Costly Information, Entry, and Credit Access

Using a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric information and differing comparative advantages among lenders, this paper analyzes the impact of lender entry on credit access and aggregate net output. The model shows that lender entry has the potential to create a segmented market that increases credit access for those firms targeted by the new lenders but potentially reduces credit access for all other firms. The overall impact on net output depends on the distribution of firms, the relative costs of lenders, and the cost of acquiring information. The model provides new insights into the evidence regarding foreign lenders\u27 entry into emerging markets

The Impact of Foreign Bank Entry in Emerging Markets: Evidence From India

This paper uses the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s—analyzing variation in both the timing of the new foreign banks’ entries and in their location—to estimate the effect of foreign bank entry on domestic credit access and firm performance. In contrast to the belief that foreign bank entry should improve credit access for all firms, the estimates indicate that foreign banks financed only a small set of very profitable firms upon entry, and that on average, firms were 8 percentage points less likely to have a loan after a foreign bank entry because of a systematic drop in domestic bank loans. Similar estimates are obtained using the location of pre-existing foreign firms as an instrument for foreign bank locations. Moreover, the observed decline in loans is greater among smaller firms, firms with fewer tangible assets, and firms affiliated with business groups. The drop in credit also appears to adversely affect the performance of smaller firms with greater dependence on external financing. Overall, this evidence is consistent with the exacerbation of information asymmetries upon foreign bank entry

CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk: Evidence From a Natural Experiment

This paper examines the two-way relationship between managerial compensation and corporate risk by exploiting an unanticipated change in firms\u27 business risks. The natural experiment provides an opportunity to examine two classic questions related to incentives and risk—how boards adjust incentives in response to firms\u27 risk and how these incentives affect managers\u27 risk-taking. We find that, after left-tail risk increases, boards reduce managers\u27 exposure to stock price movements and that less convexity from options-based pay leads to greater risk-reducing activities. Specifically, managers with less convex payoffs tend to cut leverage and R&D, stockpile cash, and engage in more diversifying acquisitions

Do Public Equity Markets Matter in Emerging Economies? Evidence From India

Do public equity markets serve an unique role that is not easily served by other forms of financing in emerging economies? We analyze this question using the collapse of India’s equity market in 1997, which provides an exogenous shock to firms’ ability to issue equity. We find that both public and private firms exhibit higher bankruptcy rates and lower growth after 1997. The decline in growth is greater among firms with more external finance needs and fewer tangible assets. Overall, the evidence suggests that public equity markets are an important, not easily replaced, source of finance in emerging economies

Growing Out of Trouble? Corporate Responses to Liability Risk

This article analyzes corporate responses to the liability risk arising from workers\u27 exposure to newly identified carcinogens. We find that firms, especially those with weak balance sheets, tend to respond to such risks by acquiring large, unrelated businesses with relatively high operating cash flows. The diversifying growth appears to be primarily motivated by managers\u27 personal exposure to their firms\u27 risk in that the growth has negative announcement returns and is related to firms\u27 external governance, managerial stockholdings, and institutional ownership. The results suggest that corporate governance is particularly important when firms are exposed to the risk of large, adverse shocks

Common Errors: How to (and Not to) Control for Unobserved Heterogeneity

Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (or “common errors”), such as industry-specific shocks, is a fundamental challenge in empirical research.This paper discusses the limitations of two approaches widely used in corporate finance and asset pricing research: demeaning the dependent variable with respect to the group (e.g., “industry-adjusting”) and adding the mean of the group\u27s dependent variable as a control. We show that these methods produce inconsistent estimates and can distort inference. In contrast, the fixed effects estimator is consistent and should be used instead. We also explain how to estimate the fixed effects model when traditional methods are computationally infeasible

Essays on banking and corporate finance in developing countries

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.Includes bibliographical references.This dissertation consists of three essays that examine banking and corporate finance in developing countries. Specifically, it explores the theoretical and empirical implications of open capital markets, foreign bank entry, and the role of bond markets during banking crises. Chapter 1 analyzes the impact of opening capital markets using a theoretical model that incorporates both foreign and domestic lenders in the presence of asymmetric information. The model suggests that when foreign lenders are limited in their ability to obtain information about entrepreneurs, they may engage in cream-skimming by only targeting the largest, most profitable firms. This cream-skimming can induce a reallocation of credit that may either increase or decrease overall net output of the open economy. The consequences of this credit reallocation depend on the type of financial opening and the quality of domestic institutions. Chapter 2 examines the entry of foreign banks as a specific case of opening capital markets. I estimate the impact of entry using variation in the location of foreign banks established in India following a policy change in 1994. The estimates indicate that the 10 percent most profitable firms received larger bank loans, but that on average, firms were 7.6 percentage points less likely to have a loan after entry.(cont.) The decline in loans was uncorrelated with firms' profitability and driven by a decrease among group-affiliated firms. The reallocation is consistent with the presence of asymmetric information, and similar estimates are obtained using the location of pre-existing foreign firms as an instrument for the location choice of new banks. Chapter 3, co-authored with Simon Johnson and Changyong Rhee, uses a quasi-natural experiment in Korea after the 1997-98 financial crises to assess bond markets in emerging economies. Evidence confirms that bond markets can develop quickly during a banking crisis and act as a 'spare tire' even when almost all previous private finance flowed through the banking system. However, access to bonds was feasible only for the largest firms, and there is no evidence that bond finance was better directed than bank finance. Firms with weaker pre-crisis corporate governance were no less likely to obtain bond financing.by Todd A. Gormley.Ph.D

Limited Participation and Consumption-Saving Puzzles: A Simple Explanation and the Role of Insurance

In this paper, we show that the existence of a large, negative wealth shock and insufficient insurance against such a shock could explain both the limited stock market participation puzzle and the low-consumption–high-savings puzzle. We then conduct an empirical analysis on the relation between household portfolio choices and access to private insurance and various types of government safety nets. The empirical results demonstrate that a lack of insurance against large, negative wealth shocks is positively correlated with lower participation rates and higher saving rates. Overall, the evidence suggests an important role of insurance in household investment and savings decisions

Ending “Too Big To Fail”: Government Promises Versus Investor Perceptions

Can a government credibly promise not to bailout firms whose failure would have major negative systemic consequences? Our analysis of Korea’s 1997–98 crisis suggests an answer: No. Despite a general “no bailout” policy during the crisis, the largest Korean corporate groups—facing severe financial and governance problems—could still borrow heavily from households by issuing bonds at prices implying very low expected default risk. The evidence suggests “too big to fail” beliefs were not eliminated by government promises because investors believed that this policy was not time consistent. Subsequent bailouts confirmed the market view that creditors would be protected

Do Firms Adjust Their Timely Loss Recognition in Response to Changes in the Banking Industry?

This paper investigates the impact of changes in the banking sector on firms’ timely recognition of economic losses. In particular, we focus on the entry of foreign banks into India during the 1990s, which likely causes an exogenous increase in lender demand for timely loss recognition. Analyzing variation in both the timing and the location of the new foreign banks’ entries, we find that foreign bank entry is associated with more timely loss recognition and this increase is positively related to a firm\u27s subsequent debt levels. The change appears driven by a shift in firms’ incentives to supply additional information to lenders and lenders seem to value this information. The increase in timely loss recognition is also concentrated among firms more dependent on external financing: private firms, smaller firms, and nongroup firms. Overall, our evidence suggests that a firm\u27s accounting choices respond to changes in the banking industry