Hidden regret in insurance markets: adverse and advantageous selection

We examine insurance markets with two types of customers: those who regret suboptimal decisions and those who don.t. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any equilibrium includes a contract which is o¤ered but not purchased

Galston on Religion, Conscience, and the Case for Accommodation

So these are some reasons why political theory might dictate that religious dissenters be accommodated even though, by enacting the laws to which the dissenters object, government indicates that it believes the dissenters err. If political theory justifies religious accommodations, however, then when government acts on the basis of political theory, is it establishing a religion? Bill argues, in support of Seeger, that claims of conscience derived from moral theory can qualify for accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause. But the two religion clauses in the Constitution use the noun “religion” only once. So if claims of conscience derived from a moral theory can qualify for exemptions under the Free Exercise clause, then when government acts to implement a moral theory and its commands, why is it not establishing a religion? For if I have a deep seated belief that some civil policy is wrong, and my belief is one equivalent to a religious belief, then why should I not regard the government as establishing a religion, and a false one at that

The Misconceived Search for the Meani of Speech in Freedom of Speech

In this (very) short essay, I establish these points: All speech is symbolic; any conduct can be used to communicate a message (i.e., symbolically); government\u27s purpose in regulating, and not a speaker\u27s intention to communicate, defines the realm of freedom of expression; and determining the value of speech has a denominator problem

Constitutional Theories: A Taxonomy and (Implicit) Critique

I am honored to have been invited to present this Madison Lecture, and I want to thank my hosts, Robby George and Brad Wilson, for their hospitality and for the excellence achieved by the Madison Program under their stewardship. My charge was to present something on constitutional theory. Now, as you shall see, I do work in one corner of constitutional theory, and of course I believe it is the right corner to work in and that all constitutional theorists should be working in my corner. The baleful truth, however, is that most constitutional theorists reject that claim, despite several articles of mine urging them to do otherwise. So, to date, I have failed in my normative aspirations regarding constitutional theory, and this lecture will steer clear of preaching to the unconverted. What I intend to do instead is to categorize the extant approaches to constitutional theory, including mine. I am going to taxonomize rather than criticize; although, I confess, some criticisms will seep through, albeit mainly implicitly

Response to Professor Kent Greenawalt\u27s Lecture

The discussion of law and religion can take various forms. One form is conceptual: What is religion? How are religious claims different from moral claims or metaphysical ones? Is the method of evaluating religious claims for their truth - the epistemology of religious claims - different from the methods of evaluation of moral claims or metaphysical ones

Introduction to the 2004 Editors’ Symposium: What Is Legal Interpretation?

Professor Alexander provides a brief introduction to the 2004 Editors\u27 Symposium titled What is Legal Interpretation

Introduction to the 2007 Editors’ Symposium: Informational Privacy: Philosophical Foundations and Legal Implications

The outstanding collection of articles and comments thereon that follows this Introduction constitutes the 2007 Editors\u27 Symposium of the San Diego Law Review. This year\u27s theme is: Informational Privacy: Philosophical Foundations and Legal Implications

Book Review: Liberal Neutrality. Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Andrew Reeve.

Book review: Liberal Neutrality. Edited by Robert E. Goodin and Andrew Reeve. London and New York: Routledge. 1989. Pp. 219. Reviewed by: Larry Alexander

The Most Persuasive Frankfurt Example and What It Shows: Or Why Determinis Is Not the Greatest Threat to Moral Responsibility

In this paper I argue that even if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) is satisfied, moral responsibility is more seriously threatened ifthe Principle of Alternative Possible Reasons (PAPR) is not satisfied. Nor, I argue, is it clear how it could be satisfied. Finally, I suggest that not only moral responsibility, but also normativity itself, is threatened by the failure to satisfy PAPR