18 research outputs found
Prostitution: You Canât Have Your Cake and Sell It
I offer an unorthodox argument for the thesis that prostitution is not just a normal job. It has the advantage of being compatible with the claim that humans should have full authority over their sexual life. In fact, it is ultimately the emphasis on this authority that leads the thesis that prostitution is a normal job to collapse. Here is the argument: merchants cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they transact with on the basis of factors like the ethnicity or the religion of their client; but if prostitutes are âsex merchantsâ, then they cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they have sex with on the basis of these factors. Yet everyone should have the full discretionary power to refuse to have sex under any circumstances
Tonneau percé, tonneau habité - CalliclÚs et DiogÚne : les leçons rivales de la nature
Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et aprĂšs eux et contrairement Ă Socrate, CalliclĂšs et DiogĂšne ont dĂ©clarĂ© avoir fondĂ© leur Ă©thique sur lâobservation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirĂ©s dâune nature que lâon pourrait a priori croire ĂȘtre la mĂȘme sont on ne peut plus opposĂ©s. CalliclĂšs croit que lâhomme est appelĂ© Ă dominer autrui ; DiogĂšne pense plutĂŽt quâil doit se dominer lui-mĂȘme ; le premier est un hĂ©doniste dĂ©bridĂ©, le second croit que le bonheur ne sâachĂšte quâau prix du sacrifice des dĂ©sirs artificiels.
Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. Dâabord, nous montrons que pour CalliclĂšs et DiogĂšne, la notion de nature non seulement diffĂšre, mais est observĂ©e sous un angle diffĂ©rent. La premiĂšre est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La premiĂšre concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de lâhomme avec lui-mĂȘme. Ensuite, nous exposons la diffĂ©rence des prĂ©supposĂ©s normatifs qui prĂ©cĂšdent ou accompagnent lâobservation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes dâanticonventionnalisme et dâanti-intellectualisme dĂ©fendues par CalliclĂšs et DiogĂšne.
SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy?
We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes
Deux formes de naturalisme antique : la nature comme fondement dâĂ©thiques contradictoires
Les Ă©thiques de CalliclĂšs et de DiogĂšne de Sinope sont briĂšvement mises en parallĂšle. Elles sont radicalement contradictoires sur les questions du contrĂŽle des dĂ©sirs et de la relation avec autrui : la premiĂšre est hĂ©doniste et prĂŽne la domination ; la seconde dĂ©fend Ă la fois une ascĂšse anti-hĂ©doniste et une Ă©thique de lâadaptation. Or, ces deux discours normatifs se ressemblent en ce quâils font tous deux appel Ă la nature pour fonder leurs thĂšses. De surcroĂźt, DiogĂšne et CalliclĂšs dĂ©fendent de vĂ©ritables naturalismes au sens oĂč leur recours Ă la nature nâest pas uniquement rhĂ©torique, mais bien justificatif. Cela se manifeste, dâune part, par lâanticonventionnalisme des deux penseurs et, dâautre part, par lâinscription en faux de ces positions contre la vision antinaturaliste de Socrate. Câest dire que lâentreprise naturaliste antique fait face Ă de sĂ©rieux problĂšmes
DĂ©sirs naturels et artificiels chez DiogĂšne et Ăpicure
This article contrasts Epicurus's and Diogenes the Cynic's respective views on acceptable desires. I emphasize their appeals to nature to legitimize or de-legitimize certain types of desires
Is Free Will Scepticism Self-Defeating?
Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self-defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised, there is a strong connection between conduct and beliefâand so between the content of free will scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self-defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the existence of leeway or reject the principle that âoughtâ implies âcanâ
Deliberation and the Possibility of Skepticism
No one is responsible for their conduct because free will is an illusion, say some skeptics. Even when it seems that we have several options, we only have one. Hence, says the free will skeptic, we should reform our practices which involve responsibility attributions, such as punishment and blame. How seriously should we take this doctrine? Is it one that we could live by? One thorn in the side of the skeptic concerns deliberation. When we deliberate about what to doâwhat film to go see, whom to befriend, which doctrine to followâwe must presume that our options are open to us. But then, every time that skeptics deliberate, they presume something which is incompatible with their doctrine, i.e. that they have several options. In a word, skeptics cannot deliberate qua skeptics. Some philosophers have responded that deliberators donât have to presume that their options are open; they only have to presume that their choice will be efficacious. I argue that this proposal uses resources which, if they are available and successful, can be employed to refute skepticism. The upshot is that free will skeptics are pushing for a doctrine that is either false or in tension with deliberation
Tonneau percé, tonneau habité
Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et aprĂšs eux et contrairement Ă Socrate, CalliclĂšs et DiogĂšne ont dĂ©clarĂ© avoir fondĂ© leur Ă©thique sur lâobservation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirĂ©s dâune nature que lâon pourrait a priori croire ĂȘtre la mĂȘme sont on ne peut plus opposĂ©s. CalliclĂšs croit que lâhomme est appelĂ© Ă dominer autrui ; DiogĂšne pense plutĂŽt quâil doit se dominer lui-mĂȘme ; le premier est un hĂ©doniste dĂ©bridĂ©, le second croit que le bonheur ne sâachĂšte quâau prix du sacrifice des dĂ©sirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. Dâabord, nous montrons que pour CalliclĂšs et DiogĂšne, la notion de nature non seulement diffĂšre, mais est observĂ©e sous un angle diffĂ©rent. La premiĂšre est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La premiĂšre concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de lâhomme avec lui-mĂȘme. Ensuite, nous exposons la diffĂ©rence des prĂ©supposĂ©s normatifs qui prĂ©cĂšdent ou accompagnent lâobservation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes dâanticonventionnalisme et dâanti-intellectualisme dĂ©fendues par CalliclĂšs et DiogĂšne.Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes
Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ratent leur cible : un nouveau heaume pour le principe des possibilités alternatives
Les contre-exemples de Frankfurt sont inoffensifs contre lâargument de la consĂ©quence (consequence argument), lâargument qui, Ă partir du principe des possibilitĂ©s alternatives et du dĂ©terminisme, montre que nous ne pouvons ĂȘtre tenus moralement responsables de nos actions. En effet, ils sont formulĂ©s soit dans un cadre dĂ©terministe, soit dans un cadre indĂ©terministe. Sâils sont formulĂ©s dans un cadre indĂ©terministe, ils sont inoffensifs parce quâils contreviennent Ă un principe mĂ©thodologique que nous dĂ©fendons : le principe de non-nĂ©gation des prĂ©misses (PNNP). En fait, nous montrons que pour tout argument donnĂ©, il est proscrit de supposer la nĂ©gation dâune prĂ©misse afin de rĂ©futer une autre prĂ©misse Ă moins que lâattaque rĂ©ussisse Ă rĂ©futer les deux prĂ©misses en question. Or, dâune part, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt indĂ©terministes supposent explicitement quâune prĂ©misse de lâargument de la consĂ©quence â le dĂ©terminisme est vrai â est fausse; et dâautre part, ils ne peuvent pas nous donner de raisons de croire en lâindĂ©terminisme, ce que nous montrons grĂące Ă des considĂ©rations sur la transmission de la justification. Construire des contre-exemples de Frankfurt indĂ©terministes est donc incorrect pour des raisons mĂ©thodologiques et logiques. Sâils sont formulĂ©s dans un cadre dĂ©terministe, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt font face Ă une autre accusation dâentorse argumentative, prĂ©sentĂ©e dans la dĂ©fense du dilemme (Dilemma Defence) de Kane-Ginet-Widerker : celle de la pĂ©tition de principe. Nous inspectons et nuançons cette accusation, mais concluons quâelle tient puisque les contre-exemples de Frankfurt dĂ©terministes supposent au final une analyse des agents contrefactuels dans les mondes dĂ©terministes et de la relation « rendre inĂ©vitable » que ne peuvent endosser ni les incompatibilistes de la marge de manĆuvre (leeway incompatibilists), ni les incompatibilistes de la source (source incompatibilists) ni non plus les semicompatibilistes. ConsĂ©quemment, les contre-exemples de Frankfurt ne peuvent plus soutenir la forme de compatibilisme Ă laquelle ils ont donnĂ© naissance. Lâincompatibilisme de la source ne peut plus ĂȘtre prĂ©fĂ©rĂ© Ă lâincompatibilisme de la marge de manĆuvre ni non plus rejeter toute participation des possibilitĂ©s alternatives dans lâexplication de la responsabilitĂ© morale sur cette seule base.Frankfurt-type examples are inoffensive against the Consequence argument, which purports to show that from both the principle of alternative possibilities and determinism, we can deduce that we are not morally responsible for our actions. Indeed, they require either a deterministic context or an indeterministic one. If they require indeterminism, they are harmless because they violate a methodological principle that we defend: the no-premise-negation principle (PNNP). In fact, we show that for each given argument, we cannot legitimately suppose the negation of a premise in order to refute another, unless the attack succeeds to refute both premises. Yet, on the one hand, indeterministic Frankfurt-type examples explicitly suppose that a premise of the Consequence argument â determinism holds â is false; and on the other hand, Frankfurt-type examples do not give us reasons to reject determinism, which we show with considerations on the transmission of justification. To build indeterministic Frankfurt scenarios is therefore incorrect for methodological and logical reasons. If they require determinism, Frankfurt-type examples are facing a different, yet very serious, argumentative accusation (presented in the Kane-Ginet-Widerker famous Dilemma defence): begging the question. We inspect and qualify this accusation. However, we ultimately claim that it still holds because a deterministic Frankfurt-type example supposes an analysis of the role of counterfactual agents and of the relation ârender inevitableâ in deterministic worlds that is acceptable neither for a leeway incompatibilist, a source incompatibilist or a semicompatibilist. Thus, Frankfurt-type examples no longer successfully support the form of compatibilism they contributed to give birth to. Also, source incompatibilism may not be preferred to leeway incompatibilism, nor reject all use of alternative possibilities in the explanation of moral responsibility on the sole basis of Frankfurt scenarios