J.D.B. and the Maturing of Juvenile Confession Suppression Law

The Supreme Court‘s decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina in 2011 marks a watershed moment in the jurisprudence of juvenile rights. Addressing a question left open in Miranda v. Arizona more than four decades ago, the Court made clear in J.D.B. that a judicial determination of whether a minor suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes must take into account the age of the suspect because juveniles cannot be held to the same standard as adults. When one considers the broader context of the Court\u27s criminal law jurisprudence of recent years, it is apparent that J.D.B. reflects the Court\u27s willingness to extend, into new areas of criminal law, a recent line of cases that treats age eighteen as a central dividing line in how the Eighth Amendment regulates the sentences of capital punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. When one looks even further back into Supreme Court history, it is evident that J.D.B. marks a return to special protections for youth that characterized the Court\u27s confession suppression caselaw more than half a century ago. This Article begins by looking back at juvenile confession suppression law in the half century preceding J.D.B. and examines the evolution of the doctrines applied in J.D.B. Part I demonstrates the special solicitude that the Court accorded juveniles half a century ago under the due process standard of voluntariness of statements and examines how and why this special protection was diluted in the ensuing decades. Part II focuses on J.D.B. itself. This section examines the new direction the Court took, the various ways in which J.D.B. diverged from the confession suppression jurisprudence of preceding years, and how the decision built upon the reasoning of recent Eighth Amendment caselaw. We also take a close look at the legislative facts in the J.D.B. decision and consider the implications of the Court having taken judicial notice of these legislative facts. Part III presents our views of the changes that J.D.B. demands of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. Part III.A shows that J.D.B.‘s restructuring of the standard for one aspect of Miranda analysis requires commensurate changes in all other aspects of the Miranda doctrine and other constitutional rules governing police interrogations. Part III.B presents our view that J.D.B., properly extended, requires that counsel be afforded to any minor suspect prior to and during any police interrogation

Brecht v. Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law

For the past two and one-half decades, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have applied the same rule for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings as they have applied on direct appeal of both state and federal convictions. Under that rule, which applied to all constitutional errors except those deemed per se prejudicial or per se reversible, the state could avoid reversal upon a finding of error only by proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court adopted this stringent standard in Chapman v. California to fulfill the federal courts\u27 responsibility to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights. Although Chapman itself arose on direct appeal, the Court understood the decision\u27s harmless error rule to be of constitutional magnitude and, consistent with the principle of parity between direct and habeas corpus consideration of constitutional issues in the federal courts, the Court repeatedly and routinely applied the same standard in habeas corpus proceedings. So did the lower federal courts

Amici Curiae Brief of New York law school professors in People v. Harris: Constitutionality of the New York Death Penalty Statute Under the State Constitution\u27s Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Antidiscrimination Clauses

Amici are teachers in New York law schools who have studied the operation of the death penalty for the purpose of teaching the subject, writing about it in scholarly journals, or representing persons accused or convicted of capital crimes. Most of us have worked in the field both as academics and as pro bono counsel for condemned inmates. Collectively, we have had first-hand experience in hundreds of death cases, in dozens of jurisdictions, extending over more than a third of a century. Our experience has convinced us that capital punishment cannot be administered with the fairness, reliability, and freedom from discrimination that a penalty so grave and irreversible requires. This is no accident or transitory condition; it is the consequence of certain innate attributes of the penalty of death. The purpose of our brief is to analyze those attributes and explain why they are fundamentally at war with the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause and the Antidiscrimination Clause of New York’s Bill of Rights. We hope to persuade the Court that it should not temporize with the death penalty in the face of this basic incompatibility but should hold the 1995 death penalty statute altogether unconstitutional

Brecht v. Abrahamson: Harmful Error in Habeas Corpus Law

For the past two and one-half decades, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have applied the same rule for assessing the harmlessness of constitutional error in habeas corpus proceedings as they have applied on direct appeal of both state and federal convictions. Under that rule, which applied to all constitutional errors except those deemed per se prejudicial or per se reversible, the state could avoid reversal upon a finding of error only by proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court adopted this stringent standard in Chapman v. California to fulfill the federal courts\u27 responsibility to protect people from infractions by the States of federally guaranteed rights. Although Chapman itself arose on direct appeal, the Court understood the decision\u27s harmless error rule to be of constitutional magnitude and, consistent with the principle of parity between direct and habeas corpus consideration of constitutional issues in the federal courts, the Court repeatedly and routinely applied the same standard in habeas corpus proceedings. So did the lower federal courts

Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure

Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure is a two-volume set consisting of practical advice and analysis of U.S. Supreme Court cases written by subject matter experts Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman. The newest edition includes comprehensive coverage of: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA); Requirements states must satisfy to obtain AEDPA opt-in benefits; Statutes of limitations; Petition filing requirements; Appointment of counsel; Range and types of discovery; Standards for obtaining federal evidentiary hearings; Exhaustion of state remedies; Procedural default; Standards for applying AEDPA\u27s section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2); Successive petitions; Obtaining a certificate of appealability; Federal prisoner practice under section 2255; Types of claims that have led to the granting of the writ; Military Commissions Act of 2006; Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006; USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005; and REAL ID Act of 2005. The treatise and the accompanying Supplement include extensive analysis of the latest habeas corpus case law as well as important statutory changes that directly affect you and your clients. Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure is the authoritative treatise that your clients need you to have and your practice absolutely demands.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1283/thumbnail.jp