers). It implies: (i) the Pareto-inefficiency of the non-cooperative interaction of individual altruistic transfers; (ii) the neutralization of public transfers by individual altruistic transfers; (iii) and the crowding out of private altruistic transfers by Pareto-efficient public redistribution. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an informal overview of the general intent and content of the theory. Section 3 gives a first formal version of the theory in a one-commodity setup (pure distributive social system). Non-cooperative distributive equilibrium is characterized, and its fundamental properties of existence and determinacy are analyzed. Section 4 extends the definitions and fundamental properties of pure distributive social systems to general social systems that combine competitive market exchange with the non-cooperative altruistic transfers of individuals endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences. Section 5 states the neutrality property in two versions of the theory successively: the general social systems of Section 4; and the important special case of the pure distributive social systems of Section 3, where the set of agents is partitioned in two subsets, namely, a subset of "poor" individuals with zero endowments and egoistic preferences, and a subset of "rich" individuals altruistic to the poor and indifferent to each other. Section 6 reviews the theory of Pareto-efficient redistribution in pure distributive social systems. Section 7 returns to the fundamental assumption of perfect substitutability of transfers through a selective review of theoretical models of imperfectly substitutable transfers and empirical tests of perfect substitutability.

Regular distributive social systems

International audienc

Chapter 5 : The Economic Theory of Gift-Giving: Perfect Substitutability of Transfers and Redistribution of Wealth

International audienceThis chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory concentrates on lump-sum voluntary transfers, individual or collective, which aim at equalizing the distribution of wealth from altruistic reasons or sentiments (perfectly substitutable altruistic transfers). It implies: (i) the Pareto-inefficiency of the non-cooperative interaction of individual altruistic transfers; (ii) the neutralization of public transfers by individual altruistic transfers; (iii) and the crowding out of private altruistic transfers by Pareto-efficient public redistribution. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an informal overview of the general intent and content of the theory. Section 3 gives a first formal version of the theory in a one-commodity setup (pure distributive social system). Non-cooperative distributive equilibrium is characterized, and its fundamental properties of existence and determinacy are analyzed. Section 4 extends the definitions and fundamental properties of pure distributive social systems to general social systems that combine competitive market exchange with the non-cooperative altruistic transfers of individuals endowed with non-paternalistic interdependent preferences. Section 5 states the neutrality property in two versions of the theory successively: the general social systems of Section 4; and the important special case of the pure distributive social systems of Section 3, where the set of agents is partitioned in two subsets, namely, a subset of “poor” individuals with zero endowments and egoistic preferences, and a subset of “rich” individuals altruistic to the poor and indifferent to each other. Section 6 reviews the theory of Pareto-efficient redistribution in pure distributive social systems. Section 7 returns to the fundamental assumption of perfect substitutability of transfers through a selective review of theoretical models of imperfectly substitutable transfers and empirical tests of perfect substitutability

Équilibre général de dons individuels

General equilibrium of individual gifts We study the properties of a social system with several agents, each one possessing an initial endowment of a unique consumption good (the income). Each agent can consume or give any proportion of the fraction of total income that he possesses from the origin or from a gift. His preferences are defined on the allocation set, and strictly increasing in his own consunption. He chooses his gifts so as to maximize his utility subject to his resource constraint, considering the others'gifts as given. A general equilibrium of indi- vidual gifts is an equilibrium of that Nash-non cooperative game. We study the normative and positive properties of equilibrium. We provide in particular a characterization of equilibrium, based on an original concept, the (i, j)-maximum. The generalization of these results to the case of an economy including several goods and trade on perfect markets is discussed eventually.Équilibre général de dons individuels Nous étudions les propriétés d'un système social comprenant plusieurs agents, possédant chacun une dotation initiale en un bien de consommation unique (le revenu). Chaque agent est susceptible de consommer ou de donner tout ou partie de la fraction de revenu qu'il possède à l'origine ou du fait d'un don. Ses préférences sont définies sur l'ensemble des allocations, et strictement croissantes en sa propre consommation. Il choisit ses dons de manière à maximiser son utilité sous contrainte de ressource, en considérant les dons des autres agents comme donnés. Un équilibre général de dons individuels est un équilibre de ce jeu non coopératif de Nash. On étudie les propriétés normatives et positives de l'équilibre. On fournit en particulier une caractérisation de l'équilibre à l'aide d'un concept original, l'(i, j)-maximum. La généralisation de ces résultats au cas d'une économie comprenant plusieurs biens et un marché de concurrence pure est parfaite est également discutée.Mercier Ythier Jean. Équilibre général de dons individuels. In: Revue économique, volume 44, n°5, 1993. pp. 925-950