Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting -- but not in new -- democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights.property rights, contract rights, autocracy, democracy

Contract Intensive Money

This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. Second, it uses this measure to provide additional and more direct evidence about the importance of secure property and contract rights for economic growth and investment. In the analysis below, we briefly review the arguments that link the quality of third-party contract enforcement to growth and investment. We then show how the new measure, which we call “contract-intensive money” or CIM, relates to the subjective measures employed in the literature. We test empirically the proposition that this variable, as a measure of the security of contract and property rights, is positively related to income, growth and investment.contract enforcement, property rights, governance, growth

International Differences in the Agricultural Price Level: Factor Endowments, Transportation Costs, and the Political Economy of Agricultural Protection

This paper presents a model of the agricultural producer price level as a function of a country's structure of agricultural trade and its protection of agriculture. In turn, the structure of a country's agricultural trade is a function of its resource endowment and its level of agricultural protection. The level of agricultural protection is a function of the political strength of farmers and of the structure of its agricultural trade. These relationships are estimated in a simultaneous equation framework.Agricultural Trade; Agriculture; Prices; Protection; Trade

Bounds on Bosonic Topcolor

We consider the phenomenology of models in which electroweak symmetry breaking is triggered by new strong dynamics affecting the third generation and is transmitted to the light fermions via a fundamental Higgs doublet. While similar in spirit to the old bosonic technicolor idea, such `bosonic topcolor' models are allowed by current phenomenological constraints, and may arise naturally in models with large extra dimensions. We study the parameter space of a minimal low-energy theory, including bounds from Higgs boson searches, precision electroweak parameters, and flavor changing neutral current processes. We show that the model can provide a contribution to D0-D0-bar mixing as large as the current experimental bound.Comment: 16 pages RevTeX, 3 Figure

Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries

This article presents a statistical study of the determinants of democracy in the postwar period. Important variables are found to be former status as a British colony, island status, the share of the population professing Islam, the percentage of European descent, penteration of the English language during colonial rule, and ethnic homogeneity

Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries

This article presents a statistical study of the determinants of democracy in the postwar period. Important variables are found to be former status as a British colony, island status, the share of the population professing Islam, the percentage of European descent, penteration of the English language during colonial rule, and ethnic homogeneity

Determinants of lasting democracy in poor countries

This article presents a statistical study of the determinants of democracy in the postwar period. Important variables are found to be former status as a British colony, island status, the share of the population professing Islam, the percentage of European descent, penteration of the English language during colonial rule, and ethnic homogeneity.democracy, development, culture, ethnic homogeneity

Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting -- but not in new -- democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights

Contract Intensive Money

This paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, it introduces a new, easily accessed and objective measure of the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights. Second, it uses this measure to provide additional and more direct evidence about the importance of secure property and contract rights for economic growth and investment. In the analysis below, we briefly review the arguments that link the quality of third-party contract enforcement to growth and investment. We then show how the new measure, which we call “contract-intensive money” or CIM, relates to the subjective measures employed in the literature. We test empirically the proposition that this variable, as a measure of the security of contract and property rights, is positively related to income, growth and investment