The Italo–Yugoslav Conflict over Albania: A View from Belgrade, 1919–1939

YugoslaviaAfter the Great War, Yugoslavia found her most dangerous enemy in Italy, which made every effort to destabilise its Adriatic neighbour—Albania played an important role in this policy. This analysis examines the Yugoslav stance towards aggressive Italian policy, arguing that Belgrade firmly believed it a matter of utmost importance to prevent the Italians from creating a foothold in the Balkans from which they could stir Albanian irredentism in Kosovo and menace Yugoslavia in its strategically sensitive southern regions in conjunction with Bulgaria. To prevent Italian interference, Yugoslavia championed the independence of Albania with its 1913 frontiers from the Paris Peace Conference onwards: it dropped Serbia’s—Yugoslavia’s pre-war predecessor’s—territorial ambitions centred on the town of Shkodra. Yugoslav policy-makers, however, could not maintain the allegiance of Ahmed-bey Zogu, a major Albanian chieftain, who took power in Tirana with Yugoslav support; but he then turned to Rome, which was more capable of and willing to provide financial means for the maintenance of the Albanian administration than Belgrade. There were also a number of officials who favoured a more forward policy that would put northern Albania under Yugoslavia’s control and thus more efficiently keep Italian aggressive designs in check

Great Britain, the Little Entente and the Genoa Conference of 1922

This article examines the British policy towards the Little Entente alliance comprised of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania in connexion with the preparation and proceedings of the Genoa Conference of 1922. In doing so the paper challenges the usual perception of the Little Entente’s attitude towards the conference as completely pro-French and thus obstructive, and suggests that British policy-makers to a large extent misinterpreted the inclinations and intentions of the three smaller powers and failed to pursue a more positive and effective policy. The reasons for this failure are to be found in the mixture of prejudiced views regarding the alliance and misperceptions of Lloyd George

The Great War and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia: The Legacy of an Enduring Conflict

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, officially named Yugoslavia after 1929, came into being on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 after the immense war efforts and sacrifices endured by Serbia. The experience of anti-Habsburg struggle both before and after 1914 and the memory of some of the most difficult moments in the Great War left a deep imprint on the minds of policy-makers in Belgrade. As they believed that many dangers faced in the war were likely to be revived in the future, the impact of these experiences was instrumental to their post-war foreign policy and military planning. This paper looks at the specific ways in which the legacy of the Great War affected and shaped the (planned) responses of the Yugoslav government to certain crises and challenges posed to Yugoslavia and the newly-established order in the region. These concern the reaction to the two attempts of Habsburg restoration in Hungary in 1921, the importance of the Greek port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) for Yugoslavia’s strategic and defence requirements, and military planning within the framework of the Little Entente (the defensive alliance between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania) in the early 1930s. In addition, it is argued here that the legacy of Serbo-Croat differences during the war relating to the manner of their unification was apparent in the political struggle between Serbs and Croats during the two decades of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s existence

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Great Britain

This paper examines in broad lines the relations between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) throughout the two interwar decades of the latter country’s existence. The survey shows that Yugoslavia was the most important country in the Balkans and thus commanded serious attention of British diplomacy, since Yugoslav foreign policy had an impact on Great Power rivalries in South-Eastern Europe incommensurate with her size and actual strength. While Yugoslavia constantly sought security for her borders, the Foreign Office wanted to see her as a pillar of peace and stability in the region. With her permanent troubles with hostile neighbours, most notably Italy, and internal tensions, the main of which was Croat discontent, this was a difficult undertaking for the Belgrade government. The Foreign Office had a good deal of sympathy for Yugoslavia in dealing with her difficulties, but it was also highly critical of Belgrade’s inefficient and corrupt administration. In foreign affairs, Britain often took a dim view of what it perceived as Yugoslavia’s conduct of foreign policy that ran contrary to British policy of all-round appeasement in South-Eastern Europe and later, in the latter half of the 1930s, containment of Nazi Germany. This would eventually lead to British involvement in the 27 March 1941 coup d’état in Belgrade which embroiled Yugoslavia in the Second World War

The Serbian Minister in London, Mateja Bošković, the Yugoslav Committee, and Serbia's Yugoslav Policy in the Great War, 1914-1916

This paper seeks to examine the outlook of the Serbian Minister in London, Mateja Mata Bošković, during the first half of the Great War on the South Slav (Yugoslav) question – a unification of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a single state, which was Serbia’s war aim. He found himself in close contact with the members of the Yugoslav Committee, an organisation of the irredentist Yugoslav émigrés from Austria-Hungary in which two Croat politicians, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, were leading figures. In stark contrast to other Serbian diplomats, Bošković was not enthusiastic about Yugoslav unification. He suspected the Croat émigrés, especially Supilo, of pursuing exclusive Croat interests under the ruse of the Yugoslav programme. His dealings with them were made more difficult on account of the siding of a group of British “friends of Serbia”, the most prominent of which were Robert William Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed, with the Croat émigrés. Though not opposed in principle to an integral Yugoslav unification, Bošković preferred staunch defence of Serbian Macedonia from Bulgarian ambitions and the acquisition of Serb-populated provinces in southern Hungary, while in the west he seems to have been content with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, part of Slavonia and an outlet to the Adriatic Sea in Dalmatia. Finally, the reception of and reaction to Bošković’s reports on the part of the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, clearly shows that the latter was determined to persist in his Yugoslav policy, despite the Treaty of London which assigned large parts of the Slovene and Croat lands to Italy and made the creation of Yugoslavia an unlikely proposition. In other words, Pašić did not vacillate between the “small” and the “large programme”, between Yugoslavia and Greater Serbia, as it has been often alleged in historiography and public discourse

The Port of Salonica in Yugoslav Foreign Policy 1919–1941

This paper explores the importance of the Greek port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) for Yugoslav foreign policy-makers during the interwar period. It suggests that, apart from economic interests, namely securing trade facilities in the port and transport facilities offered by the Ghevgheli-Salonica railway connecting the Yugo­slav territory with Salonica, there were security considerations which accounted for Belgrade's special interest in this matter. These stemmed from two reasons - Serbia's painful experience from the Great War on which occasion the cutting off of the route for Salonica had had dire consequences for the Serbian Army and the post-war strategic situation whereby Yugoslavia was nearly ringed by hostile and potentially hostile neighbours which was a constant reminder of the immediate past and made both political and military leadership envisage a potential renewed need to retreat to Salonica in a general conflict. The events prior to and during the Second World War seem to have vindicated such preoccupations of Yugoslav policy-makers. All the Great Powers involved in the conflict in the Balkans realised the significance attached to Salonica in Belgrade and tried to utilise it for their own ends. Throughout these turbulent events Prince Paul and his government did not demonstrate an inclination to exploit the situation in order to achieve territorial aggrandisement but rather reacted with restraint being vitally concerned that neither Italy nor Germany took possession of Salonica and thus encircled Yugoslavia completely leaving her at their mercy

Nikola Pašić and the Foreign Policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1919-1926

This paper looks at Nikola Pašić’s views of and contribution to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS/Yugoslavia after1929) during the latest phase of his political career, a subject that has been neglected by historians. His activities in this field are divided into two periods – during the Paris Peace Conference where he was the head of the SCS Kingdom’s delegation and after 1921 when he became Prime Minister, who also served as his own Foreign Minister. During the peace conference, Pašić held strong views on all the major problems that faced his delegation, particularly the troubled delimitation with Italy in the Adriatic. In early 1920, he alone favoured the acceptance of the so-called Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum, believing that the time was working against the SCS Kingdom. The Rapallo Treaty with Italy late that year proved him right. Upon taking the reins of government, Pašić was energetic in opposing the two restoration attempts of Karl Habsburg in Hungary and persistent in trying to obtain northern parts of the still unsettled Albania. In time, his hold on foreign policy was weakening, as King Alexander asserted his influence, especially through the agency of Momčilo Ninčić, Foreign Minister after January 1922. Pašić was tougher that King and Ninčić in the negotiations with Mussolini for the final settlement of the status of the Adriatic town of Fiume and the parallel conclusion of the 27 January 1924 friendship treaty (the Pact of Rome). Since domestic politics absorbed much of his time and energy, the old Prime Minister was later even less visible in foreign policy. He was forced to resign in April 1926 on account of his son’s corruption scandal shortly before the final break-down of relations with Italy