Discussing epistemic injustice: expertise at trial and feminist science

Il contributo discute la nozione di ingiustizia epistemica, con specifico riferimento all’ingiustizia di genere, nata all’interno degli studi di epistemologia sociale, testandone le potenzialità applicative in ambito giudiziario. In particolare, la prova scientifica potrebbe, qualora utilizzata dal giudice con atteggiamento deferente, provocare ipotesi di ingiustizia epistemica, sia nella fase di formazione del sapere scientifico mobilitato in giudizio, sia nel suo utilizzo.The paper discusses the notion of epistemic injustice, with specific reference to gender injustice, which arose within the studies of social epistemology, testing its potential applications in the judicial field. In particular, scientific evidence could, if used by the judge with a deferential attitude, generate hypotheses of epistemic injustice, both at the stage of the formation of scientific knowledge mobilized in court and in its use

L'obbedienza al diritto tra ragioni e cause

The paper targets the interaction between new neuroscientific findings on decision-making and the theoretical concept of legal obedience.Beyond the naturalistic framework, it will be argued that every legal system requires a specific model of agency, in whose definition the scientific claims have now a promi-nent role. The classic model of rational agent, issued from the Penal Enlightment, will be challenged with respect to three main neuroscientific assumptions. The first one will be the reduction of the experience of agency under coercion; the second one will be the increasing role of emotions in the understanding of the so called ‘neuromoral network’; the last one will be the ‘bounded rationality’ giving rise to nudging policies

Emozioni e teoria del giudizio: una prima ricostruzione

The paper focuses on the effects of recent psychological findings on the theory of adjudication \u2013 putting emphasis on the role played by emotions in the decisionmaking process. Two different philosophical claims will be analysed, starting from the very famous topos of digestive justice: the idea that the decision-making process is completely predictable (determinism) versus the irrationality of the decision claimed by the realists. In the conclusion a non-naturalistic perspective will be sketched, aiming at including the novel knowledge arising from psychology \u2013 i.e. emotions are part of physiological process of decision-makin

Responsibility and practical reason: a dialogical perspective

This paper tries to emancipate the concept of legal responsibility from the free will debate, by endorsing a theory of responsibility grounded on practical reason. New emerging neuroscientific findings, indeed, have challenged the traditional idea of responsibility the western legal systems rely on, which is supposed to hold the legacy of the theological idea of free will. Instead, the paper considers the classical roots of legal responsibility as a plausible genealogy of the contemporary notion, following the Oxfordian renaissance of the Aristotelean logos and practical reason. Acknowledging the classical heritage, in particular the peculiar version of judicial Rhetoric epitomized by Roman law, it is thus possible to reconsider the role played by neuroscientific findings in their supposed threaten to legal responsibility, promoting a theory of responsibility based on the dialogical dimension of legal rationality