Many contemporary philosophers tell us that we are essentially purposeful, independent, willing, and acting beings. The self is presented as a citadel defending itself against external, alien influences. Alternatively, some argue that we are the sum of a determined body and a free will. Are we really like that? And is personal liberation basically a matter of enhancing our capacity to will, to act, and to control ourselves? Is freedom necessarily a question of will and action?\ud
\ud
This book searches for alternative perspectives on human being and freedom, highlighting a different side of ourselves: openness, receptivity, dependency, being-in-relation. By articulating these aspects in the work of some key Western thinkers, including Euripides, Augustine, Eckhart, Dostoevski, and Heidegger, the author explores a different view of what liberation is and what it would be like to be fre

Coeckelbergh, Mark

English

Many contemporary philosophers tell us that we are essentially purposeful, independent, willing, and acting beings. The self is presented as a citadel defending itself against external, alien influences. Alternatively, some argue that we are the sum of a determined body and a free will. Are we really like that? And is personal liberation basically a matter of enhancing our capacity to will, to act, and to control ourselves? Is freedom necessarily a question of will and action? This book searches for alternative perspectives on human being and freedom, highlighting a different side of ourselves: openness, receptivity, dependency, being-in-relation. By articulating these aspects in the work of some key Western thinkers, including Euripides, Augustine, Eckhart, Dostoevski, and Heidegger, the author explores a different view of what liberation is and what it would be like to be fre

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Liberation and passion: reconstructing the passion perspective on human being and freedom

University of Twente Research Information

Mark CoeckelberghLiberation and PassionReconstructing the Passion Perspectiveon Human Being and FreedomDie Deutsche Bibliothek – CIP-EinheitsaufnahmeCoeckelbergh, Mark:Liberation and passion : reconstructing the passionperspective on human being and freedom / MarkCoeckelbergh. - Alfter/Bonn : DenkMal-Verl., 2002ISBN 3-935404-06-9Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. JedeVerwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohneZustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung in elektronische Systeme.ISBN 3-935404-06-9© DenkMal Verlag Alfter/Bonn  2002Satz: Dieter L. Ney, GrafschaftDruck und Bindung: Difo-Druck, BambergPrinted in Germany    ContentsChapter 1 – IntroductionEstablishing the framework1.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111.2. The Will & Action Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 1.2.2. J.S. Mill on liberty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1.2.3. H. Frankfurt on freedom of the will and what we care about . . 16 1.2.3.1. Frankfurt’s Concept of a Person (I). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 1.2.3.2. Frankfurt’s Concept of a Person (II) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201.2.3.3. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 1.2.4. The citadel image: source and significance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1.3. Iris Murdoch: Attention and Vision  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 1.3.1. The existentialist-behaviourist view: an action-perspectiveon human being and freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281.3.2. Murdoch’s critique  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291.4. Definition of freedom, my argument, and my aim(s) in thisdissertation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331.5. Note on my methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36Chapter 2 – GreeksTragedy, Dionysian Passion, and Greek Madness2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392.2. The evolution from passion to action in ancient Greek culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402.2.2. The Ancient and the Modern: Passion versus Action . . . . . . . . 402.2.2.1. Tragedy: Between Activity and Passivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 402.2.2.2. The Glory of Passivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422.2.3. From Passion to Action in Antiquity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442.2.3.1. From Dionysus to Apollo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442.2.3.2. The evolution of the meaning of hybris  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 452.2.3.3. Aristotle's view on tragedy in the Poetics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482.2.3.4. Madness in Greek culture and philosophy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 502.2.4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552.3. Are Dionysians Free?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572.3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572.3.2. Exploration of the connection between Dionysus andfreedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572.3.2.1. The liberating role of the Dionysian ritual  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572.3.2.2. Dionysus, the liberator  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 582.3.2.3. “Now the slave is a free man” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 612.3.3. Three types of Dionysian liberation and freedom. . . . . . . . . . . 622.3.4. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632.3.4.1. Social liberation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632.3.4.2. Psychological liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662.3.4.3. Mystical liberation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732.3.5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 772.4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77Chapter 3 – ChristiansPagan Rituals, Christian Grace, and Modern Reason3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 793.2. Paul’s imaginative transformation of elements in paganculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 803.2.2. Paul’s idea of freedom and liberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 813.2.3. The pagan origin of Paul’s imagery  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823.2.3.1. Mythras and Heracles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 823.2.3.2. Dionysus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 843.2.4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873.3. An Age of Darkness  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883.3.1. Magic, possession, and other phenomena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 883.3.2. The inward turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 903.4. Augustine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913.4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 913.4.2. Action: “I am, I know, and I will.” (VIII.11/318) . . . . . . . . . . . 933.4.2.1. In the whirlpool of sin: the action model of a divided self . . . . 933.4.2.2. The origin of evil: the action concept of ‘free’ will in trouble . 943.4.3. Passion: I open up myself to receive You . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 963.4.3.1. Searching. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 973.4.3.2. Personal history and the concept of vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 983.4.3.3. Receptivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 993.4.3.4. Love. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1003.4.3.5. Freedom  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1023.4.4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1033.4.5. Augustine and the Modern idea of freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053.4.5.1. Rousseau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1053.4.5.2. Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1063.5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Chapter 4 – ModernsThe Inquisitor and the Poet                  4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 4.2. The legend of the grand-inquisitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 4.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 4.2.2. The argument of the grand-inquisitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 4.2.3. My interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 4.2.4. Afterword  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 4.3. Heidegger's view of freedom and human being . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 4.3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 4.3.2. The question “What is human being?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1254.3.3. Human being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 4.3.3.1. From Nothing to Being    . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 4.3.3.2. The Poetry of Being  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 a) Thinking and art as forms of passion: disclosure andhappening. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129b) The domination of will and the inward turn  . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 c) A Heideggerian poem  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 4.3.3.3. The essence of thinking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 4.3.3.4. Heidegger’s view of human being: Ek-sistence  . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 a) Why is it necessary to clarify the relationshipbetween Being and Dasein? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133b) The concept of ek-sistence and the relationshipbetween Dasein and Being. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1354.3.4. Human freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 4.3.5. Gelassenheit  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4.3.5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4.3.5.2. Gelassenheit: Towards another relationship to things. . . . . . . . 139 4.3.5.3. Gelassenheit: Heidegger’s answer to the question abouthuman being and freedom. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 4.3.6. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 4.3.6.1. General conclusion and comparison with Augustine . . . . . . . . 144 4.3.6.2. Comparison with Levinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 4.4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Chapter 5 – The Politics of PassionCritical Implications for Politics & Society         5.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153 5.2. Meister Eckhart’s Theory of Passion and Freedom  . . . . . . . . . 154 5.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 5.2.2. Passion and freedom in Eckhart’s work  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 5.2.2.1. The potentiality within us . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 5.2.2.2. Eckhart’s Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 5.2.2.3. Sermons on Receptivity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 5.2.2.4. Eckhart’s explicit theory of passion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 5.2.3. The merits of Eckhart’s theory of passion and freedom . . . . . . 160 5.3. Eckhart and social critique  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 5.3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 5.3.2. Fromm: To have or to be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 5.3.2.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 5.3.2.2. The world as it is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 5.3.2.3. The world as it should be  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 5.3.2.4. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 5.3.3. Sölle: mysticism and resistance  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 5.3.3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 5.3.3.2. Eckhart’s definition of poverty (again) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170 5.3.3.3. Sölle’s view of human being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 5.4. Towards an alternative Critical Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 5.4.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 5.4.2. The challenge for critical theory in Heidegger’s laterthought  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1785.4.3. The gnostic world-view as a metaphor for the core ofcritical thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1785.4.4. The interactionist approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 5.4.5. Thinking Heidegger and Habermas together  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 5.5. Conclusion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190 ConclusionTwo perspectives on human being and freedom           Overview of the arguments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 Conclusion: Passion versus Action?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199Chapter 1 – IntroductionEstablishing the framework1.1.  IntroductionThe project of this book emerged from my reflections on various writingsdealing with the issue of freedom. I noticed that most discussions of personalfreedom depend on the concept of an active self. The self, as it is consideredin these discussions, is viewed as a purposeful, potent agent, a willing self,setting itself a task in the world, making decisions, actively shaping its life,controlling its passions, feelings, and desires, etc. The aim of this book is toshow that a very different perspective on freedom is possible and even prefer-able, based on the concept of a self shaped by passion: a self that is beingmoved, shaped, discovered, disclosed, revealed; a self that receives, opensitself up, suffers, submits, accepts; a self the being of which is disclosedduring its life. My claim is that this view of a self-in-passion has been mostlydisregarded, lost sight of, in the Western philosophical tradition. Therefore Ithink that it is necessary to open up and explore this perspective. In this chapter, I first present what I will call the will & action model ofhuman being and freedom. In discussions of freedom, problems about andobjections to this or that account of freedom usually arise from within thismodel. A particular theory is challenged, but the arguments for or againstremain part of the will & action framework. My purpose is a different one. Iwill use the idea of freedom found in Frankfurt and Mill as illustrations of thewill & action framework. In the course of this presentation, I do not want todefend or critique a particular theory, but rather raise questions about theadequacy of the overall framework in which these theories are situated, aframework which is often so much taken for granted. I want to challenge theway the question of freedom is defined in this framework, and ask: Is thiswhat the question of freedom for human beings is?  Secondly, I want to show that there are philosophers, such as Iris Murdoch,who have raised radical questions concerning the validity of the assumptionsabout the self and its freedom that are made in such discussions of freedom.This might give us inspiration if we want to start challenging the adequacy ofthe will & action framework. Thirdly, I say something about the general conception of freedom I use inthis book, and its relevance in relation to the will & action framework on theone hand, and the passion framework on the other hand. I will argue that con-ceptions of the constitution of human being and conceptions of freedom arenecessarily linked, and I then reformulate the aim of this book as the explora-tion of a different conception of human being as a basis for a different view ofhuman freedom. I will show that the argument in this book is ultimately anargument about the core of human selfhood and human freedom.I will present the ‘program’ of this book, which is to challenge the will &action framework by developing an alternative. I will call this alternative the‘passion’ framework. In this book, I will use the term ‘passion’ not entirely inits usual meaning (which is vague anyway), but rather in a semi-technicalway, to point to a variety of key elements or key concepts (passivity,receptivity, openness, dependency, love, etc.) that are part of the alternativeidea of human being and freedom that I want to develop in this book. Often –and particularly in the will & action framework – these elements are seen asimpediments to freedom, elements that stand in the way of my freedom. Iwant to show that, on the contrary, these elements need not be consideredimpediments but rather a basis for a strikingly different representation ofhuman being and freedom. My agenda is to put these conceptions to work inmy discussion of certain thinkers and cultural elements in the history ofWestern philosophy. Because the ‘passion’ idea of human being and freedomhas largely been lost sight of, my aim is to articulate this idea, and the notionof ‘passion’ is my instrument, my conceptual tool, to open it up. I willdescribe the structure of my book in this perspective. Finally, I will say something more on my methodology. To conclude this introduction, I summarize the structure of this chapter:1) Presentation of the will & action framework(a) J.S. Mill on liberty(b) H. Frankfurt on freedom of the will and what we care about2) A challenge to the adequacy of the will & action framework: Iris Mur-doch3) Definition of freedom, core structure of my argument, and the pro-grammatic aim of my book: Starting to articulate and develop thepassion framework 4) Note on my methodology. . .

Liberation and passion: reconstructing the passion perspective on human being and freedom

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