Support of working informal caregivers in the Netherlands and in Germany

The division of responsibilities and organizational structures in the field of long-term care is a subject of much discussion. This is made even more clear by the EU Work-Life Balance Directive of June 2019. In view of the rising pressure of combining work and care, it is important to enable and facilitate the working informal caregiver. In this paper an attempt is made to gain more insight into this issue. We identified the opportunities and risks of an informalization of care and studied how persons in the Netherlands and Germany are being supported to combine the different roles and tasks. The comparison shows that informal care is not only a responsibility of the individual and/or the employer but that the government should play a role in facilitating and enabling working informal caregivers. This can also be defended on efficiency arguments. It is not possible to take out an insurance against the provision of informal care on the private market. Furthermore, providing informal care has negative external effects related to a reduction of labour market participation and the ensuing costs for society

Inkomensbescherming bij levensloopactiviteiten: Een onderzoek naar de Werkloosheidswet en spaarregelingen

This study focuses on the facilitation of activities in other areas than paid work (these activities were gathered under the heading ' life cycle activities') and deals with the question to what extent the current Dutch Unemployment Act (Werkloosheidswet, abbr. WW) can take into account differences in life cycles by financing leave, and how the WW can be modified in order to increase the possibilities for leave. As the potential of the WW to support life cycle activities is low, it was discussed whether four in the past decade presented proposals for the inclusion of a savings element in the WW, which, although meant to reduce the costs of the WW in the first place, also suggest the possibility of leave, bring what they pretend to do, and whether they are in conformity with the points of departure of the WW. The main outcome is that an obligatory savings scheme, on condition that certain requirements are met and that the scheme is not at the expense of the existing social security, would be an interesting option to see to a broader function of social security. With the obligatory savings character the employee would be entitled to a compensation for loss of income in case of leave. If the savings obligation were to be linked to a conditional right to leave, such a right would mean the recognition of the need for leave for life cycle activities. This would mean that not only paid work is to be regarded as socially relevant. With a credit facility in connection with the possibility of acquittal the obligatory savings scheme would also possess an element of solidarity. Such a savings scheme creates security, while it conforms to the legal ground mentioned in 1945 by the Van Rhijn II committee. Here the collective only comes into the picture when the individual has taken his responsibility, but is not able to make it on his own, owing to circumstances. A savings scheme for leave is also in line with the policy of activation and prevention in social security. The activating and preventive element may indeed be contained in the life cycle activities themselves that give rise to the leave. Furthermore, the introduction of an obligatory savings scheme for leave might mean that the paradigm of social law is shifting. The protection of vulnerable groups would be supplemented by the promotion of labour market participation. An obligation to save for leave would offer some scope for the combination of work and other life cycle activities, enabling the individual employee to be responsible for one's own social and economic security. Finally, however, due to insufficient coherence and the presence of an inner contradiction, a savings scheme is not in conformity with the foundations of the WW, and therefore would not fit in with the WW, but would deserve its own regim

Social assistance benefits in the Netherlands

The right to a minimum subsistence level in the Netherlands is covered by a comprehensive network of schemes. All schemes are part of a rights-based system: if the conditions are fulfilled, this creates a right to social assistance benefit. The most important Act is the Participation Act, the main features of which are described in this paper. Attention will be paid to conditions for benefits and the increasingly strict obligations and sanctions. This paper provides insight into some of the consequences of the recently implemented decentralization policy in the Netherlands

'EU Citizenship and Social Rights, a Comparative Report’, D6.2 Report: Report on the transposition of the relevant EU instruments in the Member States, bEUcitizen

This report is an analysis of national reports on Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Sweden and Spain on the access of EU citizens to social rights. The social rights studied here are subsistence benefits, housing benefits, education grants and housing benefits . Especially these rights are vulnerable in case of economically non -active EU nationals; on the other hand exclusion from these rights may lead to serious poverty. Hence a very important area. We found that in case law of the Court of Justice and in the C itizenship Directive criteria are developed to give non -economically active persons only after they have established a degree of integration into a Member State access to social rights. This is a very interesting development of EU citizenship, that both pr otects social systems and does not exclude EU citizens on ground of their nationality. It is also a difference approach then in case of, for instance, political rights for EU nationals, where equal treatment is not reached to the extent that after five yea rs one can vote for the national parliament of the host country. We then investigated the ways in which countries have traditionally developed conditions on the degree of integration and how these still influence the reaction of the system to mobile EU cit izens. We found that elements as the criteria for residency, the conditions on registering and the financing of the systems vary considerably between the countries. Some systems have more problems with EU law and react differently to this than others. Wher e for some countries influx of patients means an increased market, for others it is a serious threat. By then further protecting the system legal certainty and transparency are diminishing for both workers and EU citizens where no permanent solution is in sight. This study therefore makes the analysis that there are several ways to design a social rights system and that some seem to create fewer problems than others while still having more legal certainty for the EU citizen. In scenarios the possibilities for Member States, both the host States and the States of origin, and also that of the European Commission are sketched to reconcile EU citizenship with national systems and thus to create more legal certainty

Discriminatie in de platformeconomie juridisch bestrijden: geen eenvoudige zaak

Onderzoek wijst uit dat ook in de platformeconomie discriminatie voorkomt. Dit artikel biedt een verkenning van de juridische (on)mogelijkheden om discriminatie in de relaties tussen platform, platformwerkers en klanten te bestrijden. De Nederlandse gelijkebehandelingswetgeving biedt daartoe beslist mogelijkheden, maar deze zijn niet onbeperkt

The collective risk management of zzp’ers: How do the social protection system, networks and households effectively restrain their precariousness?

Self-employed without personnel (zzp’ers) have been growing in both number and heterogeneity. Despite the significant share of economically dependent and bogus self-employed, zzp’ers are still viewed as entrepreneurs embodying an individualized type of risk management. However, relying on market-based instruments may be ineffective, as market failures and irrational risk perceptions can hinder them from adopting arrangements to restrain their precariousness. This paper investigates how Dutch institutions empower zzp’ers with various forms of collective instruments to voluntarily manage their risk of precariousness. Precariousness is defined comprehensively as unmet basic needs. Four instruments involve a risk sharing among zzp’ers, their families, and the welfare state: statutory protection system, network, hybrid work, and household. Two main research questions are answered using a mixed-method research design: what are the basic needs covered by the collective risk management instruments available for zzp’ers? To what extent are those instruments effective in restraining their precariousness? The larger their risk sharing, the more instruments correct market failures and irrational risk perception on the one hand and provide standardized risk management on the other hand. The overall effect of collective instruments is expected to be mixed: to empower zzp’ers and to conflict with their preference for autonomy. Results show that the statutory protection system preserve a balance between business freedom and protection of zzp’ers in most vulnerable circumstances. Other instruments, especially networks, are shown to be effective in restraining the precariousness of zzp’ers. However, as for hybrid work, more standardized risk management strategies are shown to hinder their autonomy

The collective risk management of solo self-employed in the Netherlands.

The growth of solo self-employed in the Netherlands (zzp’ers) have not triggered yet a debate on how to combine their income security and business autonomy. The extent to which the social protection system and interests’ groups promote zzp’ers to take up collective arrangements mitigating income insecurity due to work incapacity and preventing income insecurity due to poor employability is investigated using the social risk management framework. Correcting economic obstacles and irrational risk perceptions, collective arrangements are found to encourage the take-up of work incapacity insurance and training among zzp’ers. Findings are based on a quantitative analysis using the Dutch Self-employed Working Conditions Survey (ZEA 2015)