Exchange of Services in Networks: Competition, Cooperation, and Fairness

Exchange of services and resources in, or over, networks is attracting nowadays renewed interest. However, despite the broad applicability and the extensive study of such models, e.g., in the context of P2P networks, many fundamental questions regarding their properties and efficiency remain unanswered. We consider such a service exchange model and analyze the users' interactions under three different approaches. First, we study a centrally designed service allocation policy that yields the fair total service each user should receive based on the service it others to the others. Accordingly, we consider a competitive market where each user determines selfishly its allocation policy so as to maximize the service it receives in return, and a coalitional game model where users are allowed to coordinate their policies. We prove that there is a unique equilibrium exchange allocation for both game theoretic formulations, which also coincides with the central fair service allocation. Furthermore, we characterize its properties in terms of the coalitions that emerge and the equilibrium allocations, and analyze its dependency on the underlying network graph. That servicing policy is the natural reference point to the various mechanisms that are currently proposed to incentivize user participation and improve the efficiency of such networked service (or, resource) exchange markets.Comment: to appear in ACM Sigmetrics 201

Regions' Size and Regional Competitiveness in the 4th EU Programming Period, 2007-2013. Regional Units in Greece.

(This paper is the result of a research program that was carried out by the Laboratory for Evaluation of Development Policies and Programs, University of Thessaly, for the Greek Ministry of Economics and National Economy). Does size matter? Is regional competitiveness affected by the regions size? Are regional problems in Greece the same or differentiated among regions? Could an administrative reform create better development preconditions? The designation of the 13 Regions in the 80s in Greece basically stemmed from the need to create development units for programming and managing the development planning. Nonetheless, the designation of regions under the effect of historical factors and political expediency led to uneven area as well as population sizes. Moreover, up to today, Greece has put its major developmental effort in the infrastructures sector, while the new 4th programming period 2007-2013 imposes competitiveness objectives and an integration of the Lisbon Strategy in the Coherence policy that constitute an innovation for the Greek reality. Thus, the question occurs whether the Greek Regions are capable to formulate and implement corresponding strategies and programmes. This paper discusses the performance of the 13 Greek regions against other comparable EU regions and presents indexes reflecting the relative progress of the Greek regions, through critical review of statistical data concerning development level and regional competitiveness. At the same time the paper considers how a restructure of resources, competences, and geographical boundaries will enable: i. Concentration of managerial effort ii. Better control of programme implementation. iii. Better utilization of the limited available personnel . iv. More economical use of equipment and facilities. And finally programme operation monitoring at the regional level through the formation of larger and more powerful regional entities, vis-vis the central Administration. To this purpose administrative decentralization schemes of various EU Countries are reviewed. The paper proposes a restructuring as follows: All the competences concerning decision-making and management of the programming are concentrated to Regional Unions. The Regions retain only proposal functions, as centers of local bodies¢ consensus and local initiatives' mobilization. The paper also elaborates on a generalized administrative scheme for the Unions and the Regions. Summing up the discussion highlights the necessity to form larger and more powerful regional units in Greece, where one¢s strategic disadvantages will be compensated by the advantages of the other and through them many local economies altogether will build a scale capable to integrate their productive structure, to cause the emergence of new functions and to constitute their negotiatory advantage for FDI and activities attraction.

Regional Competitiveness: In Search of a Framework for Greek Regions Strategic Planning and Measurement of Competitiveness.

(This paper is the result of a research program that was carried out by the Laboratory for Evaluation of Development Policies and Programs, University of Thessaly). Greek economy, after nominal converging with other western European countries and meeting the accession criteria to the European Monetary Union, sets as a new objective the attainment of “real†convergence. Success in this objective, while operating in a globalized economic environment and the single European market, will be judged on the choice of a development policy focused on competitiveness and regional development. This paper exactly aims at informing the strategic planning of a regional competitiveness policy. Especially, it intends to set specifications for a regional competitiveness strategy, to define actions at an institutional level for its implementation and to propose a quantification and measurement system of its results. Based on the definition of competitiveness and its determinant factors for each level (national, branch, enterprise, regional) and how they are intertwined, the necessity for a regional competitiveness strategy is validated by a critical analysis of Greek economy¢s recent related data and performance. The frame in which Greek regions¢ competitiveness problems will be addressed is analyzed under the light of the European Union¢s new regional development policies Furthermore, the article analyzes the competitiveness strategic planning of Greece and Greek regions in interventions of the current programming period. Namely, it evaluates the extent at which competitiveness is identified and specified in the Community Support Programme, the Competitiveness Operational Programme and the SWOT analyses of the Regional Operational Programmes. Moreover the policies that implement the European regional policy (CSP, OP) and the competitiveness policy (COP) are being evaluated on aspects that include fund allocation, strategy update, regional priorities, implementation progress, efficiency, performance, and synergies, as far as competitiveness and its determinant factors are concerned. Based on literature review, the paper assesses and analyzes the most renowned benchmark systems of countries¢ and regions¢ competitiveness. This paper results to a coherent set of proposals for regional competitiveness policy strategic planning. Particularly, it defines requests towards the aforementioned policy and identifies important issues for the forthcoming programming period. It proposes the establishment of regional agencies analogous to the National Competitiveness and Development Council, alternative organizational forms and a typical action plan. It defines an index set for Greek regions¢ competitiveness benchmarking, a synthesis and utilization methodology, and evaluates the documentation of available data.

Optimal monitoring design

This paper considers a Principal–Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for the frequently observed single-bonus wage contracts

Flexible moral hazard problems

This paper considers a moral hazard problem where the agent can choose any output distribution with a support in a given compact set. The agent's effort-cost is smooth and increasing in first-order stochastic dominance. To analyze this model, we develop a generalized notion of the first-order approach applicable to optimization problems over measures. We demonstrate each output distribution can be implemented and identify those contracts that implement that distribution. These contracts are characterized by a simple first-order condition for each output that equates the agent's marginal cost of changing the implemented distribution around that output with its marginal benefit. Furthermore, the agent's wage is shown to be increasing in output. Finally, we consider the problem of a profit-maximizing principal and provide a first-order characterization of principal-optimal distributions

Project design with limited commitment and teams

We study the interaction between a group of agents who exert effort to complete a project and a manager who chooses its objectives. The manager has limited commitment power so that she can commit to the objectives only when the project is sufficiently close to completion. We show that the manager has incentives to extend the project as it progresses. This result has two implications. First, the manager will choose a larger project if she has less commitment power. Second, the manager should delegate the decision rights over the project size to the agents unless she has sufficient commitment power