Comments on Knowledge and Ideology: The Epistemology of Social and Political Critique

Michael Morris' Knowledge and Ideology is an original and valuable contribution to the philosophical debate concerning the meaning and validity of the concept of ideology critique. While the concept of ideology has occupied a pivotal role within the tradition of critical social theory, as Terry Eagleton had already pointed out in his 1994 study, the term nevertheless has "a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with one another." Morris takes Eagleton's analysis as his point of departure, distinguishing between "epistemic" and "functional" varieties of ideology critique. Unlike Eagleton's earlier study, however, which focused on the historical development of these two dominant ways of conceiving ideology, Morris' work attempts to show how the cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions of belief can be productively reconciled in a "Neo-Hegelian variation of epistemic ideology critique." Morris' work makes a compelling case that critical social theory can be sensitive to the social dimensions of belief without abandoning the legitimate goals of the traditional epistemological project. I have some questions, however, regarding how he proposes to reconcile these two competing visions of ideology critique

Once Again From the Beginning: On the Relationship of Skepticism and Philosophy in Hegel's System

This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its legitimate role within the project of philosophical science. Hegel finds that historical forms of skepticism have misunderstood their own activity and thus have drawn the wrong conclusions from the epistemological challenges that they raise. For Hegel, these challenges lead not to the suspension of judgment, as many skeptics have assumed, but to an insight into the fundamental nature of reality itself. For this reason, I argue that it is important to distinguish between historical forms of skepticism (e.g., Pyrrhonism) and the "self-completing skepticism" that Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the latter sense of skepticism, I argue, that one finds at work in Hegel's own philosophical project at nearly every stage of his career

Toward a Critique of Crisis Consciousness

viii, 83 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number.My thesis begins by acknowledging the fact that our time is marked by crisis. Although this seems, to most, undeniable, I argue that because we lack the criterion for legitimating this claim, appeals to crisis are always susceptible to ideological appropriation and misuse. Hence, the thesis strives to articulate a space of critical reflection in which the legitimate diagnosis of crises may be possible. To this end, I turn to the tradition of continental philosophy, appraising the efforts of Karl Marx, Jurgen Habermas, and Jacques Derrida. While each of these thinkers offers a unique critique of crisis, I argue that they nevertheless succumb to what I call "crisis consciousness" - a condition in which the perception of crisis is inseparable from that of powerlessness.Adviser: Cheyney Rya