Questioning the group-based approach to social equality in the post-apartheid South Africa

In this paper, I investigate whether the pursuit of group-based social equality should constitute a political goal or not. I explain that social equality refers to the mechanism for horizontal presentation of opportunities to individuals in a given society to express their abilities. It could also mean the right to vie, contest, compete or take advantage of certain opportunities or even to the freedom to pursue or obtain certain opportunities among free citizens in any society. I argue that the position of the mainstream European South African population seems to be that this should be an individual-based exercise since the sectional policy of apartheid has been disestablished. However, the majority of native South Africans appear to hold that since the post-apartheid South African society is heavily lopsided that the pursuit of social equality, especially by the natives who experience great economic disadvantage as a political goal, should be group-based in order to address comprehensively the social and economic ills of apartheid. This groupbased approach is challenged by European South Africans who argue that it introduces another form of inequality that places them at a disadvantage. I will analyze the arguments on both sides and attempt to justify the group-based approach in the light of the post-apartheid peculiar circumstances of native South Africans.Keywords: social equality, political goal, individual, group, South African society, aparthei

Why African Philosophers should build systems: An exercise in conversational thinking

At the height of the Great Debate about the existence or otherwise of African philosophy, Kwasi Wiredu bemoaned the dearth of originality in the practice of African philosophy. For him, African philosophers should now go beyond talking about African philosophy and get down to actually doing it. But what does it mean to do African philosophy? And what is the importance of actually doing African philosophy? In this paper, I will argue that doing African philosophy should involve, among other things, system-building. I will argue that the growth of the discipline and the advancement of Africa’s intellectual history constitute strong reasons for African philosophers to aim at building systems in this era. I will highlight existing attempts at system-building in African philosophy and show their weaknesses in order to project conversational thinking as a better framework. I will conclude by arguing that systembuilding is part of the overall goal of conversational philosophy, which has been demonstrated in some quarters as the future direction ofAfrican philosophy.Keywords: African philosophy, system-building, conversational thinking, conversational philosoph

Language, thought, and interpersonal communication: a cross-cultural conversation on the question of individuality and community

The ongoing debate among African philosophers on the relation of the individual and the community has spawned radical, moderate, and limited communitarian views. In this paper we will insert the question of interpersonal communication into the individual-community conundrum and raise the discourse to the level of cross-cultural engagement. We will highlight the dominant perspectives in Afro-communitarianism with particular emphasis on the Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye and the Nigerian philosopher Ifeanyi Menkiti. Expanding the discourse into the domain of intercultural/comparative philosophy, this paper will engage Gyekye and Menkiti’s Afro-communitarianism and Jean-Paul Sartre’s radical individualism and the resulting conflictual presentation of interpersonal relation. The paper adopts the conversational method.Keywords: Ifeanyi Menkiti, Kwame Gyekye, Afro-communitarianism, community, individual, Jean-Paul Sartr

Protecting the rights of victims in transitional justice : an interrogation of amnesty

The authors argue in this article that some categories of amnesty programmes, such as ‘blanket’ and ‘self-granted amnesties’ that bar the prosecution of perpetrators, have not been very helpful in the protection of the rights of victims in transitional justice. They contend, before embarking on widespread abuses of human rights since the post-ICJ era, that most perpetrators, especially dictators, often are aware of the legal odds but feel confident that if their regimes collapse, they would press for amnesty at least in return for a transitional process involving cooperation, surrender, confession, reparation and reconciliation. The Chilean, Peruvian and Sri Lankan cases have become citeable precedents. This reliance presents these categories of amnesty as unjust instruments of transitional justice. The article proposes a rule of law-based transitional justice that will involve an adjustment in the international law as a viable alternative to some amnesty programmes that appear to shield perpetrators from justice.http://www.ahrlj.up.ac.zaam2020Philosoph