Can We Build Behavioral Game Theory?

The way economists and other social scientists model how people make interdependent decisions is through the theory of games. Psychologists and behavioral economists, however, have established many deviations from the predictions of game theory. In response to these findings, a broad movement has arisen to salvage the core of game theory. Extant models of interdependent decision-making try to improve their explanatory domain by adding some corrective terms or limits. We will make the argument that this approach is misguided. For this approach to work, the deviations would have to be consistent. Drawing in part on our experimental results, we will argue that deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In turn, the problem of finding an equilibrium strategy is not easier but rather is exponentially more difficult. It does not seem that game theory can be repaired by adding corrective terms (such as consideration of personal characteristics, social norms, heuristic or bias terms, or cognitive limits on choice and learning). In what follows, we describe new methods for investigating interdependent decision-making. Our experimental results show that people do not choose consistently, do not hold consistent beliefs, and do not in general align actions and beliefs. We will show that experimental choices are inconsistent in ways that prevent us from drawing general characterizations of an individual’s choices or beliefs or of the general population\u27s choices and beliefs. A general behavioral game theory seems a distant and, at present, unfulfilled hope

Against Game Theory

People make choices. Often, the outcome depends on choices other people make. What mental steps do people go through when making such choices? Game theory, the most influential model of choice in economics and the social sciences, offers an answer, one based on games of strategy such as chess and checkers: the chooser considers the choices that others will make and makes a choice that will lead to a better outcome for the chooser, given all those choices by other people. It is universally established in the social sciences that classical game theory (even when heavily modified) is bad at predicting behavior. But instead of abandoning classical game theory, those in the social sciences have mounted a rescue operation under the name of “behavioral game theory.” Its main tool is to propose systematic deviations from the predictions of game theory, deviations that arise from character type, for example. Other deviations purportedly come from cognitive overload or limitations. The fundamental idea of behavioral game theory is that, if we know the deviations, then we can correct our predictions accordingly, and so get it right. There are two problems with this rescue operation, each of them is fatal. (1) For a chooser, contemplating the range of possible deviations, as there are many dozens, actually makes it exponentially harder to figure out a path to an outcome. This makes the theoretical models useless for modeling human thought or human behavior in general. (2) Modeling deviations are helpful only if the deviations are consistent, so that scientists (and indeed decision makers) can make predictions about future choices on the basis of past choices. But the deviations are not consistent. In general, deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In addition, people’s beliefs are in general not consistent with their choices. Accordingly, all hope is hollow that we can construct a general behavioral game theory. What can replace it? We survey some of the emerging candidates

Estimating Potential Ground and Surface Water Pollution from Land Application of Poultry Litter - II

In Arkansas, approximately 1 Tg of poultry (Gallus gallus domesticus) manure and litter is produced annually. These waste products are commonly applied to pastures as a soil amendment or fertilizer, but excessive application rates and poor management practices could result in nutrient contamination of ground and surface water. The purpose of this study was to: (1) assess the nutrient concentrations in poultry manure and (2) evaluate the nitrogen loss from land-applied poultry litter and manure due to ammonia volatilization and denitrification. Analyses for total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), inorganic nitrogen (Ni), phosphorus (P), and potassium (K) were compared in 12 wet and dry hen manure samples. Drying the manure reduced the TKN from 57 to 40 g N/kg on a dry weight basis in wet and dry manure, respectively. The Ni in the manure was in the ammoniacal form with values of 19 and 2 g N/kg for wet and dry manure, respectively. The P and K levels were not influenced by drying the manure and had values of 24 and 21 g/kg, respectively. The results indicate that the nitrogen content of hen manure can be significantly reduced by drying the sample prior to analysis. In a 10-day laboratory study and an 11-day field study to evaluate ammonia volatilization from surface-applied hen manure, results indicated that 37% of the total nitrogen content of the manure was lost. The results indicated that a substantial amount of nitrogen in surface-applied poultry waste can be lost due to ammonia volatilization. Laboratory studies to evaluate denitrification in a Captina silt loam amended with 9 Mg/ha of poultry litter were conducted. When the soil was aerobically incubated for 168 h and then flooded for 66 h, the nitrate-nitrogen level decreased a net of 17 mg N/kg. The results indicated that, if the ammoniacal nitrogen in the litter is oxidized to nitrate under aerobic conditions and then the soil is flooded and available carbon is present, denitrification can occur rapidly. Results from these studies indicate that soil and environmental conditions playa critical role in determining the potential for nitrate pollution of ground and surface water when poultry manure and litter are surface-applied to pastures

Deciding the Winner of an Arbitrary Finite Poset Game is PSPACE-Complete

A poset game is a two-player game played over a partially ordered set (poset) in which the players alternate choosing an element of the poset, removing it and all elements greater than it. The first player unable to select an element of the poset loses. Polynomial time algorithms exist for certain restricted classes of poset games, such as the game of Nim. However, until recently the complexity of arbitrary finite poset games was only known to exist somewhere between NC^1 and PSPACE. We resolve this discrepancy by showing that deciding the winner of an arbitrary finite poset game is PSPACE-complete. To this end, we give an explicit reduction from Node Kayles, a PSPACE-complete game in which players vie to chose an independent set in a graph

Reactive Force Field for Proton Diffusion in BaZrO3 using an empirical valence bond approach

A new reactive force field to describe proton diffusion within the solid-oxide fuel cell material BaZrO3 has been derived. Using a quantum mechanical potential energy surface, the parameters of an interatomic potential model to describe hydroxyl groups within both pure and yttrium-doped BaZrO3 have been determined. Reactivity is then incorporated through the use of the empirical valence bond model. Molecular dynamics simulations (EVB-MD) have been performed to explore the diffusion of hydrogen using a stochastic thermostat and barostat whose equations are extended to the isostress-isothermal ensemble. In the low concentration limit, the presence of yttrium is found not to significantly influence the diffusivity of hydrogen, despite the proton having a longer residence time at oxygen adjacent to the dopant. This lack of influence is due to the fact that trapping occurs infrequently, even when the proton diffuses through octahedra adjacent to the dopant. The activation energy for diffusion is found to be 0.42 eV, in good agreement with experimental values, though the prefactor is slightly underestimated.Comment: Corrected titl

The nonlinear Bernstein-Schr\"odinger equation in Economics

In this paper we relate the Equilibrium Assignment Problem (EAP), which is underlying in several economics models, to a system of nonlinear equations that we call the "nonlinear Bernstein-Schr\"odinger system", which is well-known in the linear case, but whose nonlinear extension does not seem to have been studied. We apply this connection to derive an existence result for the EAP, and an efficient computational method.Comment: 8 pages, submitted to Lecture Notes in Computer Scienc

J/psi dissociation by light mesons in an extended Nambu Jona-Lasinio model

An alternative model for the dissociation of the J/psi is proposed. Chiral symmetry is properly implemented. Abnormal parity interactions and mesonic form factors naturally arise from the underlying quark sub-structure. Analytic confinement for the light quarks is generated by appropriately chosen the quark interaction kernels. Dissociation cross sections of the J/psi by either a pion or a rho meson are then evaluated and discussed.Comment: 24 pages, 13 figures, final versio

Interferometry of direct photons in Pb+Pb collisions at 158 AGeV

We present final results from the WA98 experiment which provide first measurements of Bose-Einstein correlations of direct photons in ultrarelativistic heavy ion collisions. Invariant interferometric radii were extracted in the range $100<K_T<300$ MeV/c and compared to interferometric radii of charged pions. The yield of direct photons for $100<p_T<300$ MeV/c was extracted from the correlation strength parameter and compared to the yield of direct photons measured in WA98 at higher $p_T$ with the statistical subtraction method, and to predictions of a fireball model.Comment: 4 pages, 3 figures, proceedings for Quark Matter 200