Online_supplementary_materials – Supplemental material for Joking about ourselves: Effects of disparaging humor on ingroup stereotyping

<p>Supplemental material, Online_supplementary_materials for Joking about ourselves: Effects of disparaging humor on ingroup stereotyping by Catalina Argüello Gutiérrez, Hugo Carretero-Dios, Guillermo B. Willis, and Miguel Moya in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations</p

sj-docx-1-spp-10.1177_19485506231221310 – Supplemental material for Economic Inequality and Unfairness Evaluations of Income Distribution Negatively Predict Political and Social Trust: Evidence From Latin America Over 23 Years

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-spp-10.1177_19485506231221310 for Economic Inequality and Unfairness Evaluations of Income Distribution Negatively Predict Political and Social Trust: Evidence From Latin America Over 23 Years by Efraín García-Sánchez, Juan Diego García-Castro, Guillermo B. Willis and Rosa Rodríguez-Bailón in Social Psychological and Personality Science</p

Economic threats, political and national identification predict affective polarization: longitudinal evidence from Spain

Economic threats, along with political identities and ideologies, are associated with affective polarization. However, there is still a need to learn more about the consequences of different economic threats and identities fueling polarization. We take a longitudinal perspective in testing the influence of these phenomena on affective polarization. Specifically, we tested the effect of subjective personal and collective economic threats and political, national, regional, and European identities on affective polarization towards politicians and partisans in Spain. We use four waves of the E-DEM panel study from Spain (N = 2,501) collected between 2018 and 2019. We conducted longitudinal multilevel analyses to determine the growth in affective polarization and included predictors at the between- and within-person levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that collective economic threats, such as perceiving more unfairness in the distribution of wealth and being dissatisfied with the Spanish economy, positively predict affective polarization. Contrary to our expectations, personal economic threats did not predict affective polarization. Furthermore, political and national identities positively predicted affective polarization towards politicians and partisans. Interestingly, exploratory analyses suggested that the associations between economic threats, identities, and affective polarization are moderated by political ideology. We discuss how economic threats and identities may exacerbate animosities toward political actors.</p

supplementary material, Final_Supplements_EIandEuropeanIdentity – Two Countries in Crisis: Economic Inequality in the EU and Disidentification With Europe in Spain and Greece

<p>supplementary material, Final_Supplements_EIandEuropeanIdentity for Two Countries in Crisis: Economic Inequality in the EU and Disidentification With Europe in Spain and Greece by Katerina Petkanopoulou, Ángel Sánchez-Rodríguez, Guillermo B. Willis, Xenia Chryssochoou, and Rosa Rodríguez-Bailón in Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology</p