The Organization of Production and Economic Development

A formalization of the Coase-Williamson-Cheung theory of the firm is used to examine the trade-off between the firm and the market as institutions for organizing production in a dynamic, general equilibrium model with increasing returns to labor specialization. The model considers the interaction of internal and external transaction costs and the gains to labor specialization in determining important aspects of the organization of production including the degree of labor specialization, the size and specialization of firms and the pattern of interfirm trade. Endogenous growth is driven by capital accumulation and the division of labor. The evolution of economic organization is characterized by increases in labor specialization, interfirm trade, firm specialization (vertical disintegration) and firm employment.development; endogenous growth; labor specialization; dynamic model; institutions; division of labor; growth; transactions costs; coordination; coordination costs; contract enforcement; organization; neoinstitutionalism; traditional economy; interpersonal exchange; theory of the firm; interpersonal exchange

The Division of Labor, Coordination Costs and the Growth of Government

The paper develops a dynamic, general equilibrium model of specialization-driven growth in which the private cost of coordinating among specialists is a function of public expenditure on physical and institutional infrastructure. Growth is characterized by endogenous increases in labor specialization, the capital-labor ratio, coordination costs, market size, and the interdependence of economic agents. In addition, model provides an explanation for a frequently ignored stylized fact of economic growth, the secular rise of government's share of output, in terms of the economic role of the government.development; endogenous growth; labor specialization; dynamic model; institutions; division of labor; growth; transactions costs; coordination; coordination costs; contract enforcement; organization; neoinstitutionalism; traditional economy; interpersonal exchange; government; transaction sector; public investment; public capital

Explaining the Evidence on Inequality and Growth: Informality and Redistribution

Please do note quote without permission of author. - This paper constructs a simple model that can account for both the negative relationship between growth and income inequality observed in the cross-country data and the positive relationship observed within countries over time. The model employs a dual-economy structure with formal and informal sectors. Growth is driven by formal sector human capital spillovers. Restrictive institutions impose barriers to formality that reduce the growth rate and increase inequality. Redistributive taxation lowers inequality but blunts the incentive to accumulate, lowering growth. Institutional structures vary more across than within countries. Consequently, variations in institutional barriers to formality may account for the negative relationship between growth and inequality found in the cross-country data. Variations in the intensity of redistribution may account for the positive relationship observed within countries over time.Growth, Inequality, Dualism, Informal Sector, Institutions

Legal origin and the evolution of environmental quality

We extend the empirical literature on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) by showing the legal origin matters for the evolution of environmental quality. Using observations of ambient sulfur dioxide levels, we find that the EKC for French and British legal origin countries diverge as incomes rise, with the EKC for French legal origin countries lying significantly below that for countries of British legal origin. This finding is robust to the inclusion of proxies for democracy and corruption, the institutional variables emphasized in the current EKC literature. Our results are consistent with the idea that the British common law tradition places a greater emphasis on private relative to collective property rights.Environmental quality, institutions, legal origin. economic development, evironmental Kuznets curve

NASA/USRA advanced design program activity 1990/1991

Four problems were defined which had aspects which would be reasonably assigned to an interdisciplinary design team. The design problems are: (1) design of a thermal shield for a lunar telescope (thermal protection for a lunar telescope); (2) selenotextile shielding structure (a structure to protect a lunar habitat from intense solar radiation of tubes of woven polytetrafluoroethylene coated fiberglass fabric); (3) pneumatically assisted elbow joint design for the NASA Zero-prebreathe suit (will allow astronauts to make the transition from a high pressure internal environment to a lower pressure suit without spending time in an air lock); and (4) electrochemical system to power assist an astronaut's finger joints (assist in the movement of an astronaut's distal and proximal interphalangeal finger joints)

Do all countries follow the same growth process?

We estimate a finite mixture model in which countries are sorted into groups based on the similarity of the conditional distributions of their growth rates. We strongly reject the hypothesis that all countries follow a common growth process in favor of a model in which there are two classes of countries, each with its own distinct growth process. Group membership does not conform to the usual categories used to control for parameter heterogeneity such as region or income. However, we find strong evidence that one country characteristic that helps to sort countries into different regimes is the quality of institutions, specifically, the degree of law and order. Once institutional features of the economy are controlled for, we find no evidence that geographic characteristics play a role in determining the country groupings.finite mixture models; multiple equilibria; institutional quality

La Plata, 1890-1893: Boom, Bust and Controversy

La Plata was a small mining town nested in the south end of Cache County that flourished from 1891 until 1893, During its three-year heyday it caught and held the attention of all northern Utah. Today, the ghost town of La Plata reposes in relative obscurity, remembered by only a few, having little historical significance and even less historical evidence of its brief existence. But from the evidence that does exist, mainly in the form of contemporary newspaper accounts, a reconstruction of the town and the social, political, and economic controversies that surrounded its boom and bust is possible