A New Approach to Firm Governance

Over the last twenty years or so, the firm has changed considerably, especially with the growing importance of human capital. Paradoxically, the primacy of the shareholder value model has endured. The aim of this paper is to explore the main theoretical and empirical elements involved to propose a new model of firm governance. We view strategic employees of firms as critical resources because they represent specific human capital. We explain that the inalienable residual rights of control they have over their own human capital are inconsistent with disciplinary models of corporate governance. They rather call for the creation of an internal mode of regulation able to effectively mobilize specific human capital by motivating key employees. This model, which we call the ‘multi-resource model', is composite: we show that it aims to encourage, retain and collectively enrich critical resources by using an original operational system based on complementary instruments of incentive and coordination.

The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Redefined Integration and Disintegration

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between integration and disintegration. We argue that the conception of this link depends on the way one defines the firm and its coordinating role. We focus on studying the human capital-intensive firm. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms consists in coordinating productive tasks. The role of the firm is to coordinate the specialization of complementary resources and the division of labour. We show that integration and disintegration must be differentiated by the tools they give to the firm to effectively govern productive assets.Specific human capital; coordination; disintegration; integration; boudaries of the firm

Un modèle renouvelé de gouvernance d'entreprise : une évaluation empirique sur données françaises

This article has a dual purpose. On the one hand, it proposes a renewed analysis of the governance of specific human capital-intensive firms. On the other hand, it empirically estimates the nature of the corresponding operational model in France at the beginning of the 2000s. Actually, for nearly two decades, the firm has changed, especially with the growing importance of human capital in the value creation process. This evolution raises questions about the necessity to revisit firm governance. Considering that the very first mission of a large number of firms is to retain and to accumulate specific skills, we propose that a composite model that we call the "multi-resource" model offirm governance has to be outlined. Firstly, we analytically show that this latter aims at motivating key partners at work through the simultaneous use of individualized incentive tools and horizontal coordinative mechanisms. Secondly, we give an original empirical exploitation of the "Employer" part of the REPONSE 2004-2005 survey to test the hypothesis that such a governance system is implemented by some French firms.specific human capital; multi-resource firm governance; horizontalisation of coordination; reponse 2004-2005; verticalisation of incentives

The Human Capital-Intensive Firm and Coordination: Redefined Integration and Disintegration

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between integration and disintegration. We argue that the conception of this link depends on the way one defines the firm and its coordinating role. We focus on studying the human capital-intensive firm. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms consists in coordinating productive tasks. The role of the firm is to coordinate the specialization of complementary resources and the division of labour. We show that integration and disintegration must be differentiated by the tools they give to the firm to effectively govern productive assets

Capital humain, prestataires de services logistiques et frontières de la firme

18 p.International audienceThe aim of this paper is to analyze the changing boundaries of human capital-intensive firms resulting from the growing importance of the fourth party logistics. The specific relationships between these partners are at the origin of a real evolution in the way of studying the interfirm coordination and observing the resulting extension of the firm boundaries. We show that the traditional approaches of the firm are unsuitable for investigating these strong and complex links. Moreover, we suggest that the "new" theories of the firm give some relevant elements to understand these modern forms of cooperation.Notre article a pour objectif d'analyser l'évolution des frontières des firmes intensives en capital humain faisant suite à l'importance accrue des Prestataires de Services Logistiques dans leur activité productive. Les relations spécifiques entre ces partenaires sont à l'origine d'une véritable mutation dans la façon d'étudier la coordination interentreprises et d'observer l'élargissement des frontières de la firme qui en découle. Nous montrons que les approches traditionnelles de la firme sont inadaptées pour comprendre ces liens forts et complexes. Nous suggérons, par ailleurs, que les "nouvelles" analyses des frontières de la firme mettent à disposition des éléments d'investigation capables de cerner ces formes modernes de coopération

The Role of CSR in the Governance of the "New firm": an Empirical Study of the French Telecommunications Industry

The aim of this paper is to propose an instrumental analysis of corporate social responsibility (CSR). After underlining the corporate governance issues raised by the "new firm", which is vertically disintegrated and intensive in specific human capital, we argue that CSR can be useful as a means to regulate power relationships between key productive partners of the firm. Based on the analysis of official reports and interviews of the four major French operators of telecommunications, we show that CSR is voluntarily used by firms to maintain long-term wealth-creative employment and subcontracting relationships, through the deployment of formal and informal mechanisms

Capital humain, prestataires de services logistiques et frontières de la firme

The aim of this paper is to analyze the changing boundaries of human capital-intensive firms resulting from the growing importance of the fourth party logistics. The specific relationships between these partners are at the origin of a real evolution in the way of studying the interfirm coordination and observing the resulting extension of the firm boundaries. We show that the traditional approaches of the firm are unsuitable for investigating these strong and complex links. Moreover, we suggest that the "new" theories of the firm give some relevant elements to understand these modern forms of cooperation.Human Capital; Boundaries of the Firm; Fourth Party Logistics

Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration

26 pagesThe aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between vertical integration and disintegration which are traditionally opposed in the literature. The conception of integration and disintegration closely depends on the way we define the firm and its role. This paper focuses on human capital-intensive firms. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms is much more a coordination of productive tasks than a coordination of property rights. We argue that the role of the firm isn't to manage the hold-up problem using residual rights of control on physical assets, but to coordinate complementarities between internal and external agents, division of labour and specialization of resources. Therefore, we show that the coordinating role of the firm involves a redefinition of the link between integration and disintegration. We advance that it can not be viewed as the opposition between the two institutional modes of coordination which are hierarchy and market. Integration and disintegration must be differentiated through the tools they provide to the firm in order to govern the productive specialization of its human assets.L'objectif de cet article est de reconsidérer le rapport de l'intégration verticale à la dé-intégration verticale, traditionnellement opposées dans la littérature. La compréhension de l'intégration et de la dé-intégration dépend étroitement de la façon dont sont appréhendés la nature et le rôle de la firme. Cet article se focalise sur les firmes intensives en capital humain. Le rôle coordinateur de ce type de firmes ne se limite pas à gérer le problème de hold-up à partir des droits de contrôle résiduels sur des actifs physiques. Nous montrons qu'il consiste plus largement à coordonner la spécialisation productive de l'ensemble des partenaires clés de l'entreprise, qu'ils soient internes ou externes. Dans cette perspective, nous proposons une nouvelle définition du lien entre intégration et dé-intégration verticale. De notre point de vue, l'intégration et la dé-intégration ne sont plus des finalités ; elles conservent une portée instrumentale dans l'activité de coordination. Intégration et dé-intégration doivent être différenciées sur la base des outils qu'elles offrent à la firme en vue de gouverner la spécialisation des actifs humains

La RSE comme instrument de la gouvernance d'entreprise

Après avoir mis en évidence les problèmes de gouvernance posés par la " nouvelle firme ", désintégrée verticalement et intensive en capital humain, nous avançons que la responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise (RSE) peut servir à réguler les rapports de force entre les partenaires productifs clés de la firme. A partir de l'étude des documents officiels des quatre principaux opérateurs de téléphonie mobile en France, nous montrons que la RSE est volontairement utilisée par les entreprises pour pérenniser des relations d'emploi et de sous-traitance créatrices de richesses, à travers la mise en place de dispositifs formels et informels.human capital; boundaries of the firm; corporate governance; corporate social responsibility; French industry of telecommunications

Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration

The aim of this paper is to reconsider the link between vertical integration and disintegration which are traditionally opposed in the literature. The conception of integration and disintegration closely depends on the way we define the firm and its role. This paper focuses on human capital-intensive firms. We explain that coordination by this kind of firms is much more a coordination of productive tasks than a coordination of property rights. We argue that the role of the firm isn't to manage the hold-up problem using residual rights of control on physical assets, but to coordinate complementarities between internal and external agents, division of labour and specialization of resources. Therefore, we show that the coordinating role of the firm involves a redefinition of the link between integration and disintegration. We advance that it can not be viewed as the opposition between the two institutional modes of coordination which are hierarchy and market. Integration and disintegration must be differentiated through the tools they provide to the firm in order to govern the productive specialization of its human assets.Integration; disintegration; coordination; human capital; theory of the firm