Information technology and productivity: where are we now and where are we going?

Productivity growth in the U.S. economy jumped during the second half of the 1990s, a resurgence that many analysts linked to developments in information technology (IT). However, shortly after this consensus emerged, demand for IT products fell sharply, leading to a debate about the connection between IT and productivity and about the sustainability of the faster growth. ; This article contributes to this debate in two ways. First, the authors provide updated estimates of the proximate sources of growth using a growth accounting framework that focuses on information technology. Their results confirm that the acceleration in labor productivity after 1995 was driven by the greater use of IT capital goods and the more rapid efficiency gains in the production of these goods. Second, to assess whether the pickup in productivity growth is sustainable, the authors analyze the steady-state properties of a multisector growth model. This exercise generates a range for labor productivity growth of 2 percent to 2 3/4 percent per year, which suggests that much-and possibly all-of the resurgence is sustainable. ; The analysis also highlights that future increases in output will depend on the pace of technological advance in the semiconductor industry and on the extent to which products embodying these advances diffuse through the economy.Information technology ; Productivity ; Technology ; Economic development

Financial innovation and the Great Moderation: what do household data say?

Aggressive deregulation of the household debt market in the early 1980s triggered innovations that greatly reduced the required home equity of U.S. households, allowing them to cash-out a large part of accumulated equity. In 1982, home equity equaled 71 percent of GDP; so this generated a borrowing shock of huge macroeconomic proportions. The combination of increasing household debt from 43 to 56 percent of GDP with high interest rates during the 1982-1990 period is consistent with such a shock to households’ demand for funds. This paper uses a quantitative general equilibrium model of lending from the wealthy to the middle class to evaluate the positive and normative aspects of the transition to a high debt economy. Using the model, we interpret evidence on the changing distribution of assets and debt as well as macro time series since 1982.Households - Economic aspects

Intangible Capital and Economic Growth

Published macroeconomic data traditionally exclude most intangible investment from measured GDP. This situation is beginning to change, but our estimates suggest that as much as $800 billion is still excluded from U.S. published data (as of 2003), and that this leads to the exclusion of more than$3 trillion of business intangible capital stock. To assess the importance of this omission, we add capital to the standard sources-of-growth framework used by the BLS, and find that the inclusion of our list of intangible assets makes a significant difference in the observed patterns of U.S. economic growth. The rate of change of output per worker increases more rapidly when intangibles are counted as capital, and capital deepening becomes the unambiguously dominant source of growth in labor productivity. The role of multifactor productivity is correspondingly diminished, and labor's income share is found to have decreased significantly over the last 50 years.

Les technologies de l’information et la productivité : situation actuelle et perspectives d’avenir

Dans la deuxième moitié des années quatre-vingt-dix, la croissance de la productivité de l’économie américaine a rebondi, un phénomène que nombre d’analystes ont attribué aux technologies de l’information. Cependant, peu de temps après que ce consensus se soit imposé, la demande pour les produits de technologies de l’information s’effondrait, relançant un vif débat sur le lien entre les technologies de l’information et la productivité, de même que sur la durabilité éventuelle d’une croissance aussi forte. Nous apportons notre contribution à ce débat de deux manières : premièrement, dans le but d’évaluer la robustesse de notre argumentation antérieure, nous prolongerons, jusqu’à la fin de 2001, notre analyse de la comptabilité de la croissance, dont nous avons déjà publié les résultats (Oliner et Sichel, 2000a). Les nouveaux résultats confirment les conclusions de nos travaux antérieurs : la croissance accélérée de la productivité du travail après 1995 découle principalement de l’usage croissant des biens d’équipement de type technologies de l’information et de gains d’efficacité accrus du côté de leur production ; deuxièmement, nous analyserons les propriétés de régime d’état stationnaire d’un modèle de croissance multisectoriel, afin de jauger la durabilité potentielle d’un tel regain de productivité. Nous en déduirons une fourchette de valeurs pour la croissance de la productivité du travail, se situant entre 2 % et 2 ¾ % par année, ce qui laisse présager que l’essentiel – sinon la totalité – de ce regain de vitalité pourrait être durable.Productivity growth in the U.S. economy jumped during the second half of the 1990s, a resurgence that many analysts linked to information technology (IT). However, shortly after this consensus emerged, demand for IT products fell sharply, leading to a lively debate about the connection between IT and productivity and about the sustainability of the faster growth. We contribute to this debate in two ways. First, to assess the robustness of the earlier evidence, we extend the growth-accounting results in Oliner and Sichel (2000a) through 2001. The new results confirm the basic story in our earlier work – that the acceleration in labor productivity after 1995 was driven largely by the greater use of IT capital goods and by the more rapid efficiency gains in the production of IT goods. Second, to assess whether the pickup in productivity growth is sustainable, we analyze the steady-state properties of a multi-sector growth model. This exercise generates a range for labor productivity growth of 2 percent to 2 ¾ percent per year, which suggests that much – and possibly all – of the resurgence is sustainable

How Fast Do Personal Computers Depreciate? Concepts and New Estimates

This paper provides new estimates of depreciation rates for personal computers using an extensive database of prices of used PCs. Our results show that PCs lose roughly half their remaining value, on average, with each additional year of use. We decompose that decline into age-related depreciation and a revaluation effect, where the latter effect is driven by the steep ongoing drop in the constant-quality prices of newly-introduced PCs. Our results are directly applicable for measuring the depreciation of PCs in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs) and were incorporated into the December 2003 comprehensive NIPA revision. Regarding tax policy, our estimates suggest that the current tax depreciation schedule for PCs closely tracks the actual loss of value in a zero-inflation environment. However, because the tax code is not indexed for inflation, the tax allowances would be too small in present value for inflation rates above the very low level now prevailing.

Explaining a Productive Decade

This paper analyzes the sources of recent U.S. productivity growth using both aggregate and industry-level data. The paper confirms the central role of information technology in the productivity revival during 1995-2000 and shows that it played a significant, although smaller, role after 2000. Productivity growth after 2000 appears to have been boosted by industry restructuring and cost cutting in response to profit pressures, an unlikely source of future strength. In addition, the incorporation of intangible capital into the growth accounting framework somewhat diminishes estimates of labor productivity's performance since 2000 and makes the gain during 1995-2000 look larger than in the official data. Finally, the paper examines the outlook for trend growth in labor productivity; the resulting estimate, which is subject to much uncertainty, is centered at 2 1/4 percent a year, faster than the lackluster pace that prevailed before 1995 but somewhat slower than the 1995-2000 average.macroeconomics, productivity growth, labor productivity

International evidence on business cycle duration dependence

We provide an investigation of duration dependence in prewar business expansions, contractions, and whole cycles for France, Germany, and Great Britain. Our results, obtained using both nonparametric and parametric procedures, generally indicate the presence of positive duration dependence in expansions and whole cycles but not in contractions. Our results corroborate those of our earlier studies of the United States.Business cycles