Can we choose evil? A discussion of the problem of radical evil as a modern and ancient problem of freedom

The problem discussed in this paper emerges from work I’ve\ud done on the modern ideal of autonomy.1 I found that autonomy is often\ud seen as a morally neutral term. Put in terms of good and evil, this means\ud that it is held consistent to say that a person is autonomous and chooses\ud evil. Autonomy, by itself, so it is argued, is neutral with regard to good or\ud evil. On this view, whether or not I choose evil, if I make this choice in the\ud capacity of being my own master, of governing and ruling myself, then\ud there is nothing in the way of autonomy that I lack. For example, Feinberg\ud argues that autonomy is consistent with ruthlessness, cruelty, and other\ud (moral) failings, and that it is therefore at best only a partial ideal\ud “insufficient for full moral excellence.”2\ud Is this a tenable position? In this paper I discuss whether it makes\ud sense to say that a person has a (real) choice between good and evil,\ud regardless of his state in terms of autonomy. First, I clarify the problem by\ud using aspects from the work of Plato and Augustine. Second, I show how\ud Kant attempts to deal with this problem by discussing key aspects of his\ud moral theory, in particular his concept of radical evil.\ud For the sake of my argument, I assume in this paper that it is\ud meaningful to speak of ‘good’ and ‘evil’

Liberation and passion: reconstructing the passion perspective on human being and freedom

Many contemporary philosophers tell us that we are essentially purposeful, independent, willing, and acting beings. The self is presented as a citadel defending itself against external, alien influences. Alternatively, some argue that we are the sum of a determined body and a free will. Are we really like that? And is personal liberation basically a matter of enhancing our capacity to will, to act, and to control ourselves? Is freedom necessarily a question of will and action?\ud \ud This book searches for alternative perspectives on human being and freedom, highlighting a different side of ourselves: openness, receptivity, dependency, being-in-relation. By articulating these aspects in the work of some key Western thinkers, including Euripides, Augustine, Eckhart, Dostoevski, and Heidegger, the author explores a different view of what liberation is and what it would be like to be fre

Technology and the Appearance of the Good: Carebots, Virtual Virtue, and the Best Possible Life

Growth of the elderly population and nursing shortage place increased pressure on our health care systems. One possible response is to let care robots or carebots take over care tasks. Some of these robots appear human in some way (humanoid robots), or look and act like a pet (pet robots). As personal robots they ‘share physical and emotional spaces with the user’ (Cerqui and Arras 2001) and play a role in daily life. They can assist ill and elderly people by monitoring them, by delivering drugs, by moving them around, by helping them with domestic tasks. They can be used for therapeutic aims, or to entertain and accompany people. \ud How can we evaluate such a near-future scenario in terms of its contribution to ‘the good life’, given that carebots would often replace real humans or pets?\u

Criminals or Patients? Towards a Tragic Conception of Moral and Legal Responsibility \ud

There is a gap between, on the one hand, the tragic character of human action and, on the other hand, our moral and legal conceptions of responsibility that focus on individual agency and absolute guilt. Drawing on Kierkegaard’s understanding of tragic action and engaging with contemporary discourse on moral luck, poetic justice, and relational responsibility, this paper argues for a reform of our legal practices based on a less ‘harsh’ (Kierkegaard) conception of moral and legal responsibility and directed more at empathic understanding based on the emotional and imaginative appreciation of personal narratives. This may help our societies and communities to better cope with unacceptable deeds by individuals who are neither criminals nor patients, to make room for praise as well as blame and punishment, and to set up practices and institutions that do not rely on a conception of responsibility that is hard to bear for all of us. \u

The art, poetics, and grammar of technological innovation as practice, process, and performance

Usually technological innovation and artistic work are seen as very distinctive practices, and innovation of technologies is understood in terms of design and human intention. Moreover, thinking about technological innovation is usually categorized as “technical” and disconnected from thinking about culture and the social. Drawing on work by Dewey, Heidegger, Latour, and Wittgenstein and responding to academic discourses about craft and design, ethics and responsible innovation, transdisciplinarity, and participation, this essay questions these assumptions and examines what kind of knowledge and practices are involved in art and technological innovation. It argues that technological innovation is indeed “technical”, but, if conceptualized as techne, can be understood as art and performance. It is argued that in practice, innovative techne is not only connected to episteme as theoretical knowledge but also has the mode of poiesis: it is not just the outcome of human design and intention but rather involves a performative process in which there is a “dialogue” between form and matter and between creator and environment in which humans and non-humans participate. Moreover, this art is embedded in broader cultural patterns and grammars—ultimately a ‘form of life’—that shape and make possible the innovation. In that sense, there is no gap between science and society—a gap that is often assumed in STS and in, for instance, discourse on responsible innovation. It is concluded that technology and art were only relatively recently and unfortunately divorced, conceptually, but that in practices and performances they were always linked. If we understand technological innovation as a poetic, participative, and performative process, then bringing together technological innovation and artistic practices should not be seen as a marginal or luxury project but instead as one that is central, necessary, and vital for cultural-technological change. This conceptualization supports not only a different approach to innovation but has also social-transformative potential and has implications for ethics of technology and responsible innovation

The Work of Art in the Age of AI Image Generation: Aesthetics and Human-Technology Relations as Process and Performance

AI image generators such as DALL-E 2 are deep learning models that enable users to generate digital images based on natural language text prompts. The impressive and often surprising results leave many people puzzled: is this art, and if so, who created the art: the human or the AI? These are not just theoretical questions; they have practical ethical and legal implications, for example when raising authorship and copyright issues. This essay offers two conceptual points of entrance that may help to understand what is going on here. First it briefly discusses the question whether this this art and who or what is the artist based on aesthetics, philosophy of art, and thinking about creativity and computing. Then it asks the question regarding human-technology relations. It shows that existing notions such as instrument, extension, and (quasi) other are insufficient to conceptualize the use of this technology, and proposes instead to understand what happens as processes and performances, in which artistic subjects, objects, and roles emerge. It is concluded that based on most standard criteria in aesthetics, AI image generation can in principle create art, and that the process can be seen as poietic performances involving humans and non-humans potentially leading to the emergence of new artistic (quasi)subjects and roles in the process