Imminent Nash Implementation as a Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma

This paper offers a solution to King Solomon's problem of allocating an indivisible "prize" to two agents. We add time dimension to the original space of outcomes and construct a static mechanism similar to the one used in virtual implementation. The implementation is imminent: the mechanism results in the original outcome, which is provided with an arbitrarily small delay.implementation

Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents

Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA). Although truth-telling is a dominant strategy, almost all applicants may be non-truthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results imply that one can assume truthful agents to study DA outcomes, theoretically or counterfactually. However, to estimate the preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth-telling

Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help?

Matching, Market design, Wage competition, C78, D43, J41,

Effect of wall electrical conductivity and transverse magnetic field on turbulent mercury flows in nonuniformly heated pipes

The problem of mixed convection of mercury in a horizontal circular tube heated from below under the effect of a transverse magnetic field is examined. A numerical study was performed using the LES method in a conjugate formulation including the wall which may be with or without a fouling layer (deposits) with low electrical conductivity on its inner surface. To simulate the subgrid viscosity, the CSM model was used. In the case with a Reynolds numbers of Re0 = 5000, Hartmann number of Ha0 = 150, Grashof number of Gr0 = 2.75×106, which is based on the inner radius of the pipe, and Prandtl number of Pr = 0.024, a strong influence of the fouling layer electrical conductivity on the fluid flow structure and the amplitude and frequency of fluctuations of temperature, velocity, and electric potential has been found

Matching and Economic Design

This article presents a brief survey of two-sided matching. We introduce the reader to the problem of two-sided matching in the context of the college admission model and explain two central requirements for a matching mechanism: stability and non-manipulability. We show how the frequently used ‘Boston Mechanism’ fails these key requirements and describe how an alternative, the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, leads to stable matchings but fails to be non-manipulable in general. A third mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle, is efficient and non-manipulable when only one side of the match acts strategically. We also discuss some applications of matching theory