Bounds on the degree of APN polynomials The Case of x−1+g(x)x^{-1}+g(x)

We prove that functions f:\f{2^m} \to \f{2^m} of the form $f(x)=x^{-1}+g(x)$ where $g$ is any non-affine polynomial are APN on at most a finite number of fields \f{2^m}. Furthermore we prove that when the degree of $g$ is less then 7 such functions are APN only if $m \le 3$ where these functions are equivalent to $x^3$

Small Scale Variants Of The Block Cipher PRESENT

In this note we de¯ne small scale variants of the block cipher present [1]. The main reason for this is that the running time of some recent attacks (e.g. [2, 3]) remain unclear as they are based on heuristics that are hard or even impossible to verify in practice. Those attacks usually require the full code bock of present to be available and they work only if some independence assumptions hold in practice. While those assumptions are clearly wrong from a theoretical point of view, the impact on the running times of the attacks in question is not clear. With versions of present with smaller block size it might be possible to verify how those attacks scale for those versions and hopefully learn something about present itself

A Highly Nonlinear Differentially 4 Uniform Power Mapping That Permutes Fields of Even Degree

Functions with low differential uniformity can be used as the s-boxes of symmetric cryptosystems as they have good resistance to differential attacks. The AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) uses a differentially-4 uniform function called the inverse function. Any function used in a symmetric cryptosystem should be a permutation. Also, it is required that the function is highly nonlinear so that it is resistant to Matsui's linear attack. In this article we demonstrate that a highly nonlinear permutation discovered by Hans Dobbertin has differential uniformity of four and hence, with respect to differential and linear cryptanalysis, is just as suitable for use in a symmetric cryptosystem as the inverse function.Comment: 10 pages, submitted to Finite Fields and Their Application

4-Uniform Permutations with Null Nonlinearity

We consider $n$-bit permutations with differential uniformity of 4 and null nonlinearity. We first show that the inverses of Gold functions have the interesting property that one component can be replaced by a linear function such that it still remains a permutation. This directly yields a construction of 4-uniform permutations with trivial nonlinearity in odd dimension. We further show their existence for all $n = 3$ and $n \geq 5$ based on a construction in [1]. In this context, we also show that 4-uniform 2-1 functions obtained from admissible sequences, as defined by Idrisova in [8], exist in every dimension $n = 3$ and $n \geq 5$. Such functions fulfill some necessary properties for being subfunctions of APN permutations. Finally, we use the 4-uniform permutations with null nonlinearity to construct some 4-uniform 2-1 functions from $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ to $\mathbb{F}_2^{n-1}$ which are not obtained from admissible sequences. This disproves a conjecture raised by Idrisova

Constructing new APN functions from known ones

We present a method for constructing new quadratic APN functions from known ones. Applying this method to the Gold power functions we construct an APN function x^3+\tr(x^9) over \F_{2^n}. It is proven that in general this function is CCZ-inequivalent to the Gold functions (and therefore EA-inequivalent to power functions), to the inverse and Dobbertin mappings, and in the case $n=7$ it is CCZ-inequivalent to all power mappings

Pitfalls and Shortcomings for Decompositions and Alignment (Full Version)

In this paper we, for the first time, study the question under which circumstances decomposing a round function of a Substitution-Permutation Network is possible uniquely. More precisely, we provide necessary and sufficient criteria for the non-linear layer on when a decomposition is unique. Our results in particular imply that, when cryptographically strong S-boxes are used, the decomposition is indeed unique. We then apply our findings to the notion of alignment, pointing out that the previous definition allows for primitives that are both aligned and unaligned simultaneously. As a second result, we present experimental data that shows that alignment might only have limited impact. For this, we compare aligned and unaligned versions of the cipher PRESENT

An Assessment of Differential-Neural Distinguishers

Since the introduction of differential-neural cryptanalysis, as the machine learning assisted differential cryptanalysis proposed in [Goh19] is coined by now, a lot of followup works have been published, showing the applicability for a wide variety of ciphers. In this work, we set out to vet a multitude of differential-neural distinguishers presented so far, and additionally provide general insights. Firstly, we show for a selection of different ciphers how differential-neural distinguishers for those ciphers can be (automatically) optimized, also providing guidance to do so for other ciphers as well. Secondly, we explore a correlation between a differential-neural distinguisher\u27s accuracy and a standard notion of difference between the two underlying distributions. Furthermore, we show that for a whole (practically relevant) class of ciphers, the differential-neural distinguisher can use differential features only. At last, we also rectify a common mistake in current literature, and show that, making use of an idea already presented in the foundational work[Goh19], the claimed improvements from using multiple ciphertext-pairs at once are at most marginal, if not non-existent

Nonlinear Approximations in Cryptanalysis Revisited

This work studies deterministic and non-deterministic nonlinear approximations for cryptanalysis of block ciphers and cryptographic permutations and embeds it into the well-understood framework of linear cryptanalysis. For a deterministic (i.e., with correlation ±1) nonlinear approximation we show that in many cases, such a nonlinear approximation implies the existence of a highly-biased linear approximation. For non-deterministic nonlinear approximations, by transforming the cipher under consideration by conjugating each keyed instance with a fixed permutation, we are able to transfer many methods from linear cryptanalysis to the nonlinear case. Using this framework we in particular show that there exist ciphers for which some transformed versions are significantly weaker with regard to linear cryptanalysis than their original counterparts