Reputational concerns in arbitration: Decision bias and information acquisition

We analyze how reputational concerns of arbitrators affect the quality of their decision process, in particular, information acquisition and bias. We assume that arbitrators differ in their ability to observe the state of the world and that information acquisition is costly and unobservable. We show that reputational concerns increase incentives for information acquisition but may induce arbitrators to bias their decisions towards one party in the dispute. This decision bias is greater when the dispute proceedings are confidential rather than public. Building on these results, we study the circumstances under which the parties to a contract choose to employ arbitration rather than litigation in court to resolve their disputes

The theory of incentives applied to the transport sector

Building upon Iossa and Martimort (2008), we study the main incentive issues and the form of optimal contracts for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in transports. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse firm chooses unobservable efforts in infrastructure and service quality. We begin by analyzing the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and operation into a single contract. We consider the factors that affect the optimal allocation of demand risk and their implications for the choice of contract length. We discuss the dynamics of PPP contracts and how the risk of regulatory opportunism affects contract design and incentives

The simple micro-economics of public-private partnerships

We build a unified theoretical framework to analyze the main incentive issues in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the shape of optimal contracts in those contexts. We present a basic model of procurement in a multitask environment in which a risk-averse agent chooses unobservable efforts in cost reduction and quality improvement. We begin by studying the effect on incentives and risk transfer of bundling building and operation into a single contract, allowing for different assumptions on the contractual framework and the quality of the information held by the government. We then extend the basic model in several directions. We consider the factors that affect the optimal allocation of demand risk and their implications for the use of user charges and the choice of contract length. We study the relationship between the operator and its financiers and the impact of private finance. We discuss the trade-off between incentive and flexibility in long-term PPP agreements and the dynamics of PPP contracts, including cost overruns. We also consider how the institutional environment, and specifically the risk of regulatory opportunism, affects contract design and incentives. We conclude with some policy implications on the desirability of PPPs

Vertical integration and costly demand information in regulated network industries

We study how vertical integration in regulated network industries affects the acquisition and transmission of socially valuable information on demand. We consider a regulated upstream monopoly with downstream unregulated Cournot competition and demand uncertainty. Demand information serves to set the access price and to foster competition in the unregulated segment but demand realizations can be observed at some cost only by the upstream monopolist; information acquisition is also unobservable. We show that vertical integration favours acquisition of demand information because of the transmission of information generated by the public nature of the regulatory mechanism. This holds both when access to information is easier for the upstream firm and when it is easier for downstream firms

Lender Liability in the Consumer Credit Market

In many countries consumer credit legislation provides for the extension of liability for product failure to the financial institution that advances credit to the consumer. In particular, lender liability is imposed on those credit grantors who closely operate with the supplier of the good. This paper provides a rationale for lender-responsibility in the consumer credit market. It shows that, when judicial enforcement is inefficient or there is risk of seller liquidation, lender-liability helps to protect consumers who systematically underestimate the probability of product failure and overestimate the extent to which they can obtain compensation

The market for lawyers: The value of information on the quality of legal services

We study the value of information on the quality of legal services by analyzing the incentives of litigants to hire high-quality lawyers, the incentives of lawyers to invest in quality-enhancing activities and the effect of legal representation on the decision-making behaviour of adjudicators. In a setting where adjudicators have reputational concerns, we show that better information over the quality of legal representation generates a tradeoff. On the one hand, it allows for a better match between the value of a legal dispute and the quality of the legal representation. This also has the effect of increasing the incentives of lawyers to invest in quality-enhancing training. On the other hand, better information over the quality of legal representation may induce adjudicators to bias their decisions in favour of the litigant with the highest-quality lawyer and this generates allocative inefficiency. We discuss the implications of these effects on the desirability of quality certification system (such as the Queen’s Counselor system) in the market for the legal professions

Optimism and lender liability in the consumer credit market

Credit purchases of consumer goods are commonly made upon terms governed by an agreement between the lender and the seller. This type of purchase is generally subject to a legal principle of joint responsibility under which the lender and the seller are jointly liable to the consumer for breach of the sale contract by the seller. We study the rationale for this principle in situations where market failure arises because consumers underestimate the risk of product failure - for example due to seller misrepresentation - and it is difficult to enforce seller responsibility. We show that joint responsibility increases welfare and reduces the incentives of sellers to misrepresent the quality of their products

Decision rules and information provision: monitoring versus manipulation

The paper focuses on the organization of institutions designed to resolve disputes between two parties, when some information is not veri…able and decision makers may have vested preferences. It shows that the choice of how much discretional power to grant to the decision maker and who provides the information are intrinsically related. Direct involvement of the interested parties in the supply of information enhances monitoring over the decision maker, although at the cost of higher manipulation. Thus, it is desirable when the decision maker is granted high discretion. On the contrary, when the decision maker has limited discretional power, information provision is better assigned to an agent with no direct stake. The analysis helps to rationalize some organizational arrangements that are commonly observed in the context of judicial and antitrust decision-makin

Auditing and property rights

This is the official published version. Copyright @ 2004 RANDThird-party audit provides incentives to an agent whose actions affect the value of an asset. When audit intensity and outcome are unverifiable, we show that with interim-participation constraints the optimal mechanism may use only the auditor's report, disregarding the agent's information. Furthermore, the auditor obtains the asset and the agent a monetary compensation, when a high asset value is reported. This suggests regulating renewable resources or utility networks by giving entrants the option to buy the right to use the asset at a predetermined price, and financially rewarding incumbents for good performance.The second author used financial support of the Communaute francaise de Belgique (projet ARC 98/03-221) and EU TMR Network contract no. FMRX-CT98-0203