25 research outputs found
When is an alternative possibility robust?
According to some, free will requires alternative possibilities. But not any old alternative possibility will do. Sometimes, being able to bring about an alternative does not bestow any control on an agent. In order to bestow control, and so be directly relevant qua alternative to grounding the agent's moral responsibility, alternatives need to be robust. Here, I investigate the nature of robust alternatives. I argue that Derk Pereboom's latest robustness criterion is too strong, and I suggest a different criterion based on the idea that what agents need to be able to do is keep open the possibility of securing their blamelessness, rather than needing to directly ensure their own blamelessness at the time of decision
Alternatives and responsibility: an asymmetrical approach
En este trabajo defiendo una visión asimétrica sobre la relación entre las posibilidades alternativas y la responsabilidad moral, según la cual se requiere tener posibilidades alternativas para ser culpable por lo que uno decide o hace, pero no para ser laudable por ello. Defiendo la no necesidad de alternativas para ser laudable a través de un examen de lo que yo llamo “ejemplos Lutero”. Mi defensa de la necesidad de alternativas para ser culpable procede en cambio mediante un análisis de los llamados “casos Frankfurt”. En ambos casos, mis argumentos se basan en la afirmación según la cual, en las adscripciones de responsabilidad moral, la cuestión principal no es si el agente podría haber hecho algo distinto, sino si debería haber hecho lo que hizo, de modo que la primera pregunta solo se vuelve apremiante cuando la respuesta a la segunda es negativa. Así, pues, en lo que se refiere a la responsabilidad moral, el concepto de obligación o deber moral es previo al de posibilidades alternativas.In this paper, I defend an asymmetrical view concerning the relationship
between alternative possibilities and moral responsibility, according to which
alternative possibilities are required for being blameworthy, but not praiseworthy, for
what one decides or does. I defend the non-necessity of alternatives for
praiseworthiness through an examination of what I call ‘Luther’ examples. My defence
of the necessity of alternatives for blameworthiness proceeds instead through an
analysis of so-called ‘Frankfurt’ examples. In both cases, my arguments rest on the
contention that, in ascriptions of moral responsibility, the primary question is not
whether the agent could have done otherwise, but whether she should have done what she did, so that the former question only becomes pressing when the answer to the latter is negative. Concerning moral responsibility, then, the concept of moral obligation or duty is prior to that of alternative possibilities
Free Will & Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
While philosophers have worried about mental causation for centuries, worries about the causal relevance of conscious phenomena are also increasingly featuring in neuroscientific literature. Neuroscientists have regarded the threat of epiphenomenalism as interesting primarily because they have supposed that it entails free will scepticism. However, the steps that get us from a premise about the causal irrelevance of conscious phenomena to a conclusion about free will are not entirely clear. In fact, if we examine popular philosophical accounts of free will, we find, for the most part, nothing to suggest that free will is inconsistent with the presence of unconscious neural precursors to choices. It is only if we adopt highly non-naturalistic assumptions about the mind (e.g. if we embrace Cartesian dualism and locate free choice in the non-physical realm) that it seems plausible to suppose that the neuroscientific data generates a threat to free will
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities as Sufficient but not Necessary for Moral Responsibility: A way to Avoid the Frankfurt Counter-Example
Free will and psychiatric assessment of criminal responsibility. A parallel with informed consent
In some criminal cases a forensic psychiatrist is asked to make an assessment of the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the legally relevant act. A considerable number of people seem to hold that the basis for this assessment is that free will is required for legal responsibility, and that mental disorders can compromise free will. In fact, because of the alleged relationship between the forensic assessment and free will, researchers in forensic psychiatry also consider the complicated metaphysical discussions on free will relevant to the assessment. At the same time, there is concern about the lack of advancement with respect to clarifying the nature of the forensic assessment. In this paper I argue that, even if free will is considered relevant, there may be no need for forensic researchers to engage into metaphysical discussions on free will in order to make significant progress. I will do so, drawing a parallel between the assessment of criminal responsibility on the one hand, and the medical practice of obtaining informed consent on the other. I argue that also with respect to informed consent, free will is considered relevant, or even crucial. This is the parallel. Yet, researchers on informed consent have not entered into metaphysical debates on free will. Meanwhile, research on informed consent has made significant progress. Based on the parallel with respect to free will, and the differences with respect to research, I conclude that researchers on forensic assessment may not have to engage into metaphysical discussions on free will in order to advance our understanding of this psychiatric practice. © 2010 The Author(s)