Should We Assess the Basic Premises of an Argument for Truth or Acceptability?

In this paper I challenge the currently fashionable view that we should assess the basic premises of an argument for acceptability rather than for truth, and argue in favour of recognizing premise-truth as a criterion of argument goodness in one important sense and premise-acceptability as a criterion of argument goodness in another important sense

Ethical argumentation, objectivity, and bias

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of \u27partiality,\u27 bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my discussion will focus on one type of theory of practical reasons; theories of this type are objective in as much as they hold that practical reasons are based on values that are objective in the sense of being mind-independent. I will refer to selected philosophers, including Wayne Sumner, Russ Shafer-Landau, Derek Parfit and Peter Singer

Commentary on: Fred J. Kauffeld\u27s The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions

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