Departures from Slutsky Symmetry in Household Demand Models

Maximisation of utility by a single consumer subject to a linear budget constraint is well known to imply strong restrictions on the properties of demand functions. Empirical applications to data on households however frequently reject these restrictions. In particular such data frequently show a failure of Slutsky symmetry - the restriction of symmetry on the matrix of compensated price responses. Browning and Chiappori (1998) show that under assumptions of efficient within-household decision making, the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix for demands from a k member household will be the sum of a symmetric matrix and a matrix of rank k-1. We establish the rank of the departure from Slutsky symmetry for couples under the assumption of Nash equilibrium in individual demands. We show that the Slutsky matrix is the sum of a symmetric matrix and another of rank at most 2. This result implies not only that the Browning-Chiappori assumption of efficiency can be tested against other models within the class of those based on individual optimisation, but also that the hypothesis of Nash equilibrium in demands has testable content against a general alternative.

Inequality and income gaps

This paper discusses inequality orderings based explicitly on closing up of income gaps, demonstrating the links between these and other orderings, the classes of functions preserving the orderings and applications showing their usefulness in comparison of economic policies.Inequality, income distribution

Estimation of household demand systems with theoretically compatible Engel curves and unit value specifications

We develop a method for estimation of price reactions using unit value data which exploits the implicit links between quantity and unit value choices. This allows us to combine appealing Engel curve specifications with a model of unit value determination in a way which is consistent with demand theory, unlike methods hitherto prominent in the literature. The method is applied to Czech data.Consumer demand, unit values

Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence

This paper develops a new approach to study how electoral bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of districting bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects policy choice in theory. The utility of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in the U.K. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.

Income, expenditure and the living standards of UK households

Despite the widespread use of income as a measure of household welfare, there is much to recommend the use of consumption. Indeed, standard economic arguments suggest that consumption expenditure will better reflect expected lifetime resources and many economists have been unequivocal in advocating its use. Slesnick (1993), for example, suggests that ‘From a theoretical perspective it is more appropriate to evaluate poverty using a consumption based measure of household welfare’. Cutler and Katz (1992) state that ‘Economic theory suggests that permanent income or consumption is a more accurate measure of the distribution of resources than is current income’. Poterba (1989) argues that `If households base their spending plans on their expected lifetime income, then consumption provides a more accurate measure of resources than does annual income’.

Estimating the Effect of Immigration on Wages

We discuss approaches to estimating the effect that immigration has on wages of native workers which assume a three-level CES model, where immigrants and natives are allowed to be imperfect substitutes within an age-education cell, and predict the wage impact based on estimates of the elasticities of substitution at each level. We argue that this approach is sensitive to immigrants downgrading at arrival, and we illustrate the possible bias in estimating the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives.

Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and homogeneity hold, negativity and symmetry properties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric and negative semidefinite matrix and another the rank of which never exceeds the number of public goods plus one. Under separability of the public goods the deviation from symmetry is at most rank two.Nash equilibrium, Intra-household allocation, Slutsky

Non cooperative household demand

We study non cooperative household models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods, deriving the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix and demonstrating the nature of the deviation of its properties from those of a true Slutsky matrix in the unitary model. We provide results characterising both cases in which there are and are not jointly contributed public goods. Demand properties are contrasted with those for collective models and conclusions drawn regarding the possibility of empirically testing the collective model against non cooperative alternatives and the non cooperative model against a general alternative.Nash equilibrium, Intra-household allocation, Slutsky symmetry.

Electoral bias and policy choice: theory and evidence

This paper develops an approach to studying how bias in favor of one party due to the pattern of electoral districting affects policy choice. We tie a commonly used measure of electoral bias to the theory of party competition and show how this affects party strategy in theory. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated using data on local government in England. The results suggest that reducing electoral bias leads parties to moderate their policies.