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    A review of Enda Brophy's study of call centre work in global capitalism. Language put to work. Published in 2018

    Supply-side peacekeeping: theories and new evidence from a panel data analysis

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    Why do nations with heterogeneous economies, geographic positions and institutions agree to dispatch their troops to remote conflict areas? This paper explores the domestic and international determinants of countries' contribution to peacekeeping operations from 1999 to 2009. Individual nations make their decision about where, when and how to send their military personnel as well as the justifications on which they base their involvement in sovereign states. Moral imperative for peacekeeping may be universally accepted but a country decision to participate is also based on self-interest combined to the geo-strategic dimension and finally constrained by political and technical considerations. Empirical results suggest that at the domestic level technical forces, such as the sustainability of multiple missions and military capabilities, all play a role. At the international level peacekeeping contributions are driven by the security threat that a conflict poses and the number of displaced people

    The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

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    We investigate how the influence of the military differs across authoritarian regimes and verify whether there are actually systematic differences in military expenditures amongst different forms of dictatorships. We argue that public choices in autocracies result from a struggle for power between the leader and the elite. Elites matter because they control the fates of dictators, since most dictators are overthrown by members of their inner circle. Both actors want to ensure their continued political influence through a favourable allocation of the government budget. Moreover, the control over the security forces gives access to troops and weaponry, and affects the ease with which elites can unseat dictators. Autocratic rulers employ different bundles of co-option and repression for staying in power, and thus differ in the extent that they are required to buy off the military. Therefore, the institutional makeup of dictatorships affects the nature of leader-elite interaction, and in turn the share of the government budget allocated to military spending. Drawing on a new data set that sorts dictatorships into 5 categories from 1960 to 2000, our empirical results suggest that while military and personalist regimes have respectively the highest and lowest level of military spending among authoritarian regimes, monarchies and single-party regimes display intermediate patterns of spending

    Identifying the Key Issues Measuring Loyalty

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    In the past researchers have chosen to measure loyalty using purely behavioural or attitudinal measures or attitude-behaviour combinations. The authors recommend that both attitudinal and behavioural loyalty should be measured to gain an appreciation of the loyalty make-up of the firm's customer base. Knowing the proportion of each type of loyalty is important as customer reactions to marketing efforts will differ depending on the factors underlying consistent purchase behaviour

    Economic Determinants of Third-Party Intervention in Civil Conflict

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    Our paper explores the economic conditions that lead third parties to intervene in ongoing internal wars. We develop a formal model that ties together some of the main forces driving the decision to interfere in a civil war, including the economic benefits accruing from the intervention and the potential costs associated with such choice. We predict that third party interventions are most likely in civil conflicts where the country at war harbors a profitable industry as a consequence of its high levels of peace-time production and state strength, while the opposition forces’ strength reduces the likelihood of intervention. We also present novel empirical results on the role of valuable goods, i.e. oil, in prompting third party military intervention in contexts of high state stability, by using a dataset on intrastate conflicts on the period 1960-1999.Intrastate Conflict; Third party intervention
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