Book review: Divided nations: why global governance is failing and what we can do about it

"Divided Nations: Why Global Governance is Failing and What We Can Do About It." Ian Goldin. Oxford University Press. March 2013. --- Humanity today faces a number of international challenges which spill over national boundaries: climate change, finance, pandemics, cyber security, and migration. It is becoming increasingly apparent that bodies created to assist in global governance – those such as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank – are inadequate for the task of managing such risk in the 21st century, writes Ian Goldin, in his exploration of whether the answer is to reform the existing structures, or to consider a new and radical approach. Martin Hearson feels that Divided Nations offers some sage advice for reflection on shifting global power dynamics, but its case would be much more powerful without such a strong dose of globalisation hyperbole

Book review: global rivalries: standards wars and the transnational cotton trade

As the economies of China and India continue to grow, these countries are seeking greater control over the rules that govern international trade. Setting the rules carries with it the power to establish advantage, so it is no surprise that negotiations often result in stalemates at meetings of the World Trade Organization. In Global Rivalries, Amy A. Quark aims to explore who makes the rules and how they are enforced, using the lens of cotton; a simple commodity that has become a poignant symbol of both the crisis of Western rule-making power and the potential for powerful new rivals to supplant it. Reviewed by Martin Hearson

When do developing countries negotiate away their corporate tax base?

Developing countries have concluded thousands of bilateral tax treaties, which restrict their ‘taxing rights’ over international investment. Qualitative case studies of these negotiation outcomes emphasize power politics, knowledge asymmetries and negotiating capability in the eventual distribution of taxing rights between signatories, yet such insights are absent from cross‐country quantitative work. This paper bridges the gap by replicating two quantitative studies, introducing new data on countries' ability to mobilize tax revenue and the outcomes of tax treaty negotiations. It provides statistical support for the insights from qualitative research. The size of a government's revenue base, and its reliance on corporate tax, might affect the salience of the revenue sacrifice in policy makers' minds. These variables influence the likelihood of signing a tax treaty and the particular concessions made. Power asymmetries between signatories lead to more unequal distributions of taxing rights away from developing countries, in contrast to the findings of earlier studies. Developing countries also become better negotiators as they gain experience

The UK’s tax treaties with developing countries during the 1970s

Tax treaties between developed and developing countries impose considerable costs on the latter, in the form of curbs on their right to tax investment from the former. Existing research assumes that such restrictions are accepted as a quid pro quo for resolving the problem of double taxation, which might act as an obstacle to inward investment. This paper uses archival documents to examine treaty negotiations between the United Kingdom (UK) and developing countries during the 1970s, focusing on contentious provisions concerning ‘tax sparing’, the taxation of shipping, and withholding taxes. Consistent with critical literature on tax treaties, it finds that neither side was concerned about the double taxation problem, which was resolved unilaterally by the UK’s tax credit. Rather, developing countries were primarily focused on obtaining matching tax credits in the UK to maximise the benefits to investors from their tax incentives. UK priorities, meanwhile, were to bind developing countries into OECD-type tax treatment of British firms. Negotiated outcomes did not reflect the true balance of costs and benefits to each side, but their different negotiating capacities, the political salience of particular taxes, and the precedent certain concessions might set for future negotiation

Cashing In: Giant retailers, purchasing practices, and working conditions in the garment industry

The report exposes poor working conditions in companies controlled by five top global retailers-- Carrefour, Walmart, Tesco, Aldi, and Lidl. Includes recommendations for action to reduce violations of labor rights and existing laws

Companies are behaving in precisely the way that our international tax system incentivises them to behave

Government and business have generally sought to distinguish between the vast majority of companies, which engage in ‘reasonable’ tax planning, and a small minority, whose tax avoidance becomes ‘aggressive’. Martin Hearson argues that if the government is committed to serious reform to address tax avoidance, it needs to abandon this distinction. The real problem is the incentives provided by the international tax system, and the real misconception is about what the system is designed to achieve

Tax treaties in sub-Saharan Africa: a critical review

There is growing attention on the question of tax treaties signed by developing countries. To investigate this apparent shift in opinion among policymakers, and to see what lessons can be drawn by other developing countries, Tax Justice Network Africa (TJN-A) commissioned this study of current policy towards tax treaties in Uganda and Zambia, two countries that appear to be questioning past decisions

Let\u27s Clean Up Fashion- The state of pay behind the UK high street 2008

The report surveys wages in the British fashion industry. It describes the Labour Behind the Label living wage initiative and provides information about various British companies and their labor practices