A Mutant Ahr Allele Protects the Embryonic Kidney from Hydrocarbon-Induced Deficits in Fetal Programming

Background: The use of experimental model systems has expedited the elucidation of pathogenetic mechanisms of renal developmental disease in humans and the identification of genes that orchestrate developmental programming during nephrogenesis

No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate Reorganizations

Bankruptcy scholarship is largely a debate about the comparative merits of a mandatory regime on one hand and bankruptcy by free design on the other. By the standard account, the current law of corporate reorganization is mandatory. Various rules that cannot be avoided ensure that investors’ actions are limited and they do not exercise their rights against specialized assets in a way that destroys the value of a business as a whole. These rules solve collective action problems and reduce the risk of bargaining failure. But there are costs to a mandatory regime. In particular, investors cannot design their rights to achieve optimal monitoring as they could in a system of bankruptcy by free design. This Article suggests that the academic debate has missed a fundamental feature of the law. Bankruptcy operates on legal entities, not on firms in the economic sense. For this reason, sophisticated investors do not face a mandatory regime at all. The ability of investors to place assets in separate entities gives them the ability to create specific withdrawal rights in the event the firm encounters financial distress. There is nothing mandatory about rules like the automatic stay when assets can be partitioned off into legal entities that are beyond the reach of the bankruptcy judge. Thus, by partitioning assets of one economic enterprise into different legal entities, investors can create a tailored bankruptcy regime. In this way, legal entities serve as building blocks that can be combined to create specific and varied but transparent investor withdrawal rights. This regime of tailored bankruptcy has been unrecognized and underappreciated and may be preferable to both mandatory and free design regimes. By allowing a limited number of investors to opt out of bankruptcy in a particular, discrete, and visible way, investors as a group may be able to both limit the risk of bargaining failure and at the same time enjoy the disciplining effect that a withdrawal right brings with it

Explaining Institutional Change: Why Elected Politicians Implement Direct Democracy

In existing models of direct democratic institutions, the median voter benefits, but representative politicians are harmed since their policy choices can be overridden. This is a puzzle, since representative politicians were instrumental in creating these institutions. I build a model of direct democracy that explains why a representative might benefit from tying his or her own hands in this way. The key features are (1) that voters are uncertain about their representative's preferences; (2) that direct and representative elections are complementary ways for voters to control outcomes. The model shows that some politicians benefit from the introduction of direct democracy, since they are more likely to survive representative elections: direct democracy credibly prevents politicians from realising extreme outcomes. Historical evidence from the introduction of the initiative, referendum and recall in America broadly supports the theory, which also explains two empirical results that have puzzled scholars: legislators are trusted less, but reelected more, in US states with direct democracy. I conclude by discussing the potential for incomplete information and signaling models to improve our understanding of institutional change more generally

Technology Transfers and the Clean Development Mechanism in a North-South General Equilibrium Model

This paper analyzes the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world economy comprising two regions, North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). As our model allows for labor mobility between the formal and informal sectors in the South, we are also able to capture additional aspects of how the transfer influences the Southern economy. In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a global social planner, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement to an otherwise uncontrolled market economy, the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions

The Signal of Regard: William Godwin’s Correspondence Networks

© 2019, © 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. The letter is a gift of attention, in which the writer seeks to communicate regard by means of a signal crafted uniquely for the recipient. The concept of regard, as developed by the economic historian Avner Offer, indicates both attention and approbation. Adam Smith took it to be the driver of human exchange in emotions as much as in commerce. The exchange of regard captures the logic of a prodigious correspondent like William Godwin. The personalization of the gift signal is an attempt to convey an obligation to reciprocate. Godwin was attuned to this obligation and worked hard to fulfil it—with varying degrees of success. His correspondents encompassed almost every significant literary and political figure on the political left from the era of the French Revolution to the 1832 Reform Act. The children of the Godwin household were nourished by bonds of reciprocity, which they developed and extended when, in adulthood, they dispersed across Europe. The letters of Godwin and his correspondents embody a larger conversation, allowing intimacy to be preserved at a distance. The signals they once created for each other may now be received by us

Fine mapping of regulatory loci for mammalian gene expression using radiation hybrids

We mapped regulatory loci for nearly all protein-coding genes in mammals using comparative genomic hybridization and expression array measurements from a panel of mouse–hamster radiation hybrid cell lines. The large number of breaks in the mouse chromosomes and the dense genotyping of the panel allowed extremely sharp mapping of loci. As the regulatory loci result from extra gene dosage, we call them copy number expression quantitative trait loci, or ceQTLs. The −2log(10)P support interval for the ceQTLs was <150 kb, containing an average of <2–3 genes. We identified 29,769 trans ceQTLs with −log(10)P > 4, including 13 hotspots each regulating >100 genes in trans. Further, this work identifies 2,761 trans ceQTLs harboring no known genes, and provides evidence for a mode of gene expression autoregulation specific to the X chromosome

Making Sense of Institutional Change in China: The Cultural Dimension of Economic Growth and Modernization

Building on a new model of institutions proposed by Aoki and the systemic approach to economic civilizations outlined by Kuran, this paper attempts an analysis of the cultural foundations of recent Chinese economic development. I argue that the cultural impact needs to be conceived as a creative process that involves linguistic entities and other public social items in order to provide integrative meaning to economic interactions and identities to different agents involved. I focus on three phenomena that stand at the center of economic culture in China, networks, localism and modernism. I eschew the standard dualism of individualism vs. collectivism in favour of a more detailed view on the self in social relationships. The Chinese pattern of social relations, guanxi, is also a constituent of localism, i.e. a peculiar arrangement and resulting dynamics of central-local interactions in governing the economy. Localism is balanced by culturalist controls of the center, which in contemporary China builds on the worldview of modernism. Thus, economic modernization is a cultural phenomenon on its own sake. I summarize these interactions in a process analysis based on Aoki's framework