Fixed-Parameter Algorithms for Computing Kemeny Scores - Theory and Practice

The central problem in this work is to compute a ranking of a set of elements which is "closest to" a given set of input rankings of the elements. We define "closest to" in an established way as having the minimum sum of Kendall-Tau distances to each input ranking. Unfortunately, the resulting problem Kemeny consensus is NP-hard for instances with n input rankings, n being an even integer greater than three. Nevertheless this problem plays a central role in many rank aggregation problems. It was shown that one can compute the corresponding Kemeny consensus list in f(k) + poly(n) time, being f(k) a computable function in one of the parameters "score of the consensus", "maximum distance between two input rankings", "number of candidates" and "average pairwise Kendall-Tau distance" and poly(n) a polynomial in the input size. This work will demonstrate the practical usefulness of the corresponding algorithms by applying them to randomly generated and several real-world data. Thus, we show that these fixed-parameter algorithms are not only of theoretical interest. In a more theoretical part of this work we will develop an improved fixed-parameter algorithm for the parameter "score of the consensus" having a better upper bound for the running time than previous algorithms.Comment: Studienarbei

On Parameterized Complexity of Group Activity Selection Problems on Social Networks

In Group Activity Selection Problem (GASP), players form coalitions to participate in activities and have preferences over pairs of the form (activity, group size). Recently, Igarashi et al. have initiated the study of group activity selection problems on social networks (gGASP): a group of players can engage in the same activity if the members of the group form a connected subset of the underlying communication structure. Igarashi et al. have primarily focused on Nash stable outcomes, and showed that many associated algorithmic questions are computationally hard even for very simple networks. In this paper we study the parameterized complexity of gGASP with respect to the number of activities as well as with respect to the number of players, for several solution concepts such as Nash stability, individual stability and core stability. The first parameter we consider in the number of activities. For this parameter, we propose an FPT algorithm for Nash stability for the case where the social network is acyclic and obtain a W[1]-hardness result for cliques (i.e., for classic GASP); similar results hold for individual stability. In contrast, finding a core stable outcome is hard even if the number of activities is bounded by a small constant, both for classic GASP and when the social network is a star. Another parameter we study is the number of players. While all solution concepts we consider become polynomial-time computable when this parameter is bounded by a constant, we prove W[1]-hardness results for cliques (i.e., for classic GASP).Comment: 9 pages, long version of accepted AAMAS-17 pape

Are there any nicely structured preference~profiles~nearby?

We investigate the problem of deciding whether a given preference profile is close to having a certain nice structure, as for instance single-peaked, single-caved, single-crossing, value-restricted, best-restricted, worst-restricted, medium-restricted, or group-separable profiles. We measure this distance by the number of voters or alternatives that have to be deleted to make the profile a nicely structured one. Our results classify the problem variants with respect to their computational complexity, and draw a clear line between computationally tractable (polynomial-time solvable) and computationally intractable (NP-hard) questions

Parliamentary Voting Procedures: Agenda Control, Manipulation, and Uncertainty

We study computational problems for two popular parliamentary voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. While finding successful manipulations or agenda controls is tractable for both procedures, our real-world experimental results indicate that most elections cannot be manipulated by a few voters and agenda control is typically impossible. If the voter preferences are incomplete, then finding which alternatives can possibly win is NP-hard for both procedures. Whilst deciding if an alternative necessarily wins is coNP-hard for the amendment procedure, it is polynomial-time solvable for the successive one