Bank Credit and the 2008 Financial Crisis: A cross-country Comparison

The purpose of this paper is to empirically study the macroeconomic, structural and banking determinants of bank credit growth in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Using standard cross-section econometric techniques on a sample covering over 80 countries, analyzed in the period from January 2002 to May 2009, this paper finds that larger bank credit booms in the 24 months before the crisis and lower GDP growth of main trading partners after are among the most relevant determinants of the post-crisis bank credit slowdown. Structural variables such as financial depth and integration were also important determinants of bank credit growth after the crisis. Finally, countercyclical monetary policy and liquidity played a critical role in alleviating bank credit contraction after the 2008 financial crisis, suggesting that countries should pursue appropriate institutional and macroeconomic frameworks conducive to countercyclical monetary policies.

Political Instability and Inflation Volatility

The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the causes of the worldwide diversity of inflation volatility. We show that higher degrees of political instability, ideological polarization and political fragmentation are associated with higher inflation volatility.Inflation, volatility, political instability, institutions.

Does Political Instability lead to higher and more volatile inflation? A Panel Data Analysis

Economists generally accept the proposition that high and volatile inflation rates generate inefficiencies that reduce society’s welfare. Furthermore, studies have shown that inflation is harmful to economic growth. However, determining the causes of the worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences is an important challenge not yet satisfactorily confronted by the profession. Based on a broad dataset covering over 100 countries for the period 1975-1997 and using dynamic and static panel data econometric techniques, this paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associated with both higher inflation levels and volatility. Not only does this paper advance the political economy literature establishing a relationship between inflation moments and political instability, but it also has important policy implications regarding the optimal design of inflation stabilization programs and of the institutions favorable to price stability.Inflation, volatility, political instability, institutions.

The Political Economy of Seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960-1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and socially-polarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater economic freedom as a means to lower the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits. Classification-JEL: E31, E63.Seigniorage, political instability, institutions.

How does political instability affect economic growth?

The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the effects of political instability on economic growth. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample covering up to 169 countries, and 5-year periods from 1960 to 2004, we find that higher degrees of political instability are associated with lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Regarding the channels of transmission, we find that political instability adversely affects growth by lowering the rates of productivity growth and, to a smaller degree, physical and human capital accumulation. Finally, economic freedom and ethnic homogeneity are beneficial to growth, while democracy may have a small negative effect.Economic growth, political instability, growth accounting, productivity

Political instability and inflation volatility

The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the causes of the worldwide diversity of inflation volatility. We show that higher degrees of political instability, ideological polarization and political fragmentation are associated with higher inflation volatility

The political economy of seigniorage

While most economists agree that seigniorage is one way governments finance deficits, there is less agreement about the political, institutional and economic reasons for relying on it. This paper investigates the main political and institutional determinants of seigniorage using panel data on about 100 countries, for the period 1960-1999. Estimates show that greater political instability leads to higher seigniorage, especially in developing, less democratic and sociallypolarized countries, with high inflation, low access to domestic and external debt financing and with higher turnover of central bank presidents. One important policy implication of this study is the need to develop institutions conducive to greater political stability as a means to reduce the reliance on seigniorage financing of public deficits

Does political instability lead to higher and more volatile inflation?: A panel data analysis

Economists generally accept the proposition that high and volatile inflation rates generate inefficiencies that reduce society’s welfare. Furthermore studies have shown that inflation is harmful to economic growth. However determining the causes of the worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences is an important challenge not yet satisfactorily confronted by the profession. Based on a broad dataset covering over 100 countries for the period 1975-1997 and using dynamic and static panel data econometric techniques, this paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associated with both higher inflation levels and volatility. Not only does this paper advance the political economy literature establishing a relationship between inflation moments and political instability, but it also has important policy implications regarding the optimal design of inflation stabilization programs and of the institutions favorable to price stability

Does Political Instability lead to higher and more volatile inflation? A Panel Data Analysis

Economists generally accept the proposition that high and volatile inflation rates generate inefficiencies that reduce societys welfare. Furthermore, studies have shown that inflation is harmful to economic growth. However, determining the causes of the worldwide diversity of inflationary experiences is an important challenge not yet satisfactorily confronted by the profession. Based on a broad dataset covering over 100 countries for the period 1975-1997 and using dynamic and static panel data econometric techniques, this paper shows that a higher degree of political instability is associated with both higher inflation levels and volatility. Not only does this paper advance the political economy literature establishing a relationship between inflation moments and political instability, but it also has important policy implications regarding the optimal design of inflation stabilization programs and of the institutions favorable to price stability.Inflation, Volatility, Political instability, Institutions