The Patent Paradox Revisited: Determinants of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1980-94

This paper examines the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents, despite the strengthening of US patent rights in the early 1980s. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically over the past decade. This paper explores this apparent paradox by analyzing the patenting activities of almost 100 US semiconductor firms during 1980-94. The results suggest that stronger patents may have facilitated entry by firms in niche product markets, while spawning patent portfolio races' among capital-intensive firms.

The Evolving Role of Semiconductor Consortia in the United States and Japan

This article examines the interactions between public and private actors as cooperation in the semiconductor industry becomes increasingly international. The latest manifestations of multilateral collaboration are two consortia: I300I based in the United States and Selete based in Japan. Through an analysis of their structures and their origins, this article provides a deeper understanding of the complexities facing industry-wide consortia, the role of the government in promoting or inhibiting cooperation, and the lingering rivalries that impede truly global cooperation in a dynamic, high-technology industry

The Patent Paradox Revisited: Determinants of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1980-94

This paper examines the patenting behavior of firms in an industry characterized by rapid technological change and cumulative innovation. Recent evidence suggests that semiconductor firms do not rely heavily on patents, despite the strengthening of US patent rights in the early 1980s. Yet the propensity of semiconductor firms to patent has risen dramatically over the past decade. This paper explores this apparent paradox by analyzing the patenting activities of almost 100 US semiconductor firms during 1980-94. The results suggest that stronger patents may have facilitated entry by firms in niche product markets, while spawning "patent portfolio races" among capital-intensive firms. * Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley; Nuffield College, Oxford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Institute for Fiscal Studies, London. ** Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. JEL codes: O3, K2, L5, M3 Keywords: patents, intellectual property, c..

La politique technologique de Clinton

Clinton Administration Technology Policy, by Rosé Marie Ham and David C. Mowery During the 1992 presidential élection campaign, candidates Bill Clinton and Albert Gore emphasized their commitment to a new federal government policy for the support of innovation in the US economy. This essay provides an early assessment of Clinton Administration technology policy. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this policy framework is its lack of novelty. Many if not most of the initiatives announced by President Clinton in fact originated within the Congress during the Reagan and Bush Administrations. What has changea, of course, is that the Executive branch now is far more deeply committed to the programs that emerged from Congress during the 1980s and early 1990s. Their origins in Congress mean that these programs may survive even the upheavals of the mid-term elections of 1994. But these Congressional origins also pose serions challenges to the effectiveness of the Clinton Administration's technology policies.Au cours de la campagne présidentielle de 1992, les candidats Bill Clinton et Albert Gore avaient souligné leur engagement à adopter une nouvelle politique fédérale en matière de soutien à l'innovation pour l'économie américaine. Cet article propose une première évaluation de la politique technologique de l'Administration Clinton. La caractéristique peut-être la plus marquante de cette politique est son manque de nouveauté. En effet, beaucoup, sinon toutes les initiatives annoncées par le président Clinton avaient été avancées par le Congrès au cours des présidences Reagan et Bush. Le vrai changement concerne, bien sûr, la plus grande implication de l'exécutif en faveur de ces programmes initiés par le Congrès au cours des années 80 et au début de la décennie 90. Le fait que ces « programmes » soient suscités par le Congrès leur permettra de survivre au processus électoral de 1994. Mais le fait que le Congrès soit à l'origine de ces transformations remet en jeu sérieusement l'efficacité des politiques de l'Administration Clinton en matière de technologie.Ham Rose Marie, Mowery David C., Sachwald. La politique technologique de Clinton. In: Politique étrangère, n°4 - 1994 - 59ᵉannée. pp. 991-1004

The Patent Paradox Revisited: Determinants of Patenting in the US Semiconductor Industry, 1980-94

patents, intellectual property, cross-licensing, semiconductor industry, Business, Economic History, Economics, Technology and Innovation

The genome of the stress-tolerant wild tomato species Solanum pennellii.

Solanum pennellii is a wild tomato species endemic to Andean regions in South America, where it has evolved to thrive in arid habitats. Because of its extreme stress tolerance and unusual morphology, it is an important donor of germplasm for the cultivated tomato Solanum lycopersicum. Introgression lines (ILs) in which large genomic regions of S. lycopersicum are replaced with the corresponding segments from S. pennellii can show remarkably superior agronomic performance. Here we describe a high-quality genome assembly of the parents of the IL population. By anchoring the S. pennellii genome to the genetic map, we define candidate genes for stress tolerance and provide evidence that transposable elements had a role in the evolution of these traits. Our work paves a path toward further tomato improvement and for deciphering the mechanisms underlying the myriad other agronomic traits that can be improved with S. pennellii germplasm