The Solyndra case: an institutional economics perspective on the optimal role of government support for green technology development

More than three years after its highly publicized bankruptcy, Solyndra continues to resonate as an example of well-intentioned government policies gone wrong. This paper examines the Solyndra case using an institutional economics perspective to determine if the government’s relationship with the firm was optimal in achieving environmental and energy public policy goals while minimizing risk. The analysis reveals several government deviations from theory prescribed best practice, and illustrates opposing theoretical governance prescriptions for stimulating future technological innovation at the macro and micro levels

Ledelse, lønnsomhet og etikk gjennom eksemplets makt

Bedriftseiere forventer at bedriftsledere leverer en solid bunnlinje og god avkastning. I tillegg forventer interessentgrupper utenfor virksomhetene at resultatene fremkommer på en etisk forsvarlig måte. Ledere har ulike virkemidler til rådighet for å drive virksomhetene effektivt, men noen av disse virkemidlene kan samtidig virke negativt inn på bedriftenes etiske verdigrunnlag. Ledere er nødt til å ta virksomhetenes etiske verdier på alvor, for hvis de ikke gjør det, kan virksomhetene lide betydelige tap fra redusert servicekvalitet som følge av uetisk atferd. Resultatene fra studien vår viser at etikk i organisasjonssammenheng ikke er en gitt, stabil variabel, men noe ledelsen kan påvirke. Makt er et sterkt virkemiddel for å påvirke, kontrollere og utvikle effektiviteten til en virksomhet. Samtidig påvirker bruk av makt virksomhetens etiske verdier. Til tross for gode intensjoner om effektiv koordinering av virksomheten har tvangsmakt ofte en negativ effekt på virksomhetens etiske verdier. Derfor bør ledelsen unngå å bruke tvangsmakt overfor medarbeiderne sine. Studien vår viser på den annen side at gode eksempler påvirker de ansatte mer enn noe annet. Resultatene fra studien tyder på at eksemplets makt (eller referansemakt, som er det teoretiske begrepet), er det viktigste lederverktøyet når det gjelder å fremme etiske verdier og samhold i virksomheten. Det betyr at virksomhetens ledere selv må gå i spissen som gode rollemodeller for organisasjonen. På den måten fremmer de virksomhetens etiske verdier og tilfredsstiller samtidig kundenes forventninger til servicekvalitet. Denne studien viser at eksemplets makt er mye viktigere enn andre former for påvirkning fra ledelsen i et selskap

Choice of subcontractor in markets with asymmetric information: reputation and price effects

Purpose -Buyers assessing bids from suppliers of experience services face both an adverse selection and a potential moral hazard problem. The purpose of this study is to examine (1) the relative importance of various signals of supplier reputation conveying information about unobserved supplier quality, which is important for identifying the best tender; and whether price is contingent on (2) supplier reputation, and (3) on buyer’s quality sensitiveness in a competitive bidding situation. Design/methodology/approach - This study builds on a conjoint experiment where 19 contractors consider alternative scenarios representing tenders from subcontractors of plumbing services. In the scenarios the subcontractors differ on their reputation and price variables, while the contractors differ in their quality sensitiveness. Multiple regressions analyzes the contingent price effects. Findings – Although low price is generally important for subcontractor selection, quality sensitive buyers are willing to pay subcontractors a price premium to prevent quality debasement. On the other hand, despite the combined significance of supplier reputation on choice, buyers are not willing to pay price premiums to suppliers with a quality reputation. Research limitations/implications – Conjoint studies produce multiple cases but the underlying sample is limited. Therefore, this study should be regarded as preliminary and a basis for further validation on larger samples. Practical implications – In competitive bidding situations, suppliers with strong quality reputations may benefit most by low price offers. Thus, suppliers with a strong reputation should achieve profitability through a volume premium rather than a price premium effect. Suppliers opting for price premiums should target the quality sensitive segment of the market. Originality/value – In contrast to previous findings in B2B brand equity studies, but in line with findings in information economics, this study suggests that suppliers with a reputation for quality will not receive price premiums. The results indicate that in bidding contexts in B2B markets, the reputation variables may enhance rather than reduce buyers’ price sensitivity, because supplier reputation increases low price credibility

The ineffectiveness of corporate brand investments in creating price premiums

B2B branding research indicates that corporate brand equity investments will increase suppliers’ price premiums. In contrast, economics of information studies suggest suppliers’ price premiums to decrease with their brand investments. This study, building on economics of information, tests these contrasting perspectives empirically in a B2B-services context. The results show that suppliers’ corporate brand investments are ineffective in creating price premiums because brand investments and price premiums provide substituting information of unobservable quality. Furthermore, suppliers’ price premiums decrease with buyers’ willingness to punish sellers’ quality deception. In contrast, the suppliers’ price premiums increase with their provision of warranties and with their customers’ quality sensitiveness

Når "vennene" lurer deg

Nyhetsmediene rapporterer stadig saker der både organisasjons- og privatkunder føler seg lurt av svikefulle selgere ved kjøp av finansprodukter. Felles for flere av sakene er at det står velrenommerte finansinstitusjoner bak og at kundene har opplevd et nært og tillitsfullt forhold til institusjonenes selgere. Et annet fellestrekk synes å være at produktene som har vært solgt har vært komplekse og vanskelige å vurdere for kundene, og at selgerne har hatt bedre kunnskap enn kundene om risiko og mulig avkastning. Teorier innen økonomi og markedsføring skulle tilsi at tillit og nære personlige bånd samt et godt renommé burde redusere risikoen for svikefull atferd ved salg av denne type produkter. Nyere forskning viser imidlertid overraskende effekter av tillit og vennskap i forretningsforhold. Høy grad av tillit mellom selger og kjøper både på person- og bedriftsnivå kan senke kundens aktsomhet og oppmuntre til svikefull atferd. Dette kan forsterkes av incentivsystemene i finansbransjen, samt markedets begrensede sanksjoner. I motsetning til kundene synes leverandørene i flere tilfeller å hatt lite å tape på sin atferd

If the supplier’s human capital walks away, where would the customer go?

Purpose: Professional service firms’ clients often develop stronger attachments to their key contact employee than to the service firm. Since professionals are highly mobile, buyers of professional business services constantly have to decide whether to follow their key contact employee or remain with their incumbent firm, while service firms face the threat of losing customers if the employee leaves. This study examines how the key contact employee’s human capital, the social capital between the contact employee and the client, and the service company’s structural capital affect the decision whether to follow the key contact employee to another professional service firm. Methodology/Approach: The model is tested on a sample of 120 organizational buyers of advertising services by using partial last squares (PLS) - a structural equation modelling technique. Findings: Professional service firms’ investments in company specific structural capital create a deterrent for clients to follow the contact employee, because remaining with the service firm will increase clients’ return on the service providers’ structural capital. Furthermore, higher levels of structural capital reduce the value of the contact employee’s investments in human capital should the employee leave. Conversely, human capital creates motivation to follow the contact employee, while social capital only provides value in combination with human capital. 3 Research Implications: This study employs concepts developed in economics and economic sociology rather than relationship marketing variables to examine attachments to individual professional service providers and to professional service firms. Practical Implications: The findings underline the importance of competence, both at the company and individual level, for retaining clients of professional services. These results contrast previous studies emphasizing close interpersonal relationships and service firms’ relationship building activities. Originality/Value/Contribution of the Paper: Human, social, and structural capital provide value to clients and therefore apply well to professional services. Hence, these variables provide alternative explanations to service firms’ client retention or desertion than traditional relationship marketing variables do. The findings add to our understanding of service provider-client relationships in professional services and knowledge intensive firms

Byggemarkedet - et "lemons"-marked eller velfungerende marked?

Norges Takseringsforbund har gjennom en undersøkelse i oktober 2007 anslått at problemene med manglende kontroll, slurv og feil utførelse i byggefasen representerer skader på ca 13 mill NOK på årsbasis i den norske byggebransjen. Bransjen har også vært preget av en kostnadsutvikling som har vært høyere enn i andre bransjer i landet, selv i perioder uten de siste par års ekstraordinære etterspørsel, samtidig som produktivitetsveksten har vært lavere og lønnsomheten for mange av de utførende aktørene har vært lav