The Child-Welfare System and the Limits of Determinacy

Robert Mnookin’s article, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, is a classic. His insights into the substance and process of family law have influenced scholars for nearly four decades. This essay, written for a symposium marking the upcoming anniversary of the article, demonstrates that Congress adopted many of Mnookin’s proposals to introduce greater determinacy into the child welfare system. And yet the problems he described nearly forty years ago sound all too familiar today. After engaging in a detailed analysis of the reforms, I argue that with the evidence on determinacy now in hand, it is time to reflect on the possibilities and limits of the child welfare system. Reforms to the legal standards have done little to address the larger problems that underlie child abuse and neglect, particularly poverty, social isolation, substance abuse, and parental stress. Family preservation efforts are woefully underfunded and come too late. And time limits on reunification help move children to permanency but at a substantial cost to families of origin. The child welfare system needs a fundamental reorientation toward prevention. Broad-based “family support” programs offer a promising model; it is here that we should place our real efforts. And for those children who are removed from their homes — there will always be some — the child welfare system should develop more realistic goals for children and families

Early Childhood Development and the Law

Early childhood development is a robust and vibrant focus of study in multiple disciplines, from economics and education to psychology and neuroscience. Abundant research from these disciplines has established that early childhood is critical for the development of cognitive abilities, language, and psychosocial skills, all of which turn, in large measure, on the parent-child relationship. And because early childhood relationships and experiences have a deep and lasting impact on a child’s life trajectory, disadvantages during early childhood replicate inequality. Working together, scholars in these disciplines are actively engaged in a national policy debate about reducing inequality through early childhood interventions. Despite the vital importance of this period, the law and legal scholars have been largely indifferent to the dynamics of early childhood development. Doctrine and legislation are rarely developmentally sensitive, lumping children into an undifferentiated category regardless of age. The legal system thus misses key opportunities to combat inequality and foster healthy development for all children. And most legal scholars do not engage with the wealth of interdisciplinary research on early childhood, nor are they part of the interdisciplinary dialogue and policy debates. As a result, that conversation does not include the voices of lawyers and legal scholars, who are uniquely positioned to add critical insights. Remedying this stark disconnect requires doing for law what scholars have done in other disciplines: creating a distinctive field. Accordingly, this Article proposes a subdiscipline of early childhood development and the law. The new field crystallizes a distinctive interest that the legal system must attend to and charts a path for legal scholars to follow for years to come. As with the dawning of fields such as juvenile justice, domestic violence, and elder law, early childhood development and the law will be a focal point for research within the legal academy, a vital bridge to scholars in other disciplines, and an important means for bringing lawyers and legal scholars to the heart of emerging policy debates

The Empirical Turn In Family Law

Historically, the legal system justified family law’s rules and policies through morality, common sense, and prevailing cultural norms. In a sharp departure, and consistent with a broader trend across the legal system, empirical evidence increasingly dominates the regulation of families. There is much to celebrate in this empirical turn. Properly used, empirical evidence in family law can help the state act more effectively and efficiently, unmask prejudice, and depoliticize contentious battles. But the empirical turn also presents substantial concerns. Beyond perennial issues of the quality of empirical evidence and the ability of legal actors to use it, there are more fundamental problems: Using empirical evidence focuses attention on the outcomes of legal rules, discouraging a debate about contested and competing values. Reliance on empirical evidence overlays a veneer of neutrality on normative judgments. And uncritically adopting evidence about present conditions without interrogating the role of historical discrimination that continues to disadvantage some families can replicate that discrimination. Given the promise and peril of the empirical turn in family law, this Essay proposes a framework to guide the use of this evidence. The framework preserves space for debating multiple values and advises decisionmakers when to use empirical evidence, with particular attention to the dangers for nondominant families. The framework also recommends strengthening evidentiary gatekeeping and elevating the potential for legal scholarship to serve as a bridge from the broader research base to the courts. With this guidance in place, empirical evidence can take its rightful place as a useful but cabined tool in the legal regulation of families

The Asymmetric Effects of Changes in Price and Income on Energy and Oil Demand

This paper estimates the effects on energy and oil demand of changes in income and oil prices, for 96 of the world's largest countries, in per-capita terms. We examine three important issues: the asymmetric effects on demand of increases and decreases in oil prices; the asymmetric effects on demand of increases and decreases in income; and the different speeds of demand adjustment to changes in price and in income. Its main conclusions are the following: (1) OECD demand responds much more to increases in oil prices than to decreases; ignoring this asymmetric price response will bias downward the estimated income elasticity; (2) demand's response to income decreases in many non-OECD countries is not necessarily symmetric to its response to income increases; ignoring this asymmetric income response will bias the estimated income elasticity; (3) the speed of demand adjustment is faster to changes in income than to changes in price; ignoring this difference will bias upward the estimated response to income changes. Using correctly specified equations for energy and oil demand, the long-run elasticity for increases in income is about 0.55 for OECD energy and oil, and 1.0 or higher for Non-OECD Oil Exporters, Income Growers and perhaps all Non-OECD countries. These income elasticity estimates are significantly higher than current estimates used by the US Department of Energy. Our estimates for the OECD countries are also higher than those estimated recently by Schmalensee-Stoker-Judson (1998) and Holtz-Eakin and Selden (1995), who ignore the asymmetric effects of prices on demand. Higher income elasticities, of course, will increase projections of energy and oil demand, and of carbon dioxide emissions.ENERGY DEMAND; OIL DEMAND; ASYMMETRY; IRREVERSIBILITY; INCOME ELASTICITY