Getting to Know the Other: Niqab-Wearing Women in Liberal Democracies

Governments around the world have gone to great lengths to discourage and prohibit wearing of the niqab, often relying on the justification that this form of Muslim women’s dress represents and produces the oppression of women. Setting aside that these prohibitions are themselves detrimental to women’s equality, this article focuses on the voices of women who wear the niqab or face veil. I describe and analyze how women explain their decision to wear the niqab based on interviews in seven liberal democracies. For most women, the primary motivation for wearing the niqab is religious, though supplementary reasons are also offered. The niqab is an embodied practice that represents a personal spiritual journey. Women’s explanations for why and when they wear the niqab suggest a complex intermingling of doctrinal knowledge and practical lived experience that negotiates religion day to day. Women often pair their religious agency with a sophisticated rights-based framework to justify their sartorial choices. Women refute the idea that the niqab makes them submissive. Their empowered interpretations of their religion and their conviction to lead a life that is different from most, in countries with pervasive anti-Muslim racism, suggest a great deal of independence and courage. This research offers nuance to the depiction of women who are typically portrayed monotonously, dispelling inaccurate stereotypes used to support discriminatory decision making about niqab-wearing women

23. What’s in a Face? Demeanour Evidence in the Sexual Assault Context

Natasha Bakht’s chapter examines another manifestation of law’s understanding of sexual assault — the need to test the credibility of complainants — this time expressed by a claim that Muslim women must remove their niqabs so that their “demeanour” can be scrutinized. Many authors in this collection have explored this constant in sexual assault: from the moment of reporting to police through to the criminal trial, women’s accounts are disbelieved and filtered by police “unfounding” rates that are simply not comparable for other crimes, as explained by Teresa DuBois in Chapter Nine, and by other forms of “credibility-testing,” such as the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit discussed by Jane Doe in Chapter Sixteen. Natasha’s analysis joins with that pursued by Maria Campbell, Tracey Lindberg, and Priscilla Campeau in Chapter Five by exploring the role of racism and colonialism in marginalizing and stigmatizing complainants. She argues here that the demand that Muslim women “take off their clothes” in order to testify to their experience of sexual assault amounts to cultural and religious discrimination and to yet another form of “whacking the complainant” by defence lawyer

“The Earth is Our Mother”: Freedom of Religion and the Preservation of Indigenous Sacred Sites in Canada

For centuries, the Canadian state engaged in systematic religious persecution of Indigenous peoples through legal prohibitions, coercive residential schooling, and the dispossession and destruction of sacred sites. Though the Canadian government has abandoned the criminalization of Indigenous religious practices and is beginning to come to grips with the devastating legacy of residential schools, it continues to permit the destruction and desecration of Indigenous sacred sites. Sacred sites play a crucial role in most Indigenous cosmologies and communities; they are as necessary to Indigenous religions as human-made places of worship are to other religious traditions. The ongoing case of Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations) represents the first opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to consider whether the destruction of an Indigenous sacred site constitutes a violation of freedom of religion under subsection 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Building on the ground-breaking work of John Borrows and Sarah Morales, we will argue that Indigenous spiritual traditions have a home in this provision and merit a level of protection equal to that enjoyed by other faith groups in Canada. In general, subsection 2(a) will be infringed by non-trivial state (or state-sponsored) interference with an Indigenous sacred site. Moreover, the approval of commercial or industrial development on an Indigenous sacred site without consent and compensation will generally be unjustifiable under section 1 of the Charter. Recognition of these principles would signal respect for the equal religious citizenship of Indigenous Canadians.Pendant des siècles, l’État canadien a systématiquement participé à la persécution religieuse des peuples autochtones à travers la mise en place d’interdictions juridiques, de pensionnats indiens coercitifs et par la dépossession et la destruction de leurs sites sacrés. Bien que le gouvernement canadien ait abandonné la criminalisation des pratiques religieuses autochtones et qu’il se soit décidé à faire face à l’héritage dévastateur des pensionnats indiens, il continue de permettre la destruction et la profanation des sites autochtones sacrés. Ces lieux sacrés jouent un rôle crucial dans la plupart des cosmologies et communautés autochtones; pour les religions autochtones, ils sont aussi nécessaires que les lieux de culte bâtis par les individus d’autres traditions religieuses. L’affaire en cours Nation Ktunaxa c. Colombie-Britannique représente la première occasion pour la Cour Suprême du Canada de se prononcer quant à savoir si la destruction d’un site autochtone sacré constitue une violation de la liberté de religion reconnue par l’article 2(a) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. En nous appuyant sur travaux innovateurs de John Borrows et Sarah Morales, nous argumenterons que les traditions spirituelles autochtones sont protégées par une telle disposition et qu’elles méritent un niveau de protection égal à celui conféré aux autres groupes religieux du Canada. En général, l’entrave non négligable de lieux de culte autochtones par l’État (ou par les programmes subventionnés par l’État) constituent une violation de l’article 2(a). De plus, l’approbation sans consentement ni compensation de développements commerciaux et industriels sur des sites sacrés autochtones ne pourra être justifié en vertu de l’article 1. La reconnaissance de ces principes signalerait le respect de la citoyenneté religieuse égale des peuples autochtones au Canada

“The Earth is Our Mother”: Freedom of Religion and the Preservation of Indigenous Sacred Sites in Canada

For centuries, the Canadian state engaged in systematic religious persecution of Indigenous peoples through legal prohibitions, coercive residential schooling, and the dispossession and destruction of sacred sites. Though the Canadian government has abandoned the criminalization of Indigenous religious practices and is beginning to come to grips with the devastating legacy of residential schools, it continues to permit the destruction and desecration of Indigenous sacred sites. Sacred sites play a crucial role in most Indigenous cosmologies and communities; they are as necessary to Indigenous religions as human-made places of worship are to other religious traditions. The ongoing case of Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations) represents the first opportunity for the Supreme Court of Canada to consider whether the destruction of an Indigenous sacred site constitutes a violation of freedom of religion under subsection 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Building on the ground-breaking work of John Borrows and Sarah Morales, we will argue that Indigenous spiritual traditions have a home in this provision and merit a level of protection equal to that enjoyed by other faith groups in Canada. In general, subsection 2(a) will be infringed by non-trivial state (or state-sponsored) interference with an Indigenous sacred site. Moreover, the approval of commercial or industrial development on an Indigenous sacred site without consent and compensation will generally be unjustifiable under section 1 of the Charter. Recognition of these principles would signal respect for the equal religious citizenship of Indigenous Canadians.Pendant des siècles, l’État canadien a systématiquement participé à la persécution religieuse des peuples autochtones à travers la mise en place d’interdictions juridiques, de pensionnats indiens coercitifs et par la dépossession et la destruction de leurs sites sacrés. Bien que le gouvernement canadien ait abandonné la criminalisation des pratiques religieuses autochtones et qu’il se soit décidé à faire face à l’héritage dévastateur des pensionnats indiens, il continue de permettre la destruction et la profanation des sites autochtones sacrés. Ces lieux sacrés jouent un rôle crucial dans la plupart des cosmologies et communautés autochtones; pour les religions autochtones, ils sont aussi nécessaires que les lieux de culte bâtis par les individus d’autres traditions religieuses. L’affaire en cours Nation Ktunaxa c. Colombie-Britannique représente la première occasion pour la Cour Suprême du Canada de se prononcer quant à savoir si la destruction d’un site autochtone sacré constitue une violation de la liberté de religion reconnue par l’article 2(a) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés. En nous appuyant sur travaux innovateurs de John Borrows et Sarah Morales, nous argumenterons que les traditions spirituelles autochtones sont protégées par une telle disposition et qu’elles méritent un niveau de protection égal à celui conféré aux autres groupes religieux du Canada. En général, l’entrave non négligable de lieux de culte autochtones par l’État (ou par les programmes subventionnés par l’État) constituent une violation de l’article 2(a). De plus, l’approbation sans consentement ni compensation de développements commerciaux et industriels sur des sites sacrés autochtones ne pourra être justifié en vertu de l’article 1. La reconnaissance de ces principes signalerait le respect de la citoyenneté religieuse égale des peuples autochtones au Canada

Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary, Second Edition

Significantly revised and completely updated (to 31 March 2015), the second edition of Families and the Law continues to offer readers an in-depth discussion of issues in family law within a socio-legal context. It examines legal regulation of families and family members in three main contexts: the formation of families (through relationships of marriage or cohabitation, or the creation of parent–child relationships), legal intervention in intact families (including responsibilities for care and protection of children, domestic violence and elder abuse), and the dissolution of families at divorce or separation (including issues about family law bargaining and other forms of dispute resolution, and legal issues concerning property sharing, ongoing custody and care of children, and spousal and child support). Throughout the book, there are references to critical, comparative, and interdisciplinary literature about family law, opportunities for applying principles and engaging in problem solving, and questions and commentary about the need for legal and social change in relation to family law issues. For all who study family law in Canada, this book is an invaluable resource — providing a highly comprehensive treatment of “families” and “law,” as well as an informed and critical context for understanding both the history and more contemporary and future challenges for such relationships. A class-tested, carefully-considered collection of cases and commentary, Families and the Law is a stimulating learning resource, perfect as a primary or secondary text for courses on family law, legal studies, and law and society programs, and an invaluable resource for all who study family law in Canada.https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/faculty_books/1313/thumbnail.jp

Families and the Law: Cases and Commentary, Third Edition

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/faculty_books/1391/thumbnail.jp