Multinational Production, Skilled Labor and Real Wages

Adapting our earlier model of multinationals, we address policy issues involving wages and labor skills. Multinational firms may arise endogenously, exporting their firm-specific knowledge capital to foreign production facilities, and geographically fragmenting production into skilled and unskilled-labor-intensive activities. Multinationals thus alter the nature of trade, from trade in goods (produced with both skilled and unskilled labor) to trade in skilled- labor-intensive producer services. Results shed light on several policy questions. First, multinationals increase the skilled/unskilled wage gap in the high income country and, under some circumstances, in the low income country as well. Second, there is a sense in which multinationals export low skilled jobs to the lower income country. Third, trade barriers do not protect unskilled labor in the high income countries. By inducing a regime shift to multinationals, trade barriers protect the abundant factor, at least in the high income country and possibly in both countries. Fourth, a convergence in country characteristics induces the entry of multinationals and raises the skilled-unskilled wage gap in the initially large and skilled-labor-abundant country, and possibly in the small skilled-labor-scarce country as well.

A Multi-Country Approach to Factor-Proportions Trade and Trade Costs

Classic trade questions are reconsidered by generalizing a factor-proportions model to multiple countries, multi-stage production, and country-specific trade costs. We derive patterns of production specialization and trade for a matrix of countries that differ in relative endowments (columns) and trade costs (rows). We demonstrate how the ability to fragment production and/or a proportional change in all countries' trade costs alters these patterns. Production specialization and the volume of trade are higher with fragmentation for most countries but interestingly, for a large block of countries, these variables fall following fragmentation. Countries with moderate trade costs engage in market-oriented assembly, while those with lower trade costs engage in export-platform production. These two cases correspond to the concepts of horizontal and vertical affiliate production in the literature on multinational enterprises. Increases in specialization and the volume of trade accelerate as trade costs go to zero with and without fragmentation.

Sub-national Differentiation and the Role of the Firm in Optimal International Pricing

We illuminate the relationship between optimal firm pricing and optimal trade policy by exploring a generalized model that accommodates product differentiation at both the national and sub-national (firm) levels. We assume monopolistic competition in the differentiated products at the sub-national level. When the national and sub-national substitution elasticities are similar we find little opportunity for small countries to improve their terms of trade through trade distortions, because firms play an important preemptive role in optimally pricing unique varieties. We contrast this with standard applications of perfect-competition Armington models, which exhibit high optimal tariffs--even for relatively small countries.

Multinational Firms, Technology Diffusion and Trade

Empirical evidence indicates a close association between multinational firms and knowledge capital, a public good within the firm. We model a firm which wishes to exploit its knowledge capital abroad, but whose workers learn all the knowledge necessary for production and can defect and produce the good themselves. The home firm must then choose between costly exporting and the possible dissipation of its knowledge capital by producing abroad. The paper examines the choice between exporting, licensing, and acquiring a subsidiary in this environment. We analyze the cost and technology parameters that support the alternative modes of serving the foreign market, and we describe the international equilibrium that jointly determines the pattern of specialization and the market mode.

The Microbiological Flora of the Gemini 9 Spacecraft Before and After Flight

Microbiological contamination of Gemini 9 spacecraft before and after fligh

The Survival of Microorganisms in Space. Further Rocket and Balloon Borne Exposure Experiments

Rocket and balloon borne exposure experiments on survival of microorganisms in space environmen

A Unified Treatment of Horizontal Direct Investment, Vertical Direct Investment, and the Pattern of Trade in Goods and Services

This paper contributes to research endogenizing multinational firms in general-equilibrium trade models. We attempt to integrate separate contributions on horizontal multinationals which produce the same final product in multiple locations, with work on vertical multinationals, which geographically fragment production by stages. Previously derived results now emerge as special cases of a more general model. Vertical multinationals dominate when countries are very different in relative factor endowments. Horizontal multinationals dominate when the countries are similar in size and in relative endowments, and trade costs are moderate to high. In some cases, foreign investment or trade liberalization leads to a reversal in the direction of trade. Investment liberalization can also lead to an increase in the volume of trade and produces a strong tendency toward factor-price equalization. Thus direct investment can be a complement to trade in both a volume-of-trade sense and in a welfare sense.

Trade Policy with Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions

A number of recent papers reach different conclusions concerning the effects of trade and industrial policy on imperfectly competitive industries; the implications for policy are therefore sensitive to assumptions concerning both firm behaviour and market structure. This paper sets out a single model within which policy can be examined under a variety of assumptions concerning market structures. The results obtained from this model can be compared to results already obtained in the literature, and the model allows further analysis of some interesting cases. We consider the four types of market structure generated by oligopoly versus free entry, and segmented markets versus integrated markets. By employing simple functional forms we are able to make direct comparisons between these cases. We conclude that the effects of trade and industrial policies are greater when markets are segmented than when they are integrated, and that, if transport costs are small, policy is more potent when the number of firms is fixed than when there is free entry

Multinational Firms and The New Trade Theory

A model is constructed in which multinational firms may arise endogenously. Multinationals exist in equilibrium when transport and tariff costs are high, incomes are high, and firm-level scale economies are important relative to plant-level scale economies. Less obvious, multinationals are more important in total economic activity when countries are more similar in incomes, relative factor endowments, and technologies. The model may thus be useful in explaining several stylized facts, including (a) the growing importance of direct investment relative to trade among the developed countries over time and (b) the greater ratio of investment to trade among the developed countries relative to this ratio for 'north-south' or 'south-south' economic relationships. The model offers predictions about the volume of trade that contrast with those of the 'new trade theory', predicting that trade at first rises and then falls as countries converge in incomes, relative endowments, and technologies. Welfare is also considered, and it is shown that direct investment makes the smaller (or high cost) country better off, but may make the larger (or low cost) country worse off.

Exploring New Markets: Direct Investment, Contractual Relations and the Multinational Enterprise

We consider the multinational firm's decision on whether to enter a new market immediately via direct investment or to contract initially with a local agent and (possibly) invest later. Use of a local agent allows the multinational to avoid costly mistakes by finding out if the market is large enough to support direct investment. However, the agent is able to extract information rents from the multinational due to being better informed about market characteristics. We find that direct investment is the desirable mode of entry when the market is on average large and there is little down- side risk in expected profits.