Pro-poor water service strategies in developing countries: promoting justice in Uganda’s urban project

Water service to the urban poor presents challenges to political leaders, regulators and managers. We identify technology mixes of yard taps, public water points (with and without pre-paid meters) to meet alternative constraints, and reflecting populations served and investment requirements. Three investment scenarios have different implications for improving water access to over 400,000 citizens in Kampala. One component, pre-paid water meters, can promote social equity and institutional sustainability. If procedural justice is given as much weight as distributive justice in the selection of pro-poor programs, pre-paid meters (the ultimate cost recovery tool) can have a place in the investment plan. The study examines how public stand pipes (and a combination of other options) can meet both financial constraints and social objectives. Financial considerations cannot be wished away when seeking effective strategies for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.Water utility optimization; pro-poor connections; pre-paid meters; cost recovery; Africa; Uganda

Revisiting the strengths and limitations of regulatory contracts in infrastructure industries

This paper evaluates regulation by contract in public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure services. Although the benefits of competition for the market and of regulatory contracts are widely acknowledged, the literature indentifies several failures in their design. These ‘flaws’ are present in both developed and developing countries and arise in all types of contracts. This study analyses both short and long term contracts, focusing on purely contractual PPPs and institutionalized PPPs (mixed companies). The evidence suggests that for all kinds of contracts, the major problems tend to arise in the preparation of public tender documents: the ‘best’ bidder is not often the winner. The likely results include redistribution in favor of the private partner, weak incentives for high performance, and renegotiation of contracts. Moreover, risks are not allocated correctly nor is effective monitoring ensured. This review of contract procedures and design allows us to draw several implications for policy-makers and to present suggestions and recommendations for improving regulatory contracts.regulation by contract; bidding documents; contract design; risk; monitoring

Quantitative studies of water and sanitation utilities: a literature survey

This paper performs a literature update of quantitative studies of water and sanitation services (WSS). There are 190 studies which use cost or production functions to evaluate the performance of WSS utilities. The studies examine (1) the scale, scope or density economies of utilities in a particular country or region, (2) the influence of ownership on efficiency, (3) the existence and power of incentives associated with different governance systems (including external regulation), and (4) performance assessment (benchmarking). In addition, this paper presents some patterns regarding quantitative methods adopted over time and major trends in results.benchmarking; water and sanitation utilities; literature survey

Regulation and corporate corruption: new evidence from the telecom sector

This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that 1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; 2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; 3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and 4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.Telecommunications; Regulation; Corruption

Monitoring utility performance and resolving conflicts

It can be argued that there are four sources of conflict in policy development and implementation: cognitive conflicts (based on technical disagreements regarding how scientific data might be interpreted), interest conflicts (where stakeholders obtain different benefits and costs under alternative policies), values conflicts (involving ideology or personal preferences regarding outcomes), and authority conflicts (stemming from jurisdictional disagreements). These potential sources of conflict characterize most politically-charged situations, with water supply management illustrating the interplay of these forces. Strategies for managing the four conflicts are reviewed: “balancing” competing goals, cycling between different objectives, making different agencies responsible for meeting specific goals, and relying on precedents to make decisions. Benchmarking (despite its limitations) is shown to be an important tool in conflict resolution, as it documents past performance, establishes baselines for gauging improvements, and makes comparisons across service providers