The Limits of the Dialogue Model of Argument

The paper starts from scepticism that all argumentation is dialogical or that all dialogue types are argumentation. The hypothesis is that the concepts of dialectic and dialogue are not isomorphic, at least as applied to argumentation. The paper will cover: (a) a review of the conceptions of dialectic and of dialogue in the argumentation literature, (b) an analysis of these concepts, (c) a critical assessment of the limits of the discussion of dialogue as a model for argumentation (d) a discussion of alternative models of argumentation, (e) an exploration of the implications of the proposed models for the relation between argument and rhetori

The “Logic” of Informal Logic

Are there any logical norms for argument evaluation besides soundness and inductive strength? The paper will look at several concepts or models introduced over the years, including those of Wisdom, Toulmin, Wellman, Rescher, defeasible reasoning proponents and Walton to consider whether there is common ground among them that supplies an alternative to deductive validity and inductive strength

A Theory of Normative Reasoning Schemes

Even with Kientpointer\u27s and Walton\u27s valuable work, we do not yet have a complete theory of argument schemes. A complete theory of argument schemes should contain at least the following: its theoretical motivation, the denotation of argument or ar gumentation used in the theory, an analysis of the concept of an argument scheme, a theory of classification of argument schemes, a solution to the problem of identifying which scheme is correct, and an account of the grounds of the normativity or normat ive argument schemes. The paper will supply these elements, worked out as fully as space permits

‘Argument’ and ‘Logic’ in Logic Textbooks

This paper reports the findings of an investigation into the conceptions of logic, argument and related concepts to be found in a number of English-language logic textbooks published over the last half-century, and it offers an analysis of the findings

The Philosophy of Argument

The paper argues that argument and argumentation deserve philosophical attention but do not receive it, and proposes some explanations. It then asks whether there is a field of philosophy, “philosophy of argument,” that might attract philosophers’ attention. A case is made that such a field exists. However, challenges to that case seriously undermine it. Thus those who want philosophers to pay more attention to argument must find other ways to make their case