Land reform, poverty reduction and growth : evidence from India

In recent times there has been a renewed interest in relationships between redistribution, growth and welfare. Land reforms have been central to strategies to improve the asset base of the poor in developing countries thought their effectiveness has been hindered by political constraints on implementation. In this paper we use panel data on the sixteen main Indian states from 1958 to 1992 to consider whether the large volume of land reforms as have been legislated have had an appreciable impact on growth and poverty. The evidence presented suggests that land reforms do appear to be associated with poverty reduction

Estimating the Peace Dividend:The Impact of Violence on HousePrices in Northern Ireland

This paper exploits data on the pattern of violence across regions and over time toestimate the impact of the peace process in Northern Ireland on house prices. Webegin with a linear model that estimates the average treatment effect of a conflictrelatedkilling on house prices - showing a negative correlation between house pricesand killings. We then develop an approach based on an economic model where theparameters of the statistical process are estimated for a Markov switching modelwhere conflict and peace are treated as a latent state. From this, we are able toconstruct a measure of the discounted number of killings which is updated in thelight of actual killings. This model naturally suggests a heterogeneous effect ofkillings across space and time which we use to generate estimates of the peacedividend. The economic model suggests a somewhat different pattern of estimates tothe linear model. We also show that there is some evidence of spillover effects ofviolence in adjacent regions.Peace Dividend, Northern Ireland, Conflict, Housing Price, Markov Chain

Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of tax competition when voters use the tax policy of neighboring jurisdictions as information to evaluate the performance of their incumbent politicians. We show that this has implications both for voter tolerance of high taxes and for the process of tax setting itself, Our empirical results, which use two different tax data sets, confirm the importance of neighbors' taxes both on the probability of incumbent reelection and on tax setting behavior.

Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence

This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Since regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, regulatory policy outcomes reflect the preferences of party elites and special interests. Direct election of regulators strengthens the power of voters by ensuring the salience of regulatory issues. Using panel data on regulatory outcomes from U.S. states, we find evidence in favor of the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies.

The de Soto Effect

This paper explores the consequences of creating and improving property rights so thatfixed assets can be used as collateral. This has become a cause célèbre of Hernando de Sotowhose views are influential in debates about policy reform concerning property rights.Hence, we refer to the economic impact of such reforms as the de Soto effect. We explore thelogic of the argument for credit contracts, both in isolation, and in market equilibrium. Weshow that the impact will vary with the degree of market competition. Where competition isweak, it is possible that borrowers will be worse off when property rights improve. Wediscuss the implications for optimal policy and the political economy of policy reform.

Read My Lips: The Political Economy of Information Transmission

The paper studies credible information transmission by governments. A group of heterogenous individuals have to make private investment and labour supply decisions while relying on the government for information about investment returns. The government consists of an elected citizen who chooses a redistributive strategy in addition to providing information. We give conditions under which the outcome leads to over- or under-investment in high-return activities and the outcome is Pareto efficient.Political economy, cheap talk, redistribution, development

Property Rights and EconomicDevelopment

This chapter develops a unified analytical framework, drawing on and extending theexisting literature on the subject, for studying the role of property rights in economicdevelopment. It addresses two fundamental and related questions concerning therelationship between property rights and economic activity. (i) What are themechanisms through which property rights affect economic activity? (ii) What arethe determinants of property rights? In answering these, it surveys some of the mainempirical and theoretical ideas from the extensive literature on the topic.Property rights, Economic development.

Fragile States and Development Policy

It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a frame-work for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety of development policies in different types of states.9076:state fragility, development