On the C*-algebra Generated by Toeplitz Operators and Fourier Multipliers on the Hardy Space of a Locally Compact Group

Let $G$ be a locally compact abelian Hausdorff topological group which is non-compact and whose Pontryagin dual $\Gamma$ is partially ordered. Let $\Gamma^{+}\subset\Gamma$ be the semigroup of positive elements in $\Gamma$. The Hardy space $H^{2}(G)$ is the closed subspace of $L^{2}(G)$ consisting of functions whose Fourier transforms are supported on $\Gamma^{+}$. In this paper we consider the C*-algebra $C^{*}(\mathcal{T}(G)\cup F(C(\dot{\Gamma^{+}})))$ generated by Toeplitz operators with continuous symbols on $G$ which vanish at infinity and Fourier multipliers with symbols which are continuous on one point compactification of $\Gamma^{+}$ on the Hilbert-Hardy space $H^{2}(G)$. We characterize the character space of this C*-algebra using a theorem of Power.Comment: 11 page

Essential Spectra of Quasi-parabolic Composition Operators on Hardy Spaces of the Poly-disc

This work is a generalization of the results in [Gul] to bi-disc case. As in [Gul], quasi-parabolic composition operators on the Hilbert-Hardy space of the bi-disc are written as a linear combination of Toeplitz operators and Fourier multipliers. The C*-algebra generated by Toeplitz operators and Fourier multipliers on the Hilbert-Hardy space of the bi-disc is written as the tensor product of the similar C*-algebra in one variable with itself. As a result we find a nontrivial set lying inside the essential spectra of quasi-parabolic composition operators

May Free Capital mobility before accession be unfavorable for admission to the EU ?

We examine the dynamics that may compensate the cost of redistribution policy in the European Union (EU), which is one of the obstacles for a candidate member country, namely Turkey to be admitted. We adress two main issues : i) may a total factor productivity (TFP) increases in the candidate country due to the positive effect of accession on institutional development compensate the cost of redistribution policy and ii) may free capital mobility before accession decrease EU’s incentive for admitting the candidate country. In a two-country model we assume that after Turkish accession, the European household gives a transfer to the Turkish household whereas an upwart TFP shift arises in Turkey due to the positive effect of accession on institutional development. We first find that a TFP increase in Turkey compensates the cost of transfer. Second, allowing for free capital mobility before accession turns out to be unfavorable for admission to the EU.EU accession, Turkey, capital mobility